Free Letter - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

Case 1 :05-cv—00284-GIVIS Document 84 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 1 of 3
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February 23, 2006
‘·/{A E—F1`LIN G
The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet `
U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware
844 N. King Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
Re: Echevarria v U-Haul International, Inc., et. al.
C. A. No. 05-284-GMS
Dear Judge Sleet:
A Pre—Trial Conference in this matter was held on February 13, 2007. At the Conference,
a question arose as to whether Defendant Roger Mayfield is entitled to contest damages and to
present evidence related to the apportionment of liability at the upcoming trial, since a default
has been entered against him. The Court requested that each party submit a Memorandum of
Law setting forth its position on this issue. The following is Defendant Roger Mayfield’s
Memorandum in response to the Cou1t’s request.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default pursuant to Fed.R..C.P. 55(a) against Defendant Roger
Mayfield ("Mr. Mayfield") on August 15, 2005, which was granted by this Court on October 5,
2005. Mr. Mayfield filed a motion to vacate the default, which was subsequently denied hy this
Court. Trial is currently scheduled to begin on March 5, 2007. As will be discussed more fully
herein, while Mr. Mayfield may not contest the factual allegations against him as pled in the
Complaint, he is entitled participate in the trial in order to contest the damages claimed bythe
Plaintiff Moreover, since the Complaint seeks to hold Mr. Mayfield and Defendant U—Haui
jointly liable, Mr. Mayfiled may present evidence related to the apportionment of liability
between himself and Defendant U-Haul.

The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
pagc jg Case 1:05-cv—00284-Gl\/IS Document 84 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 2 of 3
February 23, 2007
A consequence of the entry of default against a defendant is that "the factual allegations
of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true."
Contdyne L Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3"I Cir. 1990); 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M.
Kane, F erleral Practice and Procedure, § 2688 at 444 (2d cd. 1983)(citing T lrontson v. Wooster,
114 U.S. 104 (1885). When a plaintiff obtains a default against a defendant as to liability, ifthe
damages are not for "a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, the
court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper.
Cornclyne L Inc. 908 F.2d at 1 149; Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(1)—(2). Claims for personal injuries are
typically not "sums certain" which can "by computation be made certain;" rather, they are
considered to be “unliquidated damages," which must be determined by evidentiary hearings,
even when a defendant has defaulted. F inc/1 v. Big Chief Drilling Company, 56 F.R.D. 456, 457-
58 (ED. Tex. 1972); Brinton v. Gajj$rey, 554 F.Supp. 388, 389 (E.D.Pa. 1983).
Furthermore, where a plaintiff has demanded a trial by jury pursuant to F ed.R.Civ.P.
38(h), a defendant who has defaulted as to liability is entitled to a trial by jury on the issue of
damages. See generally Korrnes v. Weis, Voisin & Co., Inc., 61 F.R.D. 608 (E.D.Penn. 1974);
Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913, 916 (3d. Cir. 1966)(noting, "For even one who fails to contest
liability on an unliquidated claim has a vital interest in the subsequent determination of damages
and is entitled to be heard on that matter.") Finally, in a hearing to determine damages, a
defaulting defendant may not deny or dispute any of the material facts adjudicated against him by
the default, but is entitled to present evidence to determine the extent of its liability and to
apportion liability among any co—defendants. See generally Felrllraber v. Indian Trails, Inc., 45
BRD. 285 (D.Del. 1968); Coniclyne 1, Inc., 908 F..'2d at 1149.
ln the case at hand, there is no question that Mr. Mayfield may not contest the well—pled
factual ·allegations against him in the Complaint since a default as been entered against him. ln
effect, he may not dispute that he was negligent as alleged in the Complaint. However,
Plaintiffs personal injury claims are clearly not "liquitlated,” and the amount, if any, of her
damages remains to he determined at trial. Furthermore, Plaintiff demanded a jury trial when she
Bled her Complaint. Mr. Mayfield has never consented to a withdrawal of the jury demand, as
the Plaintiff has never made any attempt to have the issue adjudicated otherwise. Accordingly, as
discussed, supra, Mr. Mayfield is certainly entitled to participate in the jury trial for the purpose
of contesting the damages.
Moreover, pursuant to Inrlian Trails, Mr. Mayfield may present evidence related to the
apportionment of liability between himself and Defendant U—Hau1 since the Plaintiff seeks to
hold them jointly liable for her alleged injuries. In Inciian Trails, the third party defendant had a
default entered against it, and later, at trial, the third party plaintiff was found to he liable to the
Plaintiff. 45 F.R.D. at 286. The third party plaintiff argued that it was entitled to a judgment for
_ contribution from the defaulting third party defendant amounting to the entire judgment assessed
against it. ltl. The third party defendant argued that the default operated only to admit liability,
leaving unresolved the extent of liability. Ta'. The Court agreed, and ultimately ordered a hearing
pursuant to Fed.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) in order to "assure an equitable distribution of the common
liability," since the issue had not been fairly addressed at trial. Irtrlian Trails, 45 F.R.D. at 287.

The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
pagc 3 Case 1:05-cv—00284-Gl\/IS Document 84 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 3 of 3
February 23, 2007
Similarly, in the case at bar, the jury will be required to apportion liability among the
defendants. It is important to note that Mr. Mayl;ield’s participation with respect to this aspect of
the case will not affect the Plaintiff" s cause of action; by operation of the default, Mr. Mayfield
will be liable for any amount awarded to the Plaintiff Mr. Mayfeld would be participating in
order to determine whether, and to what extent, the other defendants are also liable to the
Plaintiff. In other words, he should be able to participate in order to "assure an equitable
distribution Oftlle COITUUOH .. ............. .. . . ..... . ...... .... ........ ..... .. . ... .............. . .... . ..... .. . ..
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Roger Mayfield respectfully submits that he is
entitled to participate at hial for the limited purposes of contesting the amount of damages, and
apportioning liability among the co—defendants.
Respectfully,
/s/Robert K. Pearce
Robert K. Pearce
RKP/mee
cc: Roger D. Landon, Esq.
Steven L. Caponi, Esq.
Robert J. Leoni, Esq.
Michael James Logullo
Frank Lococo, Esquire
Clerk of the Court