Free Answering Brief in Opposition - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

JOSEPH N. GIELATA, Plaintiff, v. ANDREA L. ROCANELLI, individually and in her official capacity as Chief Counsel of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel for the Supreme Court of Delaware, and THE OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE, Defendants. Civil Action No. 05-567 GMS

PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERING BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Dated: April 3, 2006 Joseph N. Gielata (# 4338) 501 Silverside Road, No. 90 Wilmington, Delaware 19809 (302) 798-1096 Pro Se

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TABLE OF CONTENTS NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Background of the Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 The PayPal Litigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Rocanelli Forces Plaintiff to Abort the Objection Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Rocanelli's Vendetta Escalates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 I. II. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CREATING ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FOR ROCANELLI AND THE ODC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 A. The Defendants Do Not Decide Cases, and They Are Not Entitled To Absolute Judicial Immunity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 1. Only public officials who decide cases are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Rocanelli and the ODC do not decide cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

2. B.

The Defendants May Not Claim Absolute Immunity Under Any Other Common Law Doctrine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 The Policies Underlying Common Law Absolute Immunities Do Not Support Such Immunity for the ODC and its Head. . . . . . . . . . . 16 1. Holding Rocanelli and the ODC liable will not cause a flood of vexatious litigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Liability for Rocanelli and the ODC serves important public purposes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

C.

2.

III.

THE ODC IS NOT ENTITLED TO ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY BECAUSE ANY RECOVERY AGAINST IT WILL NOT COME FROM THE STATE TREASURY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

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IV.

THIS COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS AGAINST ROCANELLI AND THE ODC IS SETTLED LAW OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . 21 A. B. This Court's Exercise of Jurisdiction is Law of the Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is Inapplicable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

V.

THE COMPLAINT STATES VIABLE § 1983 CLAIMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A. B. Noerr-Pennington Does Not Bar Plaintiff's Claims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Counts 1 Through 10 All State Viable § 1983 Claims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

VI.

THE COMPLAINT STATES VIABLE COMMON LAW CLAIMS. . . . . . . . . 33 A. B. C. D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Tortious Interference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Malicious Prosecution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Rule 10 is Inapplicable and Void. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

VII.

THE COMPLAINT STATES A JUSTICIABLE CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page

Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.15 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Amy v. The Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136 (1870) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718 (6th Cir 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Bishop v. State Bar of Texas, 736 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.11 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Brooks v. New Hampshire Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633 (1st Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n.13 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,11,15 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.5

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Calkins v. Summer, 13 Wis. 193 (1860) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668 (3d Cir. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392 (11th Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20,21 In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.19 In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.19 In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Chiropractic Alliance of New Jersey v. Parisi, 854 F. Supp. 299 (D.N.J. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.11 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 54 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.5 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 & n.7 Cyprus v. Diskin, 936 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Pa. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 Ernst v. Child & Youth Services, 108 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.7 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S. Ct. 1517 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24,25

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Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.21 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .passim Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.15 Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 Green v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc., 310 A.2d 638 (Del. 1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.20 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,18 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Hoffman v. Harris, 114 S. Ct. 1631 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

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In re Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D.N.M. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n.19 Hospital Council of Western Pennsylvania v. City of Pittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.20 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .passim Irwin & Leighton, Inc. v. W.M. Anderson Co., 532 A.2d 983 (Del. Ch. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.7 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 Lloyd v. Jefferson, 53 F. Supp. 2d 643 (D. Del. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .passim Lockridge v. Board of Trustees of University of Arkansas, 315 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 Marchese v. Umstead, 110 F. Supp. 2d 361 (E.D. Pa. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.20 McClendon v. Coverdale, 203 A.2d 815 (Del. Super. 1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 In re Member of Bar, 257 A.2d 382 (Del. 1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

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Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.7 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .passim Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.18 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Partin v. Arkansas State Board of Law Examiners, 863 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Ark. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Pawlak v. Nix, 1996 WL 560360 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.11 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Prevost v. Twp. of Hazlet, 159 Fed. Appx. 396 (3d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 Public Citizen Health Research Group v. National Inst. Of Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.D.C. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.7 Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 651 (N.D. Cal. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.19 Roadcloud v. Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole, No. 05-3787, 2006 WL 83453 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

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Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of First Republic Bank Corp. v. FDIC, 749 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Tex. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.7 Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim In re Solomon, 886 A.2d 1266 (Del. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8,10 Tackett v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 653 A.2d. 254 (Del. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Taylor v. Kentucky State Bar Association, 424 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 The Doyle, 105 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.10 Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.15 Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14,17 Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 197 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Del. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Tse v. Ventana Medical Systems, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 213 (D. Del. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 1073 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

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Watkins v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, No. 02-2881, 2002 WL 32182088 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 We, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia Dept. of Licenses and Inspections, 983 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Pa. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n.12 We, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Wichert v. Walter, 606 F. Supp. 1516 (D.N.J. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.11 Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Wright v. United States, 139 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .n.7

Statutes:

Page

U.S. Constitution, First Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .passim U.S. Constitution, Fourth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 U.S. Constitution, Sixth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 U.S. Constitution, Eleventh Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-21 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)(aa) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 29 U.S.C. §§ 151­169 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29-30 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30-31 Delaware Constitution, Article I, § 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Delaware Constitution, Article II, § 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

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10 Del. C. § 161(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 10 Del. C. § 161(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 16 Del. C. § 6801 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 18 Del. C. § 2409 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 29 Del. C. § 9008A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Del. Lawyers' R. Disciplinary P. 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35-37

Other Authorities:

Page

Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers 9 (1890) . . . . .11 J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L. J. 879 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 935 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Mary Miller Johnston, Bar Discipline, in DELAWARE SUPREME COURT: GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951-2001 395 (Justice Randy J. Holland and Helen L. Winslow, Esq. eds., 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110 (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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This answering brief is respectfully submitted by Joseph N. Gielata ("Plaintiff"), a Delaware attorney, in opposition to the motion to dismiss and opening brief in support thereof ("Def. Br.") submitted by defendants Andrea L. Rocanelli ("Rocanelli") and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (the "ODC"). NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING This case involves a public official who abused the influence of her office to benefit her family and friends. As head of the ODC, Rocanelli deliberately sought to destroy Plaintiff's liberty, livelihood and reputation, simply because he challenged the interests of those close to her. By initiating multiple bogus probes at the behest of former colleagues, and by instigating an absurd criminal proceeding at the behest of one of the world's largest corporations, the defendants have ridden roughshod over Plaintiff's rights, in the process violating this country's Constitution as well as federal and state laws. This action was commenced on August 2, 2005, one week after criminal proceedings were instituted by the State of Delaware (the "State") against Plaintiff. On that date, Plaintiff moved to temporarily enjoin the criminal proceedings as well as a follow-on proceeding initiated by the ODC to suspend Plaintiff's law license on an interim basis. A hearing before the Honorable Norma L. Shapiro was held that afternoon, at which the ODC was represented by Patricia Bartley Schwartz, Esq. by phone. In a carefully written order, Judge Shapiro reasoned that sovereign immunity barred Plaintiff's claims against the State and prosecutorial immunity barred Plaintiff's claims against Deputy Attorney General Sean Lugg, ordering: "Defendants Sean Lugg and The State of Delaware are DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction." (D.I. 5 #7.) In contrast to these immunity determinations, Judge Shapiro held that the Court has jurisdiction over the claims against Rocanelli and the ODC. Neither Rocanelli nor the ODC moved for

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reconsideration of Judge Shapiro's order or filed a notice of appeal therefrom. 1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), Judge Shapiro transferred the suit to this District. On August 9, 2005, a panel of the Supreme Court of Delaware determined to continue indefinitely the ODC's suspension petition and ordered Rocanelli's recusal from any further proceeding involving Plaintiff. The Supreme Court panel permitted Plaintiff to continue practicing law subject to certain notification conditions. On January 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint, asserting claims for compensatory relief to be determined at trial and for injunctive and declaratory relief. In the related criminal matter against Plaintiff, motions to dismiss for failure to state an offense and other dispositive motions have been filed. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 1. The defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity. Rocanelli is neither

a judge nor a prosecutor. Her misconduct took the form of frivolous and bad-faith inquisitions--not judicial or prosecutorial acts. Neither the ODC nor any predecessor entity existed in the nineteenth century, and therefore the absolute immunity afforded to the class of persons protected by judicial immunity when the Civil Rights Act was enacted is not available to the ODC or Rocanelli. Moreover, the ODC is privately funded and therefore is not entitled to the State's immunity from suit. 2. 3. This Court's jurisdiction over Rocanelli and the ODC is law of the case. The Complaint states viable Civil Rights Act claims for constitutional

violations, interference with the right to make and enforce contracts, and impairment of a right conferred by federal statute. 4.
1

The Complaint states viable common law claims.

This Court has since denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the State. (D.I. 29.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not seek reconsideration of Judge Shapiro's Younger abstention holding, but this is plainly inaccurate, as the issue was expressly raised twice. (D.I. 8 at 4; D.I. 11 at 3 n.4.)

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5.

The Complaint states a justiciable declaratory judgment claim. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS

Background of the Defendants The ODC was created in 1984. See Mary Miller Johnston, Bar Discipline, in DELAWARE SUPREME COURT: GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951-2001 395, 397 (Justice Randy J. Holland and Helen L. Winslow, Esq. eds., 2001) (hereinafter, "Bar Discipline").2 Though charged with regulating Delaware attorneys, the ODC does not adjudicate disciplinary proceedings, weigh evidence or decide disciplinary sanctions. These adjudicatory functions belong solely to the Preliminary Review Committee, the Board on Professional Responsibility, and the Delaware Supreme Court. Ibid. At all times relevant to this action, Rocanelli was chief counsel of the ODC. Prior to her employment by the ODC, Rocanelli was employed by a prominent Delaware corporate law firm (the "Delaware Firm"). ¶¶ 5, 64.3 The PayPal Litigation In 2004, Plaintiff was retained to file suit in Delaware against PayPal, Inc. ("PayPal") on behalf of an aggrieved PayPal user to enforce contractual rights. ¶ 55. PayPal retained the Delaware Firm. ¶ 57. The suit was voluntarily withdrawn, with the right to re-file expressly reserved. ¶ 58. Soon thereafter, PayPal announced a proposed settlement of a California class action which potentially would release claims asserted in Plaintiff's Delaware suit. ¶ 59. As a class action practitioner, Plaintiff quickly spotted numerous flaws with the proposed nationwide settlement. ¶ 60. Realizing that the flawed settlement would benefit PayPal immensely while providing grossly inadequate consideration to aggrieved
Its predecessor, the Censor Committee, was created in 1942. Id. at 395. Before the creation of the Censor Committee, the Delaware Supreme Court alone regulated the practice of law within the State. Ibid. 3 References to "¶ _" are to paragraphs in the amended complaint (D.I. 25) (the "Complaint").
2

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class members, Plaintiff began drafting an objection to the settlement and planning and preparing for an objection campaign to persuade the district court overseeing the class action to deny approval of the proposed settlement. ¶¶ 60-62. Rocanelli Forces Plaintiff to Abort the Objection Campaign The Delaware Firm decided to call in a favor from Rocanelli, its former employee. ¶ 64. Demonstrating her allegiance to the Delaware Firm, Rocanelli initiated a probe purportedly inquiring into Plaintiff's professional conduct. Ibid. This sham inquiry, lacking any legal or logical foundation, was designed to harass and intimidate Plaintiff. ¶¶ 64-65. Unaware of Rocanelli's connection to the Delaware Firm, Plaintiff met with Rocanelli on or about August 17, 2005 to fully explain the propriety of his conduct, but quickly discovered that Rocanelli's true aim had nothing to do with a goodfaith investigation, and everything to do with protecting PayPal. ¶ 65. In particular, Plaintiff advised Rocanelli that he intended to campaign against PayPal's proposed class action settlement, even showing Rocanelli a draft of the objection that Plaintiff intended to circulate and file in federal court. ¶ 66. Rocanelli's hostility and animus was immediately obvious. Ibid. Indeed, her subsequent actions clearly demonstrated her illegitimate antagonism. As the meeting concluded, Rocanelli advised Plaintiff to retain counsel and soon thereafter contacted the State's Attorney General office to instigate a criminal investigation. ¶¶ 66-67. As a result of Rocanelli's baseless inquiry, Plaintiff was placed on a leave of absence by his employer. ¶ 67. Plaintiff soon received veiled threats from lawyers involved in the PayPal class action to abandon the planned objection campaign. ¶¶ 6869. Faced with such overwhelming retaliation, Plaintiff was forced to abort the objection campaign. ¶ 70. But his efforts to seek justice in other ways against PayPal's corrupt enterprise would not die so quickly. ¶¶ 71-72. Nor would Rocanelli's animus. -4-

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Rocanelli's Vendetta Escalates On June 6, 2005, Plaintiff, as counsel, filed a derivative suit against officers of MBNA Corporation ("MBNA"), unaware that Rocanelli's husband is an MBNA executive. ¶¶ 83-85. This prompted Rocanelli to initiate a second sham inquiry, just two weeks after the filing of the MBNA suit. ¶ 86. Once again, Rocanelli's "investigation" lacked any legal or logical basis. ¶ 87. Again, the bogus probe was based on a protest lodged by an adversary of the Plaintiff and, as with the first inquiry, the adversary was yet another of Rocanelli's former colleagues at the Delaware Firm. ¶¶ 76-80, 88. Plaintiff responded to the second bogus probe with a letter advising Rocanelli inter alia that he was involved in litigation against MBNA and that he would be leaving the country on July 25, 2005. ¶ 89. Rocanelli saw her opportunity to pounce. On the very day that Plaintiff left the country, the State sought and obtained an indictment against Plaintiff. ¶¶ 91-93. Rocanelli immediately thereafter filed an ODC petition to suspend Plaintiff's license to practice law. ¶ 100. Upon discovering this shocking series of events, Plaintiff rushed back to the United States, only to be seized by government agents upon arrival due to a bad-faith arrest warrant. ¶¶ 12-13, 98-99. Within three days of Plaintiff's release, this suit was commenced. A panel of the Delaware Supreme Court held a pre-hearing conference concerning the ODC petition and resolved to continue indefinitely a hearing on the petition, thereby allowing Plaintiff to continue to practice law subject to agreed-upon notification conditions. ¶ 104. The Supreme Court panel also ordered Rocanelli's recusal. Ibid. ARGUMENT This lawsuit raises the question of whether an attorney and an entity both entrusted with supervising Delaware lawyers can ever be held accountable for depriving litigants of their civil rights. Defendants seek to take refuge in absolute immunity. -5-

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However, defendants' invitation to radically expand the narrow class entitled to absolute immunity has no basis in precedent, history or policy. Absolute immunity from civil liability is the exception from the rule. It is reserved for a very few officials who must have such protection to ensure that they will unabashedly discharge their official tasks. Moreover, public officials--including even the President of the United States--do not get such blanket protection from their titles (as judges or legislators, for example), but from an examination of the actual work that they do. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694 (1997) (denying President immunity from § 1983 action arising out of unofficial conduct and reaffirming "functional approach" to immunity analysis). Adjudicators, legislators, and prosecutors are immune only when they act as judges, or when they legislate or debate, or when they initiate or conduct prosecutions. Witnesses are absolutely immune when they testify. When these actors do administrative or investigative work, they lose their absolute immunity and, like other public officials, they have a qualified immunity from suit. This qualified immunity from suit applies to the great majority of officials, from governors of states, senior aides to the President, prosecutors advising police officers, judges hiring court officers, and correctional officials, to agents of the federal government. If acting in good faith and not violating any clearly established legal rules, these officials are protected from suit. They are not so shielded, however, when they breach that faith and violate legal rights that are clearly established. ODC counsel and the entity that employs them are like the majority of governmental officials. Their work is not within any of the narrow categories to which absolute immunity attaches. Their administrative and investigative tasks are cabined completely by rules. Their duties include investigating complaints, converting those investigations into disciplinary petitions if legitimate violations are stated, and then -6-

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presenting such petitions to the Preliminary Review Committee, the Board on Professional Responsibility, and/or the Delaware Supreme Court. While the ODC may be important to enforcing the standards of the Delaware bar, its work is not adjudicatory, presidential, legislative, prosecutorial or testimonial. No public purposes are furthered by completely insulating State-empowered ODC attorneys from liability for constitutional violations of litigants' civil rights. Absent such absolute immunity, the Complaint is entirely viable. I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW In Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 197 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Del. 2002), this Court summarized the legal standards applicable to a motion to dismiss: The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of a complaint, not to resolve disputed facts or decide the merits of the case. When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and must draw all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The Court is not required to accept legal conclusions either alleged or inferred from the pleaded facts. Dismissal is only appropriate when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. The burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted rests on the movant. 197 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CREATING ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FOR ROCANELLI AND THE ODC The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that "the official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991). "The presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials

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in the exercise of their duties" and, therefore, the Supreme Court has been "quite sparing" in its recognition of absolute immunity. Id. at 486-87. Much of the litigation about immunities arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Section 1983 provides that "every person" who, acting "under color" of state law, causes another citizen to be deprived of his or her constitutional rights "shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While that statute is drafted in expansive language and "on its face admits of no immunities," Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976), the Supreme Court has concluded that, in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to "abolish wholesale all [then existing] common-law immunities." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1966). Certain immunities were so "well grounded in history and reason" that Congress could not have meant to eliminate them "by covert inclusion in the general language" of the statute. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). The Supreme Court has therefore read § 1983 "in harmony with the general [common-law] principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418. Qualified immunity was a defense for government officials at common law and, thus, the United States Supreme Court has adopted qualified immunity as the presumptive standard for all government officials in civil rights actions. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-42 (1974). Where, as here, an employee and her employer have claimed a right to absolute immunity, the Court must determine whether there is a legal source for this extraordinary protection. A few other governmental officials have been afforded absolute immunity under common law doctrines. These include judges acting in their judicial capacities (see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)), witnesses testifying in court (see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)), and

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prosecutors, while initiating a prosecution and presenting the government's case (see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)). When a defendant claims that he or she is entitled to absolute common-law immunity, the Court must examine the nature of immunities afforded to such officials in the common law and then assess the vitality of those common-law principles against contemporary norms. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983). The Supreme Court has indicated many times that qualified immunity represents a difficult balance that it has struck across the board, and that the Court will not afford absolute immunity to an official "in the absence of the most convincing showing that [absolute] immunity is necessary." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 434 (White, J., concurring); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Therefore, the defendants bear a "heavy burden" in their attempt to rebut the presumption of qualified immunity. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 642 (1987). The defendants in this case do not assert that they are entitled to absolute immunity under any constitutional provision. They claim, instead, absolute immunity under the common law. Their primary claim is that they are judicial actors and are therefore entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Hence, the Court must consider the nature of the work of the ODC and its attorneys and the extent to which that work fits within the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. As explained in part A, below, ODC attorneys do not decide cases. They fill an investigative and ministerial role, and are therefore not entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Next, as set forth in part B, below, there is no other common law source under which the ODC and its counsel can claim absolute immunity from suit. Neither the ODC nor any predecessor entity existed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century; specialized disciplinary oversight over lawyers is a twentieth century phenomenon. In 1871, Delaware state courts did not have official disciplinary counsel. Because there was -9-

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no common-law tradition of official disciplinary proceedings, there was no common-law tradition of affording absolute immunity to disciplinary counsel. Moreover, any attempt to equate disciplinary counsel to other court participants fails. Finally, as explained in part C, below, none of the purposes that underlie the provision of absolute immunity are served by so insulating the ODC and its counsel. There is no public purpose in permitting ODC attorneys to stray from the narrow set of duties imposed upon them. Unlike the judges whom we hope to protect from retaliation from unpopular judgments, the prosecutors who must choose who to prosecute and how, and the witnesses who need to speak without threat of any kind of lawsuit, the ODC merits no such shield. Indeed, the ODC and its attorneys should be held accountable for complying with their obligations to provide independent and unbiased review of complaints against Delaware attorneys. A. The Defendants Do Not Decide Cases, and They Are Not Entitled To Absolute Judicial Immunity 1. Only public officials who decide cases are entitled to absolute judicial immunity

The common law has long afforded judges absolute immunity for their judicial acts. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); see also J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L. J. 879 (1980). An array of justifications support absolute immunity for those whose primary task is adjudication. Judges are guaranteed to displease someone by almost every adjudication they undertake. 4 Judges are insulated from liability because of the potential intimidation that large numbers of lawsuits can bring. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27

4

"[T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226 (1988).

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(1988); see generally, Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110 (1981). The "touchstone" of a judicial act is that it applies to the "performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights." Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Hence, "[w]here an official is not called upon to exercise...judicial discretion, courts have properly refused to extend to him the protection of absolute judicial immunity, regardless of any apparent relationship of his role to the judicial system." McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between those acts that are "judicial" and those that are "administrative." Only the "judicial" acts are protected by absolute immunity. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227-29.5 This distinction has always been in our law. Just like their modern-day counterparts, nineteenth-century judges performed both "judicial" and "ministerial" acts. Prior to 1871, the common law recognized absolute judicial immunity for judges acting in their judicial capacity. A functional approach determined which individuals qualified for such a broad protection. Judicial officers were "those whose duties are to decide controversies between individuals and accusations...against persons charged with a violation of the law." Floyd R. Mechem, A

The doctrine of absolute immunity extends to only a small, clearly defined bundle of acts performed by the official, and not to the official per se. Thus, for example, while a judge is completely immunized when performing "the paradigmatic judicial acts involved in resolving disputes" (Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227), this protection does not include work done in his or her non-judicial duties. Judges have thus been held liable for their administrative acts such as employment decisions (id.), and the preparation of lists of available jurors. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). Similarly, governors of states and correctional officials perform tasks central to our polity, but again do so without absolute immunity from suit. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). That judicial immunity stems from the task, and not the person performing them, is also clear from other controlling cases. Judges outside of the courtroom, and judges in the executive branch, also have absolute judicial immunity for adjudicatory work. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). Further, not all those who do make quasi-judicial decisions have that full immunity. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 203-06 (1985) (members of prison disciplinary committee are not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because they are not "neutral and detached" and because they do not fill a "classic" adjudicatory role).

5

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Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers 9 (1890) (citing BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY). Whether a judge was entitled to judicial immunity turned upon "whether the given act shall be considered as judicial or ministerial in its character." Id. at 441; see also Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 935, 945, 949 n.54 (1989). As early as 1879, judges were held liable for acts that were considered ministerial, rather than adjudicative. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). Hence, the liability ­ rather than the immunity ­ of ministerial officers was well established in the common law. See, e.g., Amy v. The Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136, 138 (1870) (noting an "unbroken current of authorities" holding that a public officer may be liable for failure to perform a ministerial act). 2. Rocanelli and the ODC do not decide cases

The ODC screens complaints, gathers evidence, translates viable complaints into petitions for sanctions, and presents such petitions to decision-making bodies. The Preliminary Review Committee, not the ODC, decides whether a complaint merits presentment to the Board on Professional Responsibility. The Board, not the ODC, then decides whether the evidence proves a violation under the appropriate standard, and that decision is subject to review by the Delaware Supreme Court, not the ODC. Lacking any precedent directly on point, defendants rely upon a line of nonbinding cases involving adjudicatory bodies comparable, at most, to the Preliminary Review Committee or the Board on Professional Responsibility. (Def. Br. at 7, 12-13.) All these cases are therefore inapposite, since the ODC does not adjudicate. For instance, Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n is not comparable or persuasive because there, the Court observed that, like the Preliminary Review Committee in Delaware, the "Grievance Committee reviews an initial complaint and investigates to decide if a prima facie case of improper conduct exists; if so, a formal hearing is held." 983 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir - 12 -

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1993). As with the Delaware Supreme Court, "[t]he supreme court ultimately decides what discipline should be given." Ibid. See In re Solomon, 886 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Del. 2005) ("[T]his Court has the exclusive authority to discipline members of the Delaware Bar."). Likewise, in Pawlak v. Nix, an unreported decision, the defendants included members of the Board of Law Examiners--which appears to be a decision-making body. 1996 WL 560360, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1996). In Carroll v. Gross, although it is not clear, the defendants appear to have been members of a grievance committee--again, a decision-making body. 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978)). The summary affirmance of dismissal in Carroll offers no persuasive grounds to create absolute immunity for the ODC or its attorneys. The ODC provides an important service to the Delaware legal system. 6 Delaware attorneys are officers of the judiciary and their supervision instills public confidence. But that does not transform the functions of the ODC and its attorneys into judicial acts. Judicial immunity does not come from working in a court. It does not come from being part of the legal system. It comes from judging. ODC attorneys do not decide cases. The ODC is not empowered to weigh evidence or decide whether sanctions might be appropriate. ODC attorneys are not even permitted to choose which complaints to investigate, nor are they authorized to impose any sanctions. 7 Because the ODC and its attorneys do not decide cases, they are not entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
6

It should be noted that Rocanelli represents the ODC, not the State. Indeed, the State does not even pay Rocanelli's salary or the expenses of the ODC. See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 64(f)&(g), discussed infra. 7 Except for one passing reference (Def. Br. at 35), offered without support, the defendants do not suggest or contend that they are entitled to prosecutorial immunity. If defendants raise a prosecutorial immunity argument in their reply brief, it should not be considered. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. National Inst. Of Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2002) ("The Court highly disfavors parties creating new arguments at the reply stage that were not fully briefed during the litigation." (citing Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of First Republic Bank Corp. v. FDIC, 749 F. Supp. 758, 772 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (noting that defendant "raised its third argument for the first time in its reply brief and the court will not consider it in deciding the motion to dismiss.")); Wright v. United States, 139 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The reason for this rule of waiver is that a reply brief containing new theories deprives the respondent of an opportunity to brief those new issues."). In any case, the gravamen of the Complaint is

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B.

The Defendants May Not Claim Absolute Immunity Under Any Other Common Law Doctrine

Defendants do not point to any historical or common-law basis for absolute immunity. In 1871, Delaware courts did not appoint any official(s) to perform a function that mirrors the modern-day functions of the ODC. Bar Discipline at 395. Not until the twentieth century was an office created to receive and handle complaints against attorneys. Ibid. Ethics complaints by adversaries (rather than by clients), such as those at issue in the Complaint, did not even emerge until the 1970's. Id. at 397. When, as here, an official seeking immunity performs a function that did not generally exist prior to 1871, this Court has sometimes examined whether common-law immunities were historically afforded to officials performing analogous duties. See, e.g., Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 921 (1984) (examining the common-law tort liability of English Barristers to determine whether modern-day public defenders should be accorded immunity); Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993) (denying court reporter absolute immunity in large part because official court reporters did not begin appearing in state courts until the late 19th century). Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529-36 (1984) (examining the King's prerogative writs to determine whether federal injunctive relief may be awarded against a state judge); Hoffman v. Harris, 114 S. Ct. 1631, 1632 (1994) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)

directed to conduct that was not prosecutorial in nature. Cf. Imbler, supra, 424 U.S. at 430 (absolute prosecutorial immunity extends to those functions "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process") (emphasis added). It is well-established that "absolute immunity does not extend to investigative or administrative acts." Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 376 n.6 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Ernst v. Child & Youth Services, 108 F.3d 486, 494 (3d Cir. 1997)). The Complaint alleges that the defendants performed investigative or administrative acts to deprive Plaintiff of his rights. Even if the defendants could claim that they performed prosecutorial acts--which they do not--such a claim would only shelter their conduct with absolute immunity insofar as they served a prosecutorial function. "This point is perhaps best illustrated by the determination that the senior law enforcement official in the Nation--the Attorney General of the United States--is protected only by qualified, rather than absolute, immunity when engaged in the performance of national defense functions rather than prosecutorial functions." Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)).

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(if "social workers [did not] enjoy[] absolute immunity for their official duties in 1871 [then] absolute immunity is unavailable to [them] under § 1983"). As already discussed, ODC attorneys are not like judges. Thus, they are not entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Two other sets of actors, prosecutors and witnesses, appear in court and have been accorded absolute immunity from suit. The protections afforded to both of them do not justify a similar immunity for ODC attorneys. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, The judicial process is an arena of open conflict, and in virtually every case there is, if not always a winner, at least one loser. It is inevitable that many of those who lose will pin the blame on judges, prosecutors or witnesses and will bring suit against them in an effort to relitigate the underlying conflict. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521-22 (1984) (citation omitted). Harassing litigation could deflect the attention of officials from their public duties. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 423. Indeed, "the mere threat of litigation may significantly affect the fearless and independent performance of duty by actors in the judicial process." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 522. They will "shade" their decisions, rather than exercise the "independence of judgment required by [their] public trust." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423. For these reasons, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case." Id. at 431. Nevertheless, prosecutors receive no similar protection when performing non-prosecutorial acts such as conducting an investigation, providing legal advice to the police (Burns, 500 U.S. at 494-95) or making statements at a press conference (Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1993)). Witnesses are also entitled to absolute immunity as a testimonial privilege. The common law provided such a safeguard because liability could create an unacceptable

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roadblock on "the paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth." Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. at 332-33 (quoting Calkins v. Summer, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860)). Similarly, the Supreme Court has acknowledged absolute immunity for juries who are required to evaluate the facts, and reach conclusions as to the ultimate disposition of a case. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225-26. Comparing ODC attorneys' work to that of witnesses, prosecutors, and jurors makes plain that none of the rationales that support absolute immunity applies. ODC attorneys do not ma ke judgment calls about which complaints to investigate (Bar Discipline at 399), whether the evidence is sufficient to prove a violation, or what, if any, disciplinary sanctions are appropriate. In addition to the historical/functional comparison above, the specific kind of conduct at issue in the Complaint--i.e. questionable ODC inquiries triggered by tactical protests lodged by sophisticated adversaries, rather than complaints by clients or judicial referrals--did not even exist in Delaware prior to the 1970s. See Bar Discipline at 397. Accordingly, no immunity at common law could have existed in 1871 to shield such investigations from suit even when initiated or conducted in bad faith. In short, ODC attorneys have no true predecessors in the courts of the nineteenth century. That the work of the ODC and its attorneys is in some way related to the judiciary does not, standing alone, provide a sufficient basis for absolute immunity. When the work of ODC attorneys today is compared with the tasks of judges, prosecutors, jurors or witnesses, the differences are so marked as to make plain that absolute immunity cannot cloak the ODC and its attorneys. C. The Policies Underlying Common Law Absolute Immunities Do Not Support Such Immunity for the ODC and its Head

A final step to analyzing a claim of absolute immunity under § 1983 actions is to look at the contemporary context. In cases filed under § 1983, this Court has not taken its - 16 -

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role to be one of "freez[ing] into permanent law whatever principles were current in 1871." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 34 n.2. Rather, the Court has reviewed justifications for immunity to assess their present-day validity in light of the purposes of civil rights litigation. Id.; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-29. But see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. at 922-23 ("We do not have a license to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the interests of what we judge to be sound public policy."). Indeed, the need to weigh the costs and benefits of the immunity doctrine are especially pressing when the common law offers less than definitive guidance. Smith, 461 U.S. at 93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Here, the provision of absolute immunity to the ODC and its attorneys serves neither the interests of the administration of justice nor the rights of litigants. Moreover, qualified immunity will more than adequately protect any legitimate concerns. 1. Holding Rocanelli and the ODC liable will not cause a flood of vexatious litigation

Defendants do not advance any policy argument or contend that a failure to extend absolute immunity to them will cause a flood of vexatious litigation and thereby frustrate their functions. Defendants point to no evidence that ODC proceedings are typically acrimonious or frequently produce ancillary suits. Indeed, such proceedings often appear to be largely uncontested, with the respondent often stipulating to findings of fact and violations.8 A review of state and federal jurisprudence in Delaware reveals no suits similar to the instant Complaint or comparable history of similar litigation. Accordingly, there is no basis to suggest that public policy weighs in favor of extending absolute immunity to defendants.

8

While the confidentiality of such proceedings necessarily limits this observation, it also weighs against any policy-based argument for absolute immunity. Cf. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 522 ("National security tasks, by contrast [to litigation in open court], are carried out in secret; open conflict and overt winners and losers are rare. Under such circumstances, it is far more likely that actual abuses will go uncovered than that fancied abuses will give rise to unfounded and burdensome litigation.").

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2.

Liability for Rocanelli and the ODC serves important public purposes

Civil rights actions represent a unique means of safeguarding those values we regard as most fundamental. In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees. It is this recognition that has required the denial of absolute immunity to most public officers. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 814. This is especially true in the case of the ODC and its counsel. ODC attorneys who, like Rocanelli, wrongfully exploit their office to benefit personal interests imperil public confidence in the Delaware legal system as well as cherished constitutional freedoms (e.g., the rights to choose counsel and to adequate representation), and civil rights actions are an important mechanism by which violations of this kind can be remedied. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223 ("[G]overnment officials are expected to make decisions...that above all are informed by considerations other than the personal interests of the decisionmaker." (emphasis added)). Liability here will have a "salutary effect" (id.), because it will give the ODC and its attorneys a strong incentive to fulfill their duties without conflicts of interest or animus and without violating the Constitution and federal laws. Cf. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524 ("We do not believe that the security of the Republic will be threatened if its Attorney General is given incentives to abide by clearly established law."). That liability benefits not only the parties to disciplinary proceedings but the courts and the public as well.

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III.

THE ODC IS NOT ENTITLED TO ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY BECAUSE ANY RECOVERY AGAINST IT WILL NOT COME FROM THE STATE TREASURY The ODC contends that it is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. 9

(Def. Br. at 13.) The Eleventh Amendment, adopted in response to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), has been construed to preclude suits against any of the United States. However, the Complaint alleges at ¶ 23 that the ODC is an entity privately funded by assessments paid by lawyers. Delaware Supreme Court Rule 64(g) states this clearly: Funding. ­ The annual expenses of the [ODC] shall be paid out of assessments made annually against the active members of the Bar of this Court, and from other such sources as are determined by the Court. See also Del. Supr. Ct. R. 64(f) ("The expenses of [ODC] counsel and staff, administrative costs, and all other expenses relating to disciplinary matters shall be paid in accordance with subsection (g) of this rule."). Thus, the ODC cannot reasonably assert an Eleventh Amendment defense. 10 Eleventh Amendment immunity is an affirmative defense and the burden is thus on the ODC to establish its immunity from suit. See Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he party asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity (and standing to benefit from its acceptance) bears the burden of proving its applicability."). The Third Circuit "determine[s] Eleventh Amendment

The Complaint's claims for compensatory relief are brought against Rocanelli in solely her personal capacity. ¶ 21. Thus, Rocanelli cannot claim Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Lloyd v. Jefferson, 53 F. Supp. 2d 643, 681 (D. Del. 1999) ("plaintiff points out that she has brought these claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, and, thus, sovereign immunity is not applicable as a defense"). 10 Defendants contend that the initial complaint's single description of the ODC as an arm of the Delaware Supreme Court constitutes a judicial admission that the ODC is an arm of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. (Def. Br. at 16.) As set forth herein, the description was modified in the Complaint to reflect subsequent investigation and the Delaware Supreme Court's own rules. Judicial admissions are limited to facts admitted unequivocally, but whether the ODC is an arm of the state is a question of law. Accordingly, this single inaccurate phrase, concerning a conclusion of law, in a pleading superseded by the Complaint, should be disregarded because it does not explicitly refer to the El