Free Docket Annotation - District Court of Connecticut - Connecticut

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT SONY ELECTRONICS, INC. et al., Plaintiffs, v. SOUNDVIEW TECHNOLOGIES, INC. et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) LEAD DOCKET NO. 3:00-CV-00754 (JBA) U.S.D.C./New Haven MEMBER CASE NOS. 3:00-CV-768 (JBA) 3:00-CV-981 (JBA) ALL CASES MARCH 29, 2005

SOUNDVIEW'S OPPOSITION TO SHARP'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER I. THIS COURT'S RULING ON SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION DISPOSES OF ALL OF SHARP'S ARGUMENTS This Court's Ruling (Dkt. # 476) dismissing Sharp's inequitable conduct counterclaims was correct. Even Sharp does not dispute the principal ground on which the decision rests ­ that there is no subject matter jurisdiction over Sharp's moot inequitable conduct declaratory judgment claim. "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998), quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 7 Wall.

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506, 514 (1869). That principle, upheld for a century and a half, is why each federal court has a "special obligation" to satisfy itself that subject matter jurisdiction exists: where there is no jurisdiction, the merits of the action cannot even be reached. Steel Co. 523 U.S. at 95-97. This Court need go no further to reject Sharp's motion for reconsideration ­ indeed, as the Supreme Court held in McArdle and recently reaffirmed in Steel Company, this Court actually cannot go any further. For that reason alone, Sharp's motion must be denied. Nor would Sharp's specific arguments fare any better, even if this Court had power to consider them. II. SHARP'S CHANGE OF POSITION COMES TOO LATE For the first time, Sharp now says it "is not seeking a decision on Sharp's unenforceability counterclaim that the Soundview patent is unenforceable." (Sharp Br. 4). This surprising about-face comes too late. For instance, what claim was Sharp urging toward trial other than the counterclaim it now says (for the first time) that it was not pursuing? Sharp's belated attempt to revise its counterclaim is another reason to deny its motion for reconsideration. Motions for reconsideration are not the place to try out new arguments and changed positions like the one Sharp now urges on this Court.

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"A motion for reconsideration cannot be employed as a vehicle for asserting new arguments or for introducing new evidence that could have been adduced during the pendency" of the underlying motion. Lo Sacco v. Middletown, 822 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Conn. 1993). "The scope of review on motions for reconsideration is limited to ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging gaps of a lost motion with additional matters." Id. (quotation omitted). Seaford Stamford Investor Associates, Inc. v. Thinkdirectmarketing, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1688, *2-*3 (D. Conn. 2004). At best, Sharp's motion is no more than a futile attempt at "plugging gaps of [its] lost motion with additional matters." For that reason alone, it should be denied.

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III.

SHARP COULD NOT MEET THE "STRICT STANDARD" FOR RECONSIDERATION EVEN IF IT WERE NOT TRYING IMPROPERLY TO REVISE ITS FAILED COUNTERCLAIM The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict. Reconsideration "will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked-matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995), see also United States v. Sanchez, 35 F.3d 673, 677 (2d Cir. 1994) (granting reconsideration is appropriate when a "need is shown to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice."). A "motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.

Seaford, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS1688, *2; Wood v. FBI, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25438, * 2 (D. Conn. 2004) (Arterton, J.) ("The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked ...") (emphasis added). As shown in Section V, below, in this instance Sharp has identified no "controlling decision ... that the court overlooked" ­ it merely disagrees with the Court's interpretation of those decisions. reconsideration. That is not a proper basis for

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IV.

SHARP MISSTATES THE BASIS FOR THE COURT'S RULING Sharp contends its motion is based on the "need to correct a clear error of

law." (Sharp Mem. 1). But Sharp misstates the "fundamental basis" for the Court's Ruling. Sharp says the "fundamental basis" of the Court's decision was its

observation that "Section 285, however, is not an independent basis for jurisdiction." (Sharp Mem. 2, quoting Ruling at 5). Sharp then cites cases in which courts have labeled a Section 285 request a "claim," and in which courts have adjudicated that "claim" post-judgment and post-appeal. Hence, Sharp contends the Court was in error to hold Section 285 is not an independent basis for jurisdiction, despite the holding of the Supreme Court to the contrary (see Section VII, below). In this way, Sharp twists the Court's words to make it appear as if the Court issued a different ruling from the one it actually issued. Contrary to Sharp's

arguments, the Court did not rule that mootness of the inequitable conduct claim meant that Sharp had no jurisdictional basis whatsoever for seeking attorneys fees. The part of the Ruling Sharp did not bother to quote makes this clear: Section 285, however, is not an independent basis for jurisdiction, providing only that "the court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." Thus, Sharp is entitled to seek attorney fees on the underlying litigation on which Sharp has prevailed, but cannot create more litigation that is otherwise moot merely to create an alternative basis for attorneys fees.

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(Ruling, Dkt. No. 476, at 5). Hence, the Court stated Sharp was entitled to seek fees. However, "[n]one of the cases relied on by Sharp requires that a court that would otherwise be deprived of jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judgment counterclaim must nonetheless hear the claim solely as a basis for attorneys fees." (Ruling, Dkt. No. 476, at 5-6). As shown, rather than stating that mootness meant Sharp could not go forward with any Section 285 fee request, the Court stated the opposite. The Court confirmed that Sharp has a jurisdictional basis to go forward with such a request. Sharp simply ignores that the Court's Ruling addresses a different question: what matters may the Court hear and decide en route to deciding that request. The Court correctly held that it cannot hear a moot declaratory judgment claim (i.e., for inequitable conduct) over which it has no jurisdiction, just to investigate whether a previously-unlitigated basis for attorneys fees might exist. V. SHARP "SEEKS SOLELY TO RELITIGATE AN ISSUE ALREADY DECIDED" Sharp's caselaw is not new; and it has not shown that the Court previously ignored the cases Sharp now cites. Instead, Sharp "seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided," which is not a proper basis for reconsideration. Seaford, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS1688, *2. Specifically, Sharp cites H.R. Technologies, Inc. v. Astechnologies, Inc., 275 F.3d 1378, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2002), Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1995), Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318,

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1330 (Fed. Cir. 1998), Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratoties, 339 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2003) and Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 182 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Sharp already cited these cases in briefing leading to the Ruling. Soundview's previous Reply Brief explained why they do not preclude the result the Court correctly reached. The Court's ruling is instead consistent with the closest persuasive authority: SVG Lithography Systems, Inc. v. Ultratech Stepper, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26-27 (D. Mass. 2004). In SVG, the patentee's actions deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction (namely, the patentee's covenant not to sue and simultaneous submission of a Rule 41 voluntary-dismissal motion). The accused infringer, like Sharp here, insisted on urging its "claim" for attorneys fees under Section 285. The SVG court ruled exactly the same way this Court did when confronted with the issue: Finally, Ultratech argues that this court should not dismiss the claims and counterclaims in this case because Ultratech seeks an award of attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and SVGL should not be able to avoid this liability by dismissing its claims. The Federal Circuit "and other [court]s have established that there cannot be an award of attorneys' fees unless the court has jurisdiction of the action." Hudson v. Principi, 260 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001). . . . [T]he court's decision regarding whether it has subject matter jurisdiction cannot turn on the impact it may have on Ultratech's claim that this is an exceptional case justifying an award of attorneys' fees under § 285. SVG, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27. Hence, this Court is not alone in holding that Section 285 cannot bootstrap jurisdiction to hear a matter where it is otherwise absent. There can be no "clear error of law" supporting reconsideration when the only 7

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court presented with remotely similar controlling facts did exactly what this Court did. Sharp was aware of the SVG case from Soundview's March 7, 2005 letter to the Court citing it as additional authority. reconsideration motion is inexcusable. In sum, Sharp's re-argument of the same caselaw does not demonstrate the Court made any clear legal error in its Ruling. This is particularly so, where Sharp misstates the nature of the Ruling rather than confront its actual reasoning. VI. SHARP'S RULE 11 CASELAW DOES NOT APPLY HERE As an alternative argument for reconsideration, Sharp ironically states that the Court "appears to confuse Sharp's counterclaim for unenforceability with its separate claim for Section 285 attorneys' fees." (Sharp Br. 3-4). Only Sharp appears confused. If Sharp desires strict attention to the form of its pleading, then it must explain which of its Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 pleadings it is talking about because Sharp never interposed a valid Rule 8 pleading of either inequitable conduct or a "claim" for Section 285 attorney fees. For instance, mere inspection of Sharp's "counterclaims" shows that Sharp pled only a single count (in a conclusory fashion) for non-infringement, invalidity "with respect to Sharp's products" and unenforceability "with respect to Sharp's products." (Ex. A, excerpts from Sharp's Answer and Counterclaim re 754 and 768 cases). The qualifier "with respect to Sharp's products" clearly shows Sharp never pled inequitable conduct at all. Instead, Sharp's unenforceability pleading related That Sharp ignores SVG in its

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to its failed "implied license and equitable estoppel" personal defenses, which fell on summary judgment. Sony v. Soundview, 157 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D. Conn. 2001) (denying motion for summary judgment of an implied government license, and equitable estoppel). Sharp's failure to plead inequitable conduct is even more compelling considering that Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires all such pleadings to be made with specificity. See Ferguson Beauregard / Logic Controls v. Delaware Capital Formation, 350 F.3d 1327, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Likewise, Sharp's sole count does not mention Section 285; that is only mentioned below, in its prayer for relief: "WHEREFORE, Sharp seeks the following relief and judgment: . . . C. That the Court determine this is an `exceptional case' under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and award Sharp its reasonable attorneys' fees." (Exhibit A). Sharp never had a bona fide "claim" under Section 285 (as opposed to a prayer for relief) no matter how liberally one reads its pleading. In sum, Sharp cannot now credibly say the Court was "confused" when it supposedly "overlooked" Sharp's Section 285 claim based on inequitable conduct. Sharp never pled such a "claim," and indeed never made a Rule 8 pleading of inequitable conduct at all. Obviously, Sharp's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (attached to its Amended Memorandum) do not match its pleading. That Sharp wandered so far from what it pled just strengthens the conclusion that it is just trying to manufacture more litigation.

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Sharp cites for the first time Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 39596 (1990) (superseded in part by the 1993 amendments to Rule 11), to argue the Court may still consider Section 285 attorney fees even if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the inequitable conduct claim. Cooter is inapposite. For one thing, as mentioned above, the Court is considering Sharp's Section 285 request to the extent it is based on the litigated issue of non-infringement. More importantly, Cooter merely confirmed the power of district courts to consider Rule 11 sanctions even if the plaintiff voluntarily terminates the underlying litigation (a holding superseded by the addition of the 21-day safe harbor period in the 1993 amendments to Rule 11). Such a holding does not speak to the question that was before the Court: may the Court decide declaratory judgment claims over which it otherwise lack jurisdiction just to decide whether a case might be "exceptional" under Section 285. Cooter comes nowhere near addressing this question. Indeed, the Supreme Court made it clear in Cooter that the act of violating Rule 11 happens during litigation, e.g., by signing frivolous pleadings. 496 U.S. at 398. A court naturally retains the power to decide if an attorney's conduct was inappropriate at any stage of a case. In contrast here, Sharp seeks to turn the spotlight on conduct occurring before this litigation ever existed. Hence, the policies served by Rule 11 according to Cooter are not in play. A decision to award fees under Section 285 based on inequitable conduct would not relate to

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the Court's ability to police the conduct of attorneys admitted to practice before it. VII. THE SUPREME COURT HAS REJECTED SHARP'S ARGUMENT THAT ITS CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES CONFERS JURISDICTION As yet another alternative argument, Sharp bewails the "significant discovery" it claims to have taken on the issue of inequitable conduct as a reason to reconsider the Court's Ruling. But, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected Sharp's argument in its 1998 Steel Company decision: Obviously, however, a plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit. ... An "interest in attorney's fees is ... insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim." Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. at 480 (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70-71, 90 L. Ed. 2d 48, 106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986)). Steel Company, 523 U.S. at 107. In Steel Company (just as in this case), a statutory provision authorized attorney fees in certain instances. Id. But that provision (Section 326(f) of EPCRA; 42 U.S.C. §11046(f)) did not confer subject matter jurisdiction in Steel Company ­ so 35 U.S.C. §285 cannot do so in this case. Sharp ignores Steel Company -- and no wonder. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a party's decision to incur attorney fees cannot be used to decide the threshold question of whether there is jurisdiction for Sharp to seek such fees. Here, this Court correctly concluded there is no such jurisdiction; Sharp's attempt to 11

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bootstrap itself into court by means of an attorney fee claim is contrary to controlling Supreme Court precedent. VIII. SHARP'S "NO-WAIVER" ARGUMENT IS A RED HERRING In its fourth alternative argument, Sharp suggests the Court's Ruling was based on an incorrect finding that Sharp "waived or forfeited its attorney's fee claim based upon inequitable conduct." (Sharp Br. 6). That is not true. The Court's Ruling was not based on waiver or forfeiture (though there was such a waiver), but rather on the fact the patent is expired and adjudged non-infringed in a no-longerappealable final judgment. These are the facts that led to the ruling of no subject matter jurisdiction. Sharp may wish to argue it did not intend to waive or forfeit the use of inequitable conduct as a basis for attorneys fees. But Sharp's intent is irrelevant, and not part of the Court's reasoning in any case. Even if Sharp's intent were relevant, Sharp should have foreseen that certain defenses would became moot after appeal. Sharp never objected to or

appealed from the procedural events that created that possibility. The Order of Stay Pending Appeal dated September 26, 2003 (Dkt. # 452) established two possible outcomes from the appeal. If Soundview's appeal were granted, the case would have returned to this Court with every defense, and every arguable claim for attorney-fees, still live and justiciable. But since Soundview's appeal was rejected, the case returned to this Court fully adjudicated.

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IX.

THE COURT WAS RIGHT ABOUT BUILDEX Finally, Sharp cites Buildex Inc. v. Kason Industries, Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1466

(Fed. Cir. 1988), a decision the Court's Ruling already distinguished. (Notably, since Sharp therefore cannot show that this Court "overlooked" Buildex, Sharp's arguments about that case are not a proper basis for a motion for consideration anyway. Seaford, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS1688, *2; Wood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25438, * 2.) Sharp contends Buildex requires the Court to consider inequitable conduct, even if moot. The Court's Ruling (which Sharp simply disregards) explains why Sharp is wrong: Importantly, however, the [Buildex] district court had earlier considered, and rejected, the inequitable conduct counterclaim, and the inequitable conduct claim was based on substantially the same set of facts as the invalidity counterclaim on which the district court had granted summary judgment and the Federal Circuit reversed. Thus, not only was the district court's original jurisdiction not in question, but an award of attorneys fees based on inequitable conduct would directly relate to the already-litigated subject matter. (Ruling, at 7). Sharp does not even try to show the Court read Buildex wrong. X. THREE LEVELS OF DISCRETION ALSO SUPPORT THE COURT'S RULING While the Court based its Ruling on the legal issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court's exercise of discretion supports the Ruling as well. In fact, the law provides the Court with discretion at three different levels. First, the statutory basis for Sharp's "counterclaims" is the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201. The Court always has discretion to decline to hear a declaratory judgment claim. Cygnus Therapeutics Systems v. Ala Corp., 92 F.3d 13

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1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Nobelpharma v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Two good reasons not to hear Sharp's request for a declaratory judgment are (1) that the inequitable conduct issue is moot and the public has no interest in invalidating an expired patent, and (2) even if Sharp could prevail, Sharp should not be awarded attorneys fees for litigation of its own manufacture. See Steel Company, 523 U.S. at 107. Hence, exercise of discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act supports the Court's Ruling. Second, the "inequitable conduct" decision itself is (as the name suggests) an equitable one. In general, any finding of materiality and intent to deceive operate as predicates for the Court's equitable discretion; the Court may, but need not, act on those predicates to issue a ruling of "inequitable conduct." ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 546-47 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (affirming grant of summary judgment of no inequitable conduct). Acting in equity, the Court may find

sufficient reasons to decline the equitable defense even if materiality and intent to deceive could be proved. Id. Hence, the Court's Ruling may find support in the fact that even if Sharp prevailed on every predicate fact of the defense, the Court would have discretion not to find "inequitable conduct." Finally, the ultimate decision to find a case "exceptional" under Section 285, and then to award fees, also rests with the Court's discretion. Even if (1) the Court found there was subject matter jurisdiction, (2) the Court entertained Section 285 as a declaratory judgment claim, and (3) the Court found inequitable conduct, the

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Court would still retain discretion to deny an award of attorneys fees under Section 285. "It is only after a specific finding of exceptional circumstances has been made that the discretion to award attorneys' fees can be exercised." J.P. Stevens Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., 822 F.2d 1047, 1050-51 (Fed. Cir. 1987) In addition to those reasons given above in the context of the Court's declaratory judgment discretion, there is another good reason why the Court would act within its proper discretion not to award fees under Section 285 based on inequitable conduct: Sharp's underlying "inequitable conduct" defense is incredibly weak. Indeed, Sharp's own proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (attached to its Amended Motion to Reconsider) bear this out. Sharp's proposed findings drop four out of five of the theories Sharp originally presented. Dropped theories include: · · · · the previous contention the Campbell reference was "buried" with intent to deceive; the previous contention the "Resolution" was prior art deceptively withheld from the Patent Office; the previous contention the "Petition" was prior art deceptively withheld from the Patent Office; the previous contention that the applicants made false arguments to distinguish the Keiser prior art.

Sharp's waivers show Soundview's motion for summary judgment of no inequitable conduct was meritorious. Even the last remaining theory was still subject to

Soundview's summary judgment motion. In the unlikely event the Court denied

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that last remaining aspect of Soundview's summary judgment request, at a minimum, Sharp's voluntary waiver of 80% of the defense shows the Court would be within its discretion to deny a Section 285 fee award predicated on alleged inequitable conduct. Also important is the fact that Sharp's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reveal Sharp intended to present only a paper record -- depositions and documents -- during its "trial"on inequitable conduct. (Given the severity of the allegations, Soundview intended to call those same witnesses live to let the Court view their demeanor and judge their credibility). A paper trial? What is the purpose of that? If the paper record were truly all Sharp needed to prove inequitable conduct, exceptional case status and entitlement to attorneys fees, then why did Sharp fail to make those arguments in its December 8, 2004 filings (the deadline for all fee motions)? It had all the papers then. Instead, Sharp made it appear as if it wanted a real trial (an arguably valid reason for missing the December 8 deadline). But now it is clear that all it ever really wanted was the chance to file a very-late second attorney fee request using materials it already had in-hand on December 8, using the "trial" as an excuse for its tardiness. Sharp's shifting theories and questionable tactics are not the conduct of a party deserving an award of attorneys fees, and the Court would be well within its discretion to deny them for any of these reasons. XI. CONCLUSION

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The Court's Ruling was correct; it contains no "clear error of law" entitling Sharp to reconsideration. As for Sharp's newest arguments, the Steel Co. case shows that Section 285 cannot supply jurisdiction where it is otherwise absent. Claimants cannot "litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit. ... An `interest in attorney's fees is ... insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim.'" Steel Company, 523 U.S. at 107 (citation omitted). Respectfully submitted, SOUNDVIEW TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

________/s/ David S. Monastersky_______

John J. Bogdanski (ct06217) David S. Monastersky (ct13319) HOWD & LUDORF 65 Wethersfield Avenue Hartford, Connecticut 06114 (860) 249-1361 Fax: (860) 522-9549 Raymond P. Niro (ct18107) John C. Janka (ct20463) Robert P. Greenspoon (ct21736) Paul C. Gibbons (ct18826) NIRO, SCAVONE, HALLER & NIRO 181 West Madison Street, Suite 4600 Chicago, Illinois 60602 Phone: (312) 236-0733 Attorneys for Soundview Technologies, Inc.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned counsel of record hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing SOUNDVIEW'S OPPOSITION TO SHARP'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER was served upon lead counsel for the below listed parties by facsimile and first class mail (on all lead patent counsel) on March 29, 2005:
_____/s/ David S. Monastersky____

David S. Monastersky SERVICE LIST Counsel for Consumer Electronics Association Counsel Peter J. Kadzik R. Bruce Holcomb Gary Hoffman Kenneth W. Brothers Jorge Kotelanski Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky 2101 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037 Tel: 202-785-9700 Fax: 202-887-0689 Tel: 202-775-4704 (Kadzik) [email protected] Tel: 202-828-2242 (Holcomb) [email protected] Local Counsel Connecticut Jacqueline D. Bucar Ben Solnit Tim Jensen Peter Sachner Tyler Cooper & Alcorn 205 Church Street New Haven, Connecticut 06509-1910 Tel: 203-784-8200 Fax: 203-865-7865 [email protected] Tel: 203-784-8205 (Solnit) [email protected] Tel: 203-784-8228 (Jensen) [email protected] Tel: 203-784-8240 (Sachner) [email protected] Counsel for Mitsubishi Digital Electronics America Counsel Patent Infringement Vincent J. Belusko Eric Shih Robert S. McArthur Morrison & Foerster LLP Local Counsel Connecticut Joseph L. Clasen James M. Ruel David J. Burke Robinson & Cole LLP Page 1 of 3

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555 West Fifth Street Los Angeles, California 90013-1024 Tel: 213-892-5200 Fax: 213-892-5454

695 East Main Street P.O. Box 10305 Stamford, CT 06901 Tel: 203-462-7510 Fax: 203-461-7599

Counsel for Sharp Electronics Corporation Counsel Robert W. Adams U.S. Mickey Gill Nixon & Vanderhye, PC 1100 North Glebe Road, 8th Floor Arlington, VA 22201-4714 Tel: 703-816-4000 Fax: 703-816-4100 email: [email protected] (Adams) Local Counsel Connecticut William M. Bloss Alinor C. Sterling Jacobs, Grudberg, Belt & Dow PC 350 Orange Street New Haven, CT 06511 Tel: 203-772-3100 (x 271) Fax: 203-772-1691 email: [email protected]

Counsel for Toshiba America Consumer Products, Inc. Counsel Larry S. Nixon Michael Shea Jeff Nelson Nixon & Vanderhye, PC 1100 North Glebe Road Arlington, VA 22201-4714 Tel: 703-816-4000 Fax: 703-816-4100 [email protected] Local Counsel Connecticut William M. Bloss Alinor C. Sterling Jacobs, Grudberg, Belt & Dow, P.C. 350 Orange Street., P.O. Box 606 New Haven, Connecticut 06503 Tel: 203-772-3100 Fax: 203-772-1691

Counsel for Sony Electronics, Inc. and Sony Corporation of America IP Richard I. Delucia Richard Gresalfi Elizabeth Gardner Alex D. Skucas Jeffrey S. Gerchuck Thomas R. Makin Kenyon & Kenyon LLP One Broadway New York, New York 10004 Tel: 212-425-7200

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Fax: 212-425-5288 [email protected] [email protected] Antitrust Richard M. Steuer Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP 1675 Broadway New York, NY 10019-5820 Tel: 212-506-2500 Fax: 212-262-1910 [email protected]

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