Free Settlement Agreement - District Court of Colorado - Colorado

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO JUDGE WALKER D. MILLER
CIVIL ACTION NO . 00-CV -02361-WDM-BNB (Consolidated with Nos. 00-cv-02362-WDM-BNB and 00-cv-02363-WDM-BNB; and 00-cv-02365-WDM-BNB, 00-cv-02366-WDM-BNB, 00-cv-02367WDM-BNB, 00-cv-02368-WDM-BNB, 00-cv-02369-WDM-BNB, 00-cv-02370-WDM-BNB, 00-cv-02371-WDM-BNB, 00-cv-02372-WDM-BNB, 00-cv-02373-WDM-BNB, 00-cv-02374WDM-BNB; and, 00-cv-02364-MJW-BNB and 00-cv-02394-MJW-BNB)

WYRICK G. DEANE, Plaintiff, v. MILTON TUCKER, et al., Defendants. _____________________________________________________________________________ ORDER APPROVING PROPOSED GLOBAL SETTLEMENT _____________________________________________________________________________ THIS MATTER is before the Court on the JOINT MOTION TO ISSUE NOTICE PURSUANT TO § 30-28-101(10)(C)(II), C.R.S., AND FOR ENTRY OF ORDER APPROVING PROPOSED GLOBAL SETTLEMENT ("Motion") (Docket No. 30) jointly filed on February 1, 2007, by Plaintiff Wyrick G. Deane and Defendants United States of America, Secretary of Agriculture, and the United States Forest Service, the sole remaining parties herein ("Settling Parties"). Background Following the filing of the Motion at issue, this Court ordered the consolidation of the fifteen above-numbered quiet title cases on February 8, 2007 (Docket No. 31) and thereafter ATTACHMENT 1

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authorized notice to the Board of County Commissioners for Pitkin County, Colorado ("County") and granted County the right to specially appear and be heard in accord with Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-28-101(10)(c)(II) regarding County's objection to the Settling Parties' Proposed Global Settlement (Docket Nos. 32, 41). A copy of the proposed Settlement Agreement and Release is attached to the Motion (Attachments 2 through 7 [Exs. B through F] to Docket No. 30), and incorporated here by this reference. County's objection to the Proposed Global Settlement has been fully briefed (Docket Nos. 42, 43, 45). This Court is fully advised in the premises having considered all matters of record, including the December 14, 2007 joint status report filed by the County and the Settling Parties (Docket No. 54) and the December 21, 2007 hearing thereon, and having given the County an adequate opportunity to object and be heard. Now therefore, finding good and sufficient grounds therefor, the Court enters the following findings, conclusions and order. Findings, Conclusions and Order 1. Pursuant to the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, Plaintiff Deane filed these

fifteen quiet title actions concerning certain forest lands located within the District of Colorado in federal court. The only parties claiming an ownership interest in the subject lands are the United States and Deane. The Quiet Title Act is the exclusive means by which an adverse claimant can challenge the United States' claim of title in real property. See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983). This Court therefore has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2409a as

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well as the authority, pursuant to its inherent power, to dispose of the litigation and approve the parties' Proposed Global Settlement which purports to settle and finally adjudicate disputed titles to the subject real properties as between the United States and Deane.1 2. The United States Department of Justice has the authority to enter into the

Proposed Global Settlement. The proposed compromise between Deane and the United States involves Deane's quitclaim of over 300 acres to the United States, and the United States' crossconveyance of a cabin and 2.26 federal surface acres located on the White River National Forest to Deane (referred to as "Parcel A"). The Proposed Global Settlement is subject (i) to the express power granted to the United States Department of Agriculture to manage federal lands, and (ii) to the express power granted to the United States Department of Justice to settle litigation. The United States Department of Agriculture has the authority to "[p]rotect, manage, and administer the national forests . . . [and t]his delegation covers the acquisition and disposition of lands and interest in lands as may be authorized for the protection, management, and administration of the National Forest System." 7 C.F.R. § 2.60(a)(2) and 7 C.F.R. § 2.20(a)(2)(ii); 16 U.S.C. § 551. The United States Department of Justice has the authority to

See e.g. U.S. v. Colomb, 419 F.3d 292, 299 (5th Cir. 2005): "A district court has inherent power `to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.' Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936) (referring to power to stay proceedings as incident to such inherent powers). `The federal courts are vested with inherent power "to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases[,]" ... ' Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1417 (5th Cir.1995) (footnote omitted) [add'l citations omitted]." See also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 381-82, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1677, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (court may include parties' settlement in its F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(ii) dismissal order for subsequent enforcement and jurisdiction purposes).

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"[a]ccept offers in compromise in all nonmonetary cases." 28 C.F.R. § 0.160, Part 0, Subpart Y (a)(3). 3. The County's objection to the Proposed Global Settlement is based on its view

that the United States' conveyance of the less than 35-acre parcel to Deane ­ Parcel A ­ would violate Colorado's subdivision law, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-28-101. The United States and Deane contend that the Colorado subdivision law is not implicated here and that, in any event, it has no application to the United States or to the United States' conveyance of Parcel A. This Court finds, however, that it need not reach this issue because federal preemption applies to the United States' disposition and conveyance of Parcel A:2 (a) Parcel A is presently part of the White River National Forest and therefore

subject to the federal Property Clause. The Property Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST ., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This Court has "repeatedly observed" that "`[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.'" Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539, 96

The United States' proposed conveyance of Parcel A contains the following restrictive covenants: "... all the right, title, interest, claim and demand which the United States has in and to the existing cabin and the 2.26 surrounding surface acres associated with the Ophir Lode Mining Claim and The Diamond L Lode Mining Claim and more particularly described as Parcel A ... together with all rights of ingress and egress thereto to utilize the rights and interests therein, subject to the following restrictive covenants which shall be binding upon Deane's heirs, successors and assigns, shall run with the land, and shall be enforceable by the United States for the benefit of its lands in the White River National Forest and Pitkin County, Colorado, to wit: the size of the existing cabin on Parcel A shall not be increased from the current cabin size unless repaired or remodeled, in which event the total cabin size shall be limited to no more than 500 square feet, including separate toilet facility, which must be a composting-type facility, except that these restrictive covenants shall be deemed void and unenforceable if the cabin is subject to a final order requiring that it be modified or removed pursuant to the Pitkin County Land Use Code (including those provisions applicable to Rural and Remote locations), the Pitkin County Building Code, and/or Section 30-28-120, C.R.S. (2006)." Doc. 30, Attach. 7 (Ex. F), p.3.

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S.Ct. 2285, 2291, 49 L.Ed.2d 34 (1976), quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29, 60 S.Ct. 749, 756, 84 L.Ed. 1050 (1940). California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580 (1987). Once Congress acts, `"federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause."' Id., 480 U.S. at 580-81 (citations omitted). The federal Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST ., Art. VI, cl. 2, provides: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. (b) The state of Colorado and its political subdivisions cannot exercise

dominion over federal lands with respect to matters subject to federal legislation, and Congress has expressly provided that the Secretary of Agriculture shall "regulate [the] occupancy and use" of national forests and to establish rules and regulations therefor. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (formerly the Organic Administration Act of 1897). See United States v. Hymans, 463 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir.1972) ("The Secretary of Agriculture is empowered by 16 U.S.C. § 551 to make and promulgate rules and regulations concerning the `occupancy and use' of National Forests.").3 (c) With respect to federal preemption, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

observed in Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1226-1227 (10th Cir. 2002):

See also the NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEM ENT ACT of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq., and the FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEM ENT ACT of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. These provisions are illustrative of the exercise of Congressional action over federal public property, the exercise of sovereign jurisdiction, and the expression of federal land policies served in accordance with the Property and Supremacy Clauses.

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Notably, Congress' power in this regard is "plenary." [California Coastal Comm'n , 480 U.S. at 581]. State jurisdiction over federal land "does not extend to any matter that is not consistent with full power in the United States to protect its lands, to control their use and to prescribe in what manner others may acquire rights in them." [Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 404, 37 S.Ct. 387, 61 L.Ed. 791 (1917)]. If Congress so chooses, federal legislation, together with the policies and objectives encompassed therein, necessarily override and preempt conflicting state laws, policies, and objectives under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. See [Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543, 96 S.Ct. 2285, 49 L.Ed.2d 34 (1976)] (" `A different rule would place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of [the State])' " (quoting Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526, 17 S.Ct. 864, 42 L.Ed. 260 (1897)). See also Kirkpatrick Oil & Gas Company v. United States, 675 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir. 1982) (state oil and gas communitization order may not bind federal land without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior.) (d) Federal preemption is generally made manifest in either of two ways, both

of which are present in this case: If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is pre-empted. If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. California Coastal Comm'n, 480 U.S. at 581 (holding that California environmental permit requirement did not involve land use or fall within the federal government's preemption of land use involving federal lands.) (Citations and internal quotations omitted). See also Wyoming v. United States, id. (federal management and regulation of federal wildlife refuges may preempt

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state management and regulation to the extent the two conflict, or where state management and regulation stand as obstacle to accomplishment of full purposes and objectives of federal government). (e) Here, Congress has expressed its intent to occupy fully the relevant field

by granting the U.S. Department of Agriculture the authority to "[p]rotect, manage, and administer the national forests . . . [and t]his delegation covers the acquisition and disposition of lands and interest in lands as may be authorized for the protection, management, and administration of the National Forest System." 7 C.F.R. § 2.60(a)(2) and 7 C.F.R. § 2.20(a)(2)(ii); 16 U.S.C. § 551. (f) The County's reliance on Colorado's 35-acre state subdivision law to

frustrate the Proposed Global Settlement and the United States' conveyance of Parcel A is not only in conflict with federal law, but is an obstacle to the Secretary of Agriculture's lawful decision, as authorized by Congress, to determine the disposition of national forest land, including Parcel A. Also noteworthy is that Colorado law expressly provides that local land use authority ends "where other procedural or substantive requirements for the planning for or regulation of the use of land are provided by law...." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 29-20-107. 4. Given its broad land use authority, the Secretary of Agriculture may dispose of

sovereign federal lands in a manner, as here, consistent with the Secretary's statutory authority and the public health, safety, and welfare, without local interference. To hold otherwise would subject the United States and all federal lands to the conflicting vagaries of states' subdivision

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laws and violate the clear intent of the Property and Supremacy Clauses. U.S. CONST ., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 and Art. VI, cl. 2. 5. For these reasons the County's objection to the Settling Parties' Proposed Global

Settlement is overruled. THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that the Motion for an order approving the Settling Parties' Proposed Global Settlement be, and the same hereby is, granted. This Order Approving Proposed Global Settlement concerns the above-numbered fifteen federal quiet title actions pending in this District and all of the lands described in the proposed Settlement Agreement and Release attached to the Motion (Attachments 2 through 7 [Exs. B through F] to Docket No. 30), specifically incorporated here by this reference. THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS that the Settling Parties shall, within 15 days hereof, execute and file with the Court a Stipulated Notice of Dismissal of the consolidated civil actions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), dismissing the fifteen civil actions with prejudice. The Notice shall reflect that this Court will retain ancillary jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement and Release (Attachments 2 through 7 [Exs. B through F] to Docket No. 30) for purposes of enforcement pursuant to the holding in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994). Dated this ______ day of __________________________, 2008. BY THE COURT __________________________________ WALKER D. MILLER U.S. District Court Judge

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