Free Pretrial Memorandum - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

e Case 1 :04-cv-01254-GIVIS Document 209 Filed 04/16/2007 Page 1 of 4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
HARRY SMITH, et al., :
Plaintiffs, :
v. : Case No 04-1254-GMS
JOHN CIRITELLA, et al., :
Defendants. :
PLAINTIFF’S BENCH MEMO ON THE ISSUE OF WHY THERE IS MORE THAN
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
SUCH THAT THE ISSUE MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
A. Introduction:
The record is more than sufficient for the issue of punitive damages to be submitted to the
jury. During trial, plaintiffs have offered evidence of reckless, callous, intentional and malicious
behavior by defendants, entitling plaintiffs to have the punitive damages issue submitted to the
jury. This evidence includes the following;
· Plaintiffs have presented suiiicient evidence to demonstrate that each defendant
intentionally killed Harry Smith, III, when they each shot multiple times at him
with the specific intent to kill him. This is intentional behavior.
• Each defendant testified that he is aware of the laws which forbid excessive use of
force. There is more than sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that each
defendant used excessive force against Harry Smith, III anyway, despite their
knowledge of these laws. This is reckless, malicious and intentional behavior.
· Each defendant has given ever-changing reasons for shooting Harry Smith, III.
This demonstrates that each defendant is having significant problems telling the
truth. Falsehood is evidence of malice, ill will and intentional wrongdoing.

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• Each defendant violated police department rules for police officers. Violating your
own rules is evidence of recklessness and
B. The Law of Punitive Damages. The leading case on the issue of punitive damages is
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983). was a § 1983 action arising from a brutal assault
against a youthful first offender while in a juvenile reformatory Ajury awarded $25,000 in
compensatory damages to the youth as well as $5,000 in punitives. The defendant appealed the
punitive damages award on two grounds. First, he argued that the proper test for punitive
damages is one of "actual malicious intent - ill will, spite, or intent to injure." Q at 37-38.
(internal punctuation omitted). Second, that the requisite standard for punitive damages had to be
higher than the liability standard. Q at 38.1 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected both of these
arguments. Q at 56.
As to the first argument, the Supreme Court extensively surveyed the common law both at
the time and since the enactment of § 1983 in 1871, Q at 39-51, and found that
we are content to adopt the policy judgment of the common law - that reckless or callous
disregard for the plaintiff s rights, as well as intentional violations of federal law, should be
sufficient to trigger ajury’s consideration of the appropriateness of punitive damages.
Q at 51. The Court rejected the defendants’ contentions that the higher standard of "actual
malicious intent - ill will, spite, or intent to injure," Q at 37-38 (intemal punctuation omitted),
were prerequisites for punitive damages and instead held that although these would warrant
consideration of punitive damages, "reckless or callous indiff`erence to the federally protected
rights of others" is all that is needed as an alternative basis for punitive damages, Q at 56.
The Court also rejected the defendant’s second argument that "the threshold for punitive
damages" had to be higher "than the underlying standard for liability in the first instance." Q at
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51. The Court observed that °‘[t]here has never been any general common-law rule that the
threshold for punitive damages must always be higher than that for compensatory liability." Q at
53. Continuing, the Court found "society has an interest in deterring all intentional or reckless
invasions of the rights of others, even though it sometimes chooses not to impose any liability for
lesser degrees of fault." Q at 54-55.2
Importantly, none of the Supreme Court cases dealing with punitive damages since Q
have overruled its holding.3 Rather, these cases either discuss the Qstandard, as in
Kolstad v. American Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526 (1999), or deal with the entirely separate issue
of Constitutional limitations on the size of the award of punitive damages, Q the jury’s ability to
award punitive damages themselves. Q Browning—Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S.
257 (1989) (Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause), Pacific Mutual Life Insur. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1 (1991) (Fourteenth Amendment Due Process), TXO Produc. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (same), Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994)
(same), BMW ofNorth America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (same).
Accordingly, "intentional violations of federal law" are sufficient to trigger a jury’s
consideration ofthe appropriateness of punitive damages. Q, 461 U.S. at 51. In the same
way, "a jury may assess punitive damages in a civil rights action when the defendant’s conduct is
shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 430-31
(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Q 461 U.S. at 56) (internal punctuation omitted). Thus, "the
2 Accordingly, because plaintiifs have presented sufficient evidence that each defendant
intentionally used excessive force against Harry Smith, III, which is sufiicient to support a liability
finding, this evidence also is sufficient to support a punitive damages award.
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defendant’s conduct must be, at a minimum, reckless or callous." Savarese v. Aggss, 883 F .2d
1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1989), , 527 U.S. at 536 (noting that at a minimum,
requires "recklessness in its subjective form"). Obviously then, punitives also are permitted "if the
conduct is intentional or motivated by evil motive, but the def`endant’s actions need not meet this
higher standard." Savarese, 883 F.2d at 1204.
Furthermore, as the Third Circuit recently explained, the "jury may award punitive
damages when it finds reckless, callous, intentional or malicious conduct" Springer v, Henry,
435 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir. 2006).
This standard is disjunctive. The defendants conduct must be, at a minimum, reckless or
callous. Punitive damages might also be allowed if the conduct is intentional or motivated
by evil motive, but the defendant's action need not necessarily meet this higher standard.
&
In summary, at a minimum, a defendant may be liable for punitive damages if his conduct
is reckless or callous. Intentional conduct, being an even higher standard, thus also warrants
punitives. Lastly, actual malicious intent or evil motive, being an even higher standard than
intentional, also is sufficient. As discussed above, plaintiff has presented more than sufficient
evidence of defendant’s reckless, callous, intentional and malicious behavior.
Respectfully submitted this day of April 2007.
Anne T. Sulton
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