Free Order on Motion to Dismiss - District Court of California - California

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 1 of 15

1 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 INTRODUCTION On June 26, 2007, Petitioner Dale Wills, a state prisoner incarcerated at the California State Prison - Corcoran, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging ineffective assistance by his trial and appellate counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The Court ordered Respondent to show On October 16, 2007, Petitioner v. JAMES TILTON, Respondent. / DALE WILLS, Petitioner, FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA No. C 07-03354 CW (PR) ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AS UNTIMELY (Docket no. 8)

cause why the writ should not be granted.

Respondent James Tilton filed a motion to dismiss. filed an opposition on January 18, 2008. on January 31, 2008.

Respondent filed a reply

For the reasons set forth below, Respondent's

motion to dismiss is GRANTED. BACKGROUND In 1988, Petitioner pled guilty to a first degree burglary charge stemming from an incident that occurred at the home where he was living with his family. prison. In May, 1995 Petitioner was arrested in San Lorenzo for being drunk in public. (Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Police discovered a bike He was sentenced to one year in

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 2 of 15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

in Petitioner's possession that was reported as stolen from a residence about a half mile from where Petitioner was arrested. (Id.) Petitioner was subsequently charged with first degree (Id.)

burglary and grand theft.

In May, 1996, Petitioner was found guilty of both the theft and burglary. The court found true the allegation that Petitioner

had a prior 1988 conviction for first degree burglary, which constituted a "strike" under California's Three Strikes law. Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(e)(1), 1170.12(c)(1). See

The court also found

true two allegations that Petitioner had served prior prison terms. See id. § 667.5(b). Petitioner was sentenced to seventeen years in

prison based upon his two prior prison commitments and his 1988 burglary conviction. Petitioner challenged his conviction in the California Court of Appeal where it was affirmed on June 30, 1997. Thereafter,

Petitioner filed two unrelated state habeas corpus petitions in the California Supreme Court alleging various violations of his rights by prison officials.1 In March, 2005, Petitioner discovered a case, People v. Davis, which he contends should have been cited by his trial counsel because it stands for the proposition that one cannot burglarize one's own home.2
1

18 Cal. 4th 712, 721 (1998) (citing People v.

The first of these claims involved an allegedly "arbitrary withholding of Petitioner's tennis shoes by prison officials." The second involved alleged confiscation of his property as well as denial of access to the courts. Both claims were rejected by the California Supreme Court with a citation to In re Dexter, 25 Cal. 3d 921 (1979). Davis was decided in 1998, two years after Petitioner was sentenced by the trial court. 2
2

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 3 of 15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Gauze, 15 Cal. 3d 709, 714 (1975)).

Thus, he claims, Davis

invalidates his 1988 burglary conviction because the facts alleged in that conviction involved the burglary of the home where he lived at that time. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Alameda County Superior Court, which was denied on March 21, 2006. He filed a subsequent habeas petition in the

California Court of Appeal which was denied on June 1, 2006. Petitioner filed a third habeas petition in the California Supreme Court which was denied on February 7, 2007. Petitioner filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus on June 26, 2007. include: The claims raised in the petition

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move

to strike his 1988 burglary conviction because it was invalid under Davis; and (2) prosecutorial misconduct in charging his previous burglary conviction as a prior, for the same reason. DISCUSSION The AEDPA became law on April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by

prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest date on which: (A) the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (B) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (C) the

3

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 4 of 15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (D) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Also,

"[t]he time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation." Id. § 2244(d)(2).

A state prisoner with a conviction finalized after April 24, 1996, such as Petitioner, ordinarily must file his federal habeas petition within one year of the date his process of direct review came to an end. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The one-year period generally will run from "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." § 2244(d)(1)(A). 28 U.S.C.

In a case where a petitioner does not seek review

in the state supreme court, "direct review" concludes forty days after the court of appeals renders its decision. 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2002). In the present case, Petitioner did not seek review in the California Supreme Court. Thus, the judgment became final for Smith v. Duncan,

purposes of the statute of limitations on August 9, 1997, forty days after the court of appeal rendered its decision. 4 Duncan, 297

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 5 of 15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

F.3d at 809.

Accordingly, Petitioner was required to file a

federal habeas corpus petition no later than August 9, 1998. Because he did not file the present petition until June 26, 2007 -nearly nine years after the limitations period had expired -- the petition is untimely unless he can show that he is entitled to tolling or to a delayed commencement of the limitations period. I. Statutory Tolling The petition may nonetheless be timely if the limitations period was tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for a substantial period of time. As noted earlier, AEDPA's one-year limitations

period is tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending. . . . " 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The limitations

period is also tolled during the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court. Carey, 536 U.S. at 223. In California, where prisoners

generally use the state's original writ system, this means that the limitations period remains tolled during the intervals between a state court's disposition of an original state habeas petition and the filing of the next original state habeas petition in a higher court, provided the prisoner did not delay unreasonably in seeking review in the higher court. See id. at 220-25.

Petitioner filed his state habeas petition in the Alameda County Superior Court on February 18, 2005. However, he is not

entitled to tolling under Section 2244(d)(2) because the limitations period had already run on August 9, 1998. 5 A state

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 6 of 15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

habeas petition filed after AEDPA's statute of limitations ended cannot toll the limitations period. "[S]ection 2244(d) does not

permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed," even if the state petition was timely filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823

(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that Oregon's two-year limitations period for the filing of state habeas petitions does not alter the operation of the AEDPA, even though prisoners who take full advantage of the two-year period will forfeit their right to federal habeas review). Section 2244(d)(2) cannot revive the It cannot restart the clock to

limitations period once it has run.

zero; it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. Thus, in order to toll the limitations period under

§ 2244(d)(2), Petitioner should have begun to pursue collateral relief in state court before AEDPA's one-year limitations period had expired. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823; see also Rashid v.

Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Once the limitations period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute of limitations"). Accordingly, Petitioner's state habeas petition filed on February 18, 2005 does not revive the limitations period because it had already expired. Therefore, without more, Petitioner is not

entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations period. II. Delayed Commencement Petitioner argues for a delayed commencement of the limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) and (C). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), the statute of limitations in 6

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 7 of 15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

habeas proceedings does not begin to run until "the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such state action." Petitioner contends that the State's failure to provide him with effective assistance of counsel amounted to a state-created impediment to his filing of his state and federal habeas petitions. Petitioner is effectively arguing that because he relied upon the Constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel at trial, he was "impeded" from looking into the case law surrounding his 1988 burglary conviction (and subsequently discovering Davis). Petitioner cites Coleman v. Thompson for the proposition that ineffective assistance of state-appointed counsel "constitutes an 'impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution.'" 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991).

Coleman is distinguishable from the present case and does not apply because it addresses the issue of procedural default. In

Coleman, the petitioner was unable to pursue federal habeas relief because of the failure of his counsel, post-trial, to file a direct appeal before the deadline. Id. Here, Petitioner's counsel

allegedly failed to raise a specific motion before or during trial. Counsel's alleged mistake had no effect upon Petitioner's ability to file for collateral relief, despite the fact that Petitioner had no understanding of the relevant case law or the mistake his trial counsel allegedly made. Rather than being defaulted because of his

counsel's failure to appeal, Petitioner's claim is time-barred.

7

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 8 of 15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Accordingly, Petitioner's claim that a state-created impediment delayed the onset of the statute of limitations fails because Petitioner, rather than trial counsel, was responsible for timely filing his habeas petition. Petitioner also contends that he is entitled to delayed commencement based upon a new rule of constitutional law handed down by the Supreme Court in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C), the statute of limitations in habeas proceedings does not begin to run until "the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." Petitioner claims that June 30, 2005, the date of the Supreme Court's ruling in Rompilla, is the proper starting date for the statute of limitations. He states:

In Rompilla, the Supreme Court, for the very first time, held that an attorney's failure to conduct an adequate investigation of prior convictions amounted to deficient performance, see 545 U.S. at 383, that was sufficiently prejudicial to sustain a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 390. Thus, the Rompilla Court announced a "new rule." And because Rompilla is a habeas proceeding, it necessarily follows then, a fortiori, that it has been "made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review" as the holding is dependent on retroactivity, i.e., Rompilla could not have obtained the relief he did unless the decision called for retroactive application. (Opp'n at 18-19.)

27 The Supreme Court's decision in Rompilla did not pronounce a 28 8

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 9 of 15

1 new rule of constitutional law as the term is used in section 2 2244(d)(1)(C). Instead, the case cites Strickland v. Washington,

3 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which announced the current rule under federal 4 law for reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See In

5 re Hutcherson, 438 F.3d 749 (11th Cir. 2006) (denying petitioner's 6 request to file a second habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 7 § 2244(b) because "the Court's decision in Rompilla was another 8 interpretation of the Court's long-standing principles set forth in 9 Strickland v. Washington" (internal citations omitted)). 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California Thus, because the Strickland line of cases was available to

11 Petitioner during the relevant statute of limitations period, his 12 argument based on section 2244(d)(1)(C) fails. Accordingly, his

13 federal habeas is untimely, unless equitable tolling applies. 14 III. Equitable Tolling 15 The one-year limitations period can be equitably tolled

16 because section 2244(d) is a statute of limitations and not a 17 jurisdictional bar. See Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288. "When external

18 forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for 19 the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the 20 statute of limitations may be appropriate." 21 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Miles v. Prunty, 187

Equitable tolling will not be

22 available in most cases because extensions of time should be 23 granted only if "'extraordinary circumstances' beyond [a] 24 prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time." 25 Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288 (citation and internal quotation marks 26 omitted). The prisoner must show that "the 'extraordinary Spitsyn v. The

27 circumstances' were the cause of his untimeliness."

28 Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 9

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 10 of 15

1 Ninth Circuit has said that the petitioner "bears the burden of 2 showing that this extraordinary exclusion should apply to him." 3 Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). "'[T]he

4 threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is 5 very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.'" Id. at 1066

6 (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.), 7 cert. denied, 531 U.S. 878 (2000)). The grounds for granting Lott v. Mueller,

8 equitable tolling are "highly fact dependant." 9 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). United States District Court For the Northern District of California

Where a prisoner fails to show

10 "any causal connection" between the grounds upon which he asserts a 11 right to equitable tolling and his inability to file a federal 12 habeas application timely, the equitable tolling claim will be 13 denied. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005),

14 amended, 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). 15 However, "[r]ather than let procedural uncertainties

16 unreasonably snuff out a constitutional claim, the issue of when 17 grave difficulty merges literally into 'impossibility' should be 18 resolved in [a petitioner's] favor." Lott, 304 F.3d at 920. When

19 a prisoner is proceeding pro se, his allegations regarding 20 diligence in filing a federal petition on time must be construed 21 liberally. 22 Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling (Mem. in Supp. of

23 under "the doctrine of fraudulent concealment." 24 Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 21.) 25 claim as follows: 26 27 28

Petitioner summarizes his

Due to his lack of adequate knowledge of the law and sole reliance on appointed counsel representing him in the trial and appellate courts, Petitioner had no objectively reasonable cause to believe or even remotely 10

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 11 of 15

1 2 3

suspect that any grounds existed to justify the relief sought by this current petition until March of 2005, when Petitioner came upon the People v. Davis case. (Pet. at 12-13.) According to Petitioner, it was not until he

4 discovered Davis that he could have known that his counsel had 5 failed to inform him of it. 6 counsel, he alleges that counsel's failure to inform him of Davis 7 amounts to "fraudulent concealment" entitling him to equitable 8 tolling. 9 There is no "doctrine of fraudulent concealment" in the 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California equitable tolling context. 11 affirmative conduct on the part of his trial or appellate counsel 12 that amounts to concealment. 13 alleging that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he was 14 ignorant of the law and his former counsel failed to notify him of 15 a new case. 16 Petitioner's argument fails. 17 of the law and lack of legal experience typically do not excuse 18 untimely filing, even for a pro se incarcerated prisoner. 19 v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006). 20 Petitioner also claims that he is entitled to equitable 21 tolling because he was held in the prison's Secure Housing Unit 22 (SHU) and had restricted law library access. 23 describe in any detail how his law library access was "more 24 restricted" than any other inmate. 25 set of facts setting forth how long he was housed in the SHU and 26 how his inability to access the law library during that time 27 prevented him from filing his federal habeas petition in a timely 28 11 Further, he alleges no specific Petitioner does not Rasberry The law is clear that ignorance Instead, Petitioner is effectively Petitioner has not alleged any Based upon his total reliance on

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 12 of 15

1 manner. 2

Therefore, Petitioner's argument fails.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling

3 of the limitations period. 4 IV. 5 Actual Innocence The actual innocence gateway established in Schlup v. Delo,

6 513 U.S. 298 (1995), may be available to a petitioner whose 7 petition is otherwise barred by the AEDPA's limitations period. 8 See Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776-77 (9th Cir. 2002) (implying 9 that unavailability of actual innocence gateway would raise serious 10 constitutional concerns and remanding to district court for a United States District Court For the Northern District of California 11 determination of whether actual innocence claim was established 12 before deciding whether gateway is available under AEDPA). 13 purposes of this Order, this Court will assume that actual 14 innocence, if established according to the Schlup standard, would 15 avoid the statute of limitations bar. 16 17 18 19 20 Id. at 316. 21 "To be credible, such an actual innocence claim requires 22 petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with 23 new reliable evidence -- whether it be exculpatory scientific 24 evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 25 evidence -- that was not presented at trial." 26 324. 27 presented -- that is, evidence that was not presented at trial. 28 12 The "new" evidence need not be newly available, just newly Schlup, 513 U.S. at Thus, [i]f a petitioner . . . presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of non-harmless constitutional error, the petitioner should be allowed to pass through the gateway and argue the merits of his underlying claim. For

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 13 of 15

1 Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003). 2 It is not enough that the new evidence show the existence of

3 reasonable doubt; rather, petitioner must show "that it is more 4 likely than not that no 'reasonable juror' would have convicted 5 him." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329. As the Ninth Circuit has stated,

6 "the test is whether, with the new evidence, it is more likely than 7 not that no reasonable juror would have found [p]etitioner guilty." 8 Van Buskirk v. Baldwin, 265 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2001). 9 actual innocence means factual innocence, not merely legal 10 insufficiency. United States District Court For the Northern District of California Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 Thus,

11 (1998) (citing Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 339). 12 In the present case, Petitioner alleges that he is actually

13 innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in 1996 as well as 14 the 1988 burglary charge to which he pled guilty. Petitioner

15 suggests that due to misconduct on the part of both the defense and 16 the prosecution, his 1996 trial was corrupted and he was falsely 17 convicted. 18 (Opp'n at 20-25.)

Petitioner alleges that his defense counsel was ineffective in

19 failing to move to suppress the prosecution's evidence (a bicycle 20 that he possessed, the fact that he was intoxicated, and 21 incriminating statements he made when he was arrested) and failing 22 to obtain exculpatory evidence (fingerprints on the bicycle, a 23 blood-alcohol test). Petitioner also contends that his defense

24 counsel failed to move to strike his 1988 burglary conviction and 25 suborned him to commit perjury by making him testify that he was 26 intoxicated when he was arrested. Petitioner also alleges that the

27 prosecutor committed misconduct by charging Petitioner's previous 28 burglary conviction as a prior. 13

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 14 of 15

1

Petitioner's claims fail because his allegations do not amount

2 to "clear and convincing evidence" that he is actually innocent of 3 either his 1996 or 1988 convictions. Petitioner confuses the

4 actual innocence standard with an inquiry into the merits of his 5 case. He has provided no evidence akin to "credible declarations

6 of guilt by another, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or 7 exculpatory scientific evidence" to support his innocence. 8 513 U.S. at 324. Schlup,

Instead, he alleges that misconduct at trial Such

9 caused him to be prejudiced during legal proceedings. United States District Court For the Northern District of California

10 misconduct has no bearing upon whether he is actually innocent of 11 the crimes of which he was convicted. 12 innocence claim fails. 13 14 CONCLUSION The instant petition for habeas corpus was filed nearly nine Petitioner is not Accordingly, his actual

15 years after the statute of limitations expired.

16 entitled to tolling or a delayed commencement of the limitations 17 period, and his actual innocence claim is unsupported. Therefore,

18 the petition is untimely because the statute of limitations expired 19 on August 9, 1998. Accordingly, Respondent's motion to dismiss

20 (docket no. 8) is hereby GRANTED. 21 The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in accordance with The

22 this Order, terminate all pending motions and close the file. 23 parties shall bear their own costs. 24 25 This Order terminates Docket no. 8. IT IS SO ORDERED. 8/28/08 CLAUDIA WILKEN United States District Judge
P:\PRO-SE\CW\HC.07\Wills3354.grantMTD.wpd

26 DATED: 27 28

14

Case 4:07-cv-03354-CW

Document 19

Filed 08/28/2008

Page 15 of 15

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 v. JAMES TILTON et al, Defendant. DALE WILLS,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case Number: CV07-03354 CW Plaintiff, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/

United States District Court For the Northern District of California

9 I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District 10 Court, Northern District of California. SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said 11 That on August 28, 2008, I envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said copy(ies) in a postage paid 12 envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office. 13 14 15 Bruce Louis Ortega California State Attorney's Office 16 455 Golden Gate Avenue Suite 11000 17 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 18 Dale G. Wills J-16405 Corcoran State Prison 19 P.O. Box 5246 93212-5246 Corcoran, CA 20 Dated: August 28, 2008 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
P:\PRO-SE\CW\HC.07\Wills3354.grantMTD.wpd

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

15