Free Order Dismissing Case (1915) - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

- G Case 1:05-cv—00875-KAJ Document 6 Filed 03/17/2006 Page1 of4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 - gn ·,
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE 2...;-........, 5 .1.
TYRONE H. GUINN, )
Plaintiff, g
v. g Civ. N0. 05-875-KAJ
NICOLE M. WALKER, g
Defendant. g
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Tyrone H. Guinn ("Guinn"), an inmate at the Delaware Correctional
Center ("DCC") brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. '§ 1983. He appears
pro se and on November 19, 2004, was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (D.I. 3.) I will now proceed to review and screen the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A.
For the reasons discussed below, I am dismissing the complaint as frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
I. THE COMPLAINT
Guinn alleges that defendant Nicole M. Walker ("Walker"), a public defender for
the State of Delaware, caused him to be found guilty of a crime (i.e., assault) he did not
commit. In essence Guinn alleges that Walker did not provide him with effective
assistance of counsel. More specifically, he alleges that Walker failed to subpoena
witnesses, failed to cross-examine witnesses, and failed to defend his "decisions of not
guilty".

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He seeks compensatory damages for the cost of his conviction due to his
counse|'s ineffectiveness, and for his mental anguish for being housed in the Security
Housing Unit ("SHU") at the DCC.
Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a litigant proceeds in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides for
dismissal under certain circumstances. When a prisoner seeks redress in a civil action,
28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides for screening of the complaint by the Court. Both 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915/—\(b)(1) provide that the Court may dismiss a
complaint, at any time, if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. An action is frivolous if it "Iacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
The court must "accept as true factual allegations inthe complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom? Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65
(3d Cir. 1996)(citing Holder v. City ofAllentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Additionally, pro se complaints are held to "|ess stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by |awyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim
when "it appears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief."' Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521
(1972)(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. PIaintiff’s Habeas Claim
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To the extent that Guinn attempts to challenge his conviction and/or sentence,
his sole federal remedy for challenging the fact or duration of his confinement is by way
of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Moreover, a plaintiff
cannot recover under § 1983 for alleged wrongful incarceration unless he proves that
the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck
v. Humphrey, 312 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). In the case at bar, Guinn has not alleged that
his conviction or sentence was reversed or invalidated, as required by Heck. As is
evident from his Hlings, he remains incarcerated at the DCC. Accordingly, to the extent
Guinn seeks damages for his current incarceration, his claim rests on an "inarguable
legal conclusion" and is therefore frivolous. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326.
B. State Actor
Guinn is quite clear in his complaint that he brings suit against Walker on the
basis that, according to him, she provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel.
When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived
him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color
of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Moore v. Tariler, 986 F.2d 682,
685 (3d Cir.1993).
As alleged by Gulnn, Walker is a public defender for the State of Delaware.
Public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s
traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in criminal proceedings. Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Harmon v. De/aware Secretary of State,154 Fed.Appx.
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283, 284-85 (3d Cir. 2005). Because Walker is not considered a state actor, Guinn’s
claim against her falls under § 1983.
Therefore, I am dismissing, without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) and §1915A(b)(1) the ineffective assistance of counsel claim brought
against Walker for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Tyrone I—l. Gulnn' complaint is DISIVIISSED
without prejudice as legally and frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and §
1915A(b)(1). Amendment ofthe complaint would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002); Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950,
951-52 (3d. Cir. 1978).
T i {
UNIT D STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
l\/larch 17, 2008
Wilmington, Delaware
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