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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SPARTON CORPORATION, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 92-580C ) THE UNITED STATES, ) Chief Judge Edward Damich ) Defendant. ) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO COMPLY WITH THE COURT'S FEBRUARY 20, 2008 ORDER PERMITTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE AMENDED PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT REPLACING BATES CITATIONS WITH REFERENCE TO PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NUMBERS Plaintiff hereby moves for leave to file its amended proposed findings of fact replacing bates citations with reference to plaintiff's exhibit numbers. AMENDED PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT I. BACKGROUND A. The Evolution of the Submarine Threat 1. World War ("WW") I illustrated the effectiveness of the submarine as an attack vessel. P171.4, 172.1-.2. II, the submarine was even more lethal. Id. During WW

The German

submarine fleet almost single-handedly won the battle for the Atlantic. Id. About a month before the end of WWII,

July 26, 1945, the infamous U.S.S. Indianapolis transported the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs to the Tinian Island B-29 U.S. airbase. P239.9-.10. Four days later on its

journey to the Philippines, it was sunk in 12 minutes by a

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Japanese submarine. Id.

This submarine claimed about 880

U.S. military lives. P239.10-.11. 2. Since WW II, the submarine has become an important warship in the Soviet Navy. P174.4-.6, 172.1, 172.12, 173.2.3, 240.4-.5, 241.45-.56. Subsequent to WW II, there was a

tremendous growth in the Soviet submarine fleet. Id. and P241.4-.56. As a result, the Soviet fleet soon had more Between

submarines than any other Navy in the world. Id.

1962-1970, the Soviet Union produced many different classes of nuclear powered submarines having submerged missile launch capability with which to destroy targets hundreds of miles away. Id. and P171.10-.13, 241.31-.43. For example,

the Soviet nuclear powered Yankee Submarine Class contained missiles having a range of about 1,500 statute miles (1 statute mile = 5,280 feet). Id. The Soviet nuclear powered

Charley Submarine Class possessed cruise missiles capable of following an electronic map of terrain, flying at a low altitude and destroying a distant target. Id. 3. As a result of the capability of its submarines, the Soviets have issued subtle warnings to the U.S. when the Cold War had a tendency to "heat up." P241.44. On one such

occasion, Soviet General Chervov stated that the Soviets might deploy submarines armed with nuclear missiles 100 miles off the U.S. coast. Id. Traveling time of missiles

launched from Soviet submarines a few hundred (or a 1,000)

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miles from a U.S. coastline would still be very short. Id. Such a strike would make it difficult for U.S. anti-missile forces to shoot them down. Id. Much worse, it would give

the President little time to evaluate the attack and launch a counterattack. Id. 4. From the Soviets point of view, placing their submarines close enough to the U.S. coastline is an acceptable response to the deployment of American missiles, such as the Pershing II, close to Soviet borders. P241.44. Since the Yankee

submarine missile range was about 1500 miles, the placement of a Yankee submarine 100 miles off the U.S. East and West coasts would enable said submarines to attack just about any city or target in the United States. Id. 5. Normally, the Soviets have a Yankee Class submarine on patrol off each U.S. (mainland) coastline with a third in transit to or from its home base port. P241.44. These

submarines are positioned so that they may be close enough to their targets. Each of these submarines carries 16

missiles that can travel up to 3,000 kilometers (~1875 miles) and hit a target within 1,400 meters (~4666 feet or less than a mile). 6. The first Soviet Charley Class submarine appeared in 1968 and was able, as was the Soviet Yankee Class, to fire missiles from a submerged position. P171.10-.13, 210.2-.3. Boyle. These two submarines illustrated below further

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helped fuel the Soviet Cold War threat which further prompted the U.S. Navy to seek a dual depth DIFAR sonobuoy. Id.

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7. While a submarine's primary strategic role during the world wars was against surface warships and sea born logistic traffic, the evolution of submarine launched ballistic missiles and later cruise missiles has enabled the submarine to perform an even more important strategic role, that of striking at targets in an enemy's homeland. P171.4.5, 210.3. Boyle. Indeed, no spot on earth is now beyond Nuclear

the reach of a submarine launched weapon. Id.

powered submarines are an underwater weapon system capable of world-wide deployment and destruction. Id. Nuclear

powered submarines travel submerged at speeds at least equal to those of attacking surface vessels. Id. In its current

role, the ballistic missile nuclear submarine is the ultimate deterrent, while its inherent survivability gives it a virtually guaranteed second strike defense role. Id. B. The Sonobuoy Answer To The Threat

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8. The U.S. Navy purchases hundreds of thousands of sonobuoys a year, mainly because they are expendable devices, i.e. they are used just once and thereafter selfdestruct through a scuttling mechanism. Boyle, G. Martin, A

P57.1-106.1, 107.2, 108.1-.2, 114.1-.2, 210.18-.19.

sonobuoy is a sophisticated underwater electroacoustic device capable of detecting and locating the source of underwater sounds. Id. It is primarily used to detect, To perform

locate and classify submerged submarines. Id.

these functions, it is dropped into the ocean from a hunter aircraft or vessel ("the hunter"). Id. The sonobuoy detects

underwater sounds, i.e. acoustic energy from a submarine, through the use of a transducer containing a hydrophone, converts them to electrical signals which are then transmitted by the hydrophone to a transmitter located in an electronics housing within the sonobuoy. Id. The sonobuoy

transmitter transmits the electrical detection information to an antenna for transmission to the hunter. 176.1. 9. There are three distinct types of sonobuoys. P111.2-.6, 114.2-.3, 210.3-.4. The passive sonobuoy is strictly a P114.2,

device for acoustic energy detection and does not reveal its presence to the hunted submarine. Id. A passive sonobuoy

can detect with its hydrophone(s) the presence of even the most modern submarines at great distances and transmits this

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detection information to the hunter. Id.

The active

sonobuoy is a miniature sonar system similar to those installed on ships. Id. The active sonobuoy uses a

transducer that can transmit acoustic signals into the ocean through a projector and receive through its hydrophone(s) acoustic energy underwater. Id. The active sonobuoy

transmits short pulses of sound into the ocean and locates the presence of a submarine by detecting the return pulses reflected by the target. Id. These return pulses are

transmitted to the hunter and are used to measure the time taken for the pulses to reach the target and return to the sonobuoy. Id. From this time measurement, accurate distance The third type of sonobuoy is This sonobuoy type may

information is computed. Id.

a special purpose type sonobuoy. Id.

measure the temperature of the ocean at various depths to determine the location of thermoclines (i.e. densitypressure and/or temperature differences between oceanic layers). Id. Instead of listening for acoustic energy with

a hydrophone(s), like the passive or active sonobuoy, this sonobuoy may contain a probe for sensing water temperature and transmitting the temperature reading to hunter aircraft. Id. Generally speaking, the passive sonobuoys are used to

detect the submarine target; then, the active sonobuoys are used to attack it. Id. and P111.5, 114.2-.3.

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10. The AN/SSQ-53 ("SSQ-53" or "DIFAR") class sonobuoys are passive and called DIFAR sonobuoys because they are DIrectional Frequency Analysis and Recording devices. P111.3, 114.2-.3, 176.6-.9, 210.3-.4. Earlier types of A

passive sonobuoys had no useful directional sense. Id. submarine could only be located by deploying patterns of

three or more sonobuoys in a given area and plotting signals from all in an airplane or ship. Id. The location of a This

submarine was then derived through geometry. Id.

process was time consuming and was not effective against high speed submarines that could "run away" from the sonobuoy before the "location" process was completed. Id. Beginning with fleet use of SSQ-53 sonobuoys, which contained a built-in compass, an omnidirectional hydrophone and a directional hydrophone, the U.S. fleet was able to obtain detection and bearing information from a single SSQ53 sonobuoy. Id. A pair of SSQ-53 sonobuoys provided the

specific location of a targeted submarine. Id. 11. The SSQ-36 is a special purpose sonobuoy which determines a profile of ocean temperature and permits aircraft crews dropping their sonobuoys to plan search patterns based on these oceanic temperature readings. P114.3, 111.2. 12. The SSQ-62 class sonobuoys are active, commandable ones which provide range and bearing information about a target

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submarine. P111.5, 114.2-.3.

They are called DICASS

sonobuoys, the acronym standing for Directional Command Active Sonobuoy System. Id. When this sonobuoy is deployed,

it remains passive until commanded to an active function by an ASW aircraft. Id. This sonobuoy is used to provide

simultaneous range, Doppler and bearing information for localizing and attacking subsurfaced targets. Id. 13. The SSQ-57 class sonobuoys are passively used to measure target submarine sound and ambient noise levels which assist aircraft personnel in the planning of a submarine search pattern. P111.4, 114.3.

14. The SSQ-77 class sonobuoys are passive also. P111.6, 114.3. These sonobuoys provide improved passive detection To

in deep water because they are highly sensitive. Id.

achieve this sensitivity, these sonobuoys use a vertical line array of omni-directional hydrophones which form directional beam patterns to increase detection range and help discriminate against noise. Id. They also utilize a

standard DIFAR hydrophone to determine the bearing of detected submarines. Id. Thus, the passive SSQ-77 class

sonobuoys are more effective than the passive SSQ-53 DIFAR sonobuoys in deep ocean areas. Id. 15. Prior to the development of the Sparton patented inventions, the deployment of the electronic or electrical receiving devices (e.g., hydrophone(s) within transducer(s))

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contained within active, passive and special purpose production sonobuoys was through the bottom end of these sonobuoys. P210.4.

C. Sound Waves In The Ocean 16. Although sound waves propagate in the ocean, they are also absorbed (attenuated) by the ocean, with high frequencies being absorbed at a faster rate per unit distance than low frequencies. P176.3. There are varying

factors which affect the propagation of sound waves in the ocean. Id. Among these are weather changes, density changes

affected by changes in water pressure and/or temperature, water salinity changes, subsurface currents, changing ocean floor topography and the existence of macro and microorganisms in the ocean. Id. Density changes in the oceans

at the thermoclines, i.e. a thermocline is the interface between two or more layers of sea water each having different temperatures and thus densities, have a major influence on sound propagation and antisubmarine warfare ("ASW") as they affect the velocity and direction of sound propagation. Id. The velocity of sound reaches a minimum in

the permanent thermocline in the oceans, which may be found at depths hundreds of feet below the surface of the ocean. Id. Sound propagation in the ocean depths is reflected or Thus,

refracted when sound waves strike a thermocline. Id.

a submarine can remain undetected if traveling below or in a

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thermocline if the detecting device is located above the thermocline. P168.9-.16, 174.9-.17, 176.3, 210.4-.6. Submariners learned quite well how to manage this information so as to hide their boats in and under the thermoclines. Id. The illustrations below show the

reflection or refraction of sound waves as they strike a thermocline. P171.6-.9.

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D. The Navy's Need for a Dual Depth DIFAR Sonobuoy 17. Captain Peter Huchthausen, U.S. Navy retired, served aboard navy destroyers involved in ASW operations and search and rescue operations for the lost submarine USS Thresher. P242.1. He participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis

blockade, and his ship, the USS Blandy, forced a Soviet submarine to surface in the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Id. He also served as Chief Engineer aboard the

destroyer USS Orleck and operated off the coast of Vietnam. Id. He commanded a River unit of ten river patrol boats in He served as a Soviet naval

combat on the Mekong River. Id.

submarine analyst and in ASW warfare positions on the staffs of Naval Forces Europe, the U.S. First and Third Fleets, and the Commander in Chief Pacific. Id. He was assigned as the

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senior U.S. Naval Attaché to Yugoslavia and Romania and subsequently became the chief of attaché and human intelligence collection operations in Western Europe for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Id. He served three years in

Moscow, 1987-1990, as the senior U.S. Naval Attaché to the USSR during the years immediately preceding the fall of the Soviet Union. Id. 18. Captain Huchthausen was personally knowledgeable of (a) the use by the Soviet submarines and U.S. ASW forces during the Cuban Missile Crisis of the hide and seek tactics employed by them vis-à-vis the thermocline layer and (b) the inability of U.S. ASW forces to detect one or more of these Soviet submarines sailing at deep depths, i.e. below the thermocline layer. Captain Huchthausen wrote a book,

entitled "October Fury," about these hide and seek tactics. P242.1-243.50. 19. By September 1962, the Soviets, pursuant to a mission called Anadyr, installed ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba causing the U.S. to create a naval blockade of Cuba preventing further Soviet military shipments from landing in Cuba. P242.4, 243.9, 243.29. Soviet Admiral

Rybalko supervised the naval part of that mission, called Kama. Id. Pursuant to this mission, four Soviet Foxtrot

attack submarines, each armed with a nuclear tipped torpedo, were to (a) covertly proceed to Cuba to reconnoiter

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approaches to Cuba, (b) log acoustic conditions in these approaches and (c) enter the Cuban Port Mariel to make preparations for the arrival of seven ballistic missile submarines to home base there. P243.4, 243.6. The B-4, B-

36, B-59 and B-130 Soviet submarines departed the Soviet Union for Cuba on October 1, 1962 to perform their covert mission. P243.13-.18. On October 20, 1962, two days before

President Kennedy ordered the Cuban blockade, their mission changed, and they were ordered to curtail transits to Port Mariel and take combat patrols in the Sargasso Sea off the Islands of the Bahamas. P243.27-.29. 20. U.S. ASW forces in the Caribbean responsible for implementing the Cuban blockade consisted of carrier groups comprising destroyers and aircraft. P243.10-.12. The four

Soviet attack submarines contained diesel engines, and as a result, they were required to snorkel or surface from time to time to recharge their batteries. P243.13-.18. The art

of ASW, including the effect of a thermocline upon sound propagation and submarine detection above and below it was well understood by U.S. ASW and Soviet forces. P243.10-.12. 21. At the Caicos Passage near Cuba, the B-36 submarine settled below a thermocline to avoid acoustic detection until a Norwegian tanker ship arrived at which point the B36 submarine slipped under the tanker to further avoid detection through the Caicos Passage. P243.22-.26. After

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the tanker sailed away, the B-36 continued on its journey. P243.25-.26. On October 29, 1962, the B-36 was traveling

400 miles north of San Juan Puerto Rico in Caribbean waters having a constant temperature to depths of a 100 meters which made it difficult to hide under the isothermic layer. P243.31. The B-36 had plotted the hydroacoustic conditions,

i.e. water temperature at various depths, to plot the thermocline layer. Id. As a result, the USS Cecil

destroyer, which was the escort for the carrier USS Randolph, was able to detect the B-36 submarine because the isothermic layer was below 300 feet and that depth was too deep for a submarine to hide beneath. P243.35. 22. On October 31, 1962, the B-36 submarine was forced to surface, thereby not achieving the secrecy required of its mission as a result of being unable to hide below the isothermic layer. P243.35-.40. After remaining surfaced for

two days, the B-36 submarine escaped by diving below the thermocline and resumed its patrol. P243.40. While on

patrol, it went to periscope depth, only to determine that USS ships were near. Id. The B-36 descended below the

thermocline layer and drifted off not being further detected. Id. It was ordered to return to the Soviet Union Id.

on November 7, 1962.

23. The B-59 submarine initially sailed from the USSR at a deep depth to avoid detection on its journey to Cuba and

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only surfaced to charge its batteries. P243.20.

On October

29, 1962, the B-59 submarine was about 380 miles southeast of Bermuda and had no isothermic layer to hide beneath, inasmuch as it was traveling 60-100 meters below the surface, when it had to charge its batteries. P243.31-.33. It was detected by the USS carrier Randolph which had one of its escort destroyers, the USS Cony, track the B-59 submarine for 12 hours. Id. The B-59 submarine was forced

to surface, thereby not achieving the secrecy required of its mission as a result of being unable to hide below the isothermic layer. Id. 24. On October 30, 1962, the USS Blandy destroyer, on which was Ensign Peter Huchthausen was located, was sailing 300 miles northeast of the Caicos Passage, east of Cuba and north of Haiti, when it received a message from a U.S. P3 aircraft that it had radar and visual contact of the B-130 submarine. P243.41. The B-130 determined that a U.S.

destroyer had detected it, and as a result, it dove to 150 meters which was well below the thermocline layer it had measured when it was at 75 meters. P243.41-.42. By plotting

the thermocline line and sailing beneath it where sound waves were refracted differently, the B-130 believed that its 150 meter depth would render it partially or completely invisible to the U.S. destroyer's sonar, the SQS-23, which was actively scouring the ocean depths for the B-130.

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P243.43.

The B-130 then held depth at 120 meters and

drifted for hours while the destroyer circled two miles away. Id. The USS Blandy had classified its contact with The B-130

the B-130 as a Soviet Foxtrot submarine. P243.44.

was finally forced to surface by the USS Blandy after the B130 suffered casualties to all three diesel engines and only had one of them working with reduced power. P243.45. The

USS Blandy had held the B-130 submerged for almost 17 hours and upon the surfacing of the B-130, the USS Blandy escorted the B-130 for an additional 24 hours. P243.45-.46. The B-

130 was instructed by Moscow to rendezvous with a rescue tug and return home since it could no longer submerge with its malfunctioning engines. P243.45. 25. The B-4 submarine had passed through the Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti on October 20, 1962 when it received the order to abort its transit to Port Mariel in Cuba and instead assume covert combat patrol. P243.47. The B-4 hid below a thermocline layer on its journey into Cuban waters through the Sargasso Sea off the Islands of the Bahamas. P243.28, 243.47. Then after passing through the

Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti, the B-4 headed south and around the southeastern point of Cuba to avoid contact with a host of U.S. ASW warships in the area. P243.48. On November 2, 1962, an S2F Tracker aircraft from

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radar contact on the B-4. Id.

While the B-4 surfaced

momentarily to receive orders from Moscow, a U.S. P2V aircraft detected the surfaced B-4. P243.49. The B-4

immediately submerged to a hundred meters to evade further detection by the aircraft. Id. After a few hours, the B-4

sailed at a depth of 60 meters which was just below the thermocline layer as plotted by the ship's navigator. P243.50. The thermocline layer had given them acoustic Despite all the sonobuoys being dropped to

protection. Id.

detect and locate the B-4, the U.S. lost contact with the B4 and was unable to detect it again either on radar or with sonobuopy patterns. Id. When the B-4 was safe from

detection, it surfaced to charge its batteries and resumed covert combat patrol. Id. The B-4 used a new RG-10 passive

sonar to obtain early and greater range detection of U.S. shipping than its normal acoustic systems were capable of obtaining. Id. Whenever a U.S. ship came close to it, the

B-4 descended to 120 meters below the thermocline layer to prevent detection. Id. The B-4 was the sole submarine that

was not forced to surface by U.S. forces during the Cuban Missile Crisis as a result of its ability to avoid detection by hiding below the thermocline layer. Id. On November 20,

1962, the B-4 received orders to return home. Id. 26. About 2-3 years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Magnavox and Sanders Corporations ("Magnavox and Sanders") were

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selected by the Navy in the 1964-65 fiscal year time frame to design and develop the SSQ-53 sonobuoy. spanned a 3-4 year time period. This development

Production of the SSQ-53 Sparton

sonobuoy first occurred in fiscal year ("FY") 1968.

was added by the Navy as an SSQ-53 third supplier in FY 1969 by virtue of contract N00019-69-C-0465 ("the 0465 contract"). P2.1-3.16, 152.22.

27. The SSQ-53 was the first production passive sonobuoy providing the Navy with both target detection and bearing information from a single sonobuoy. P210.4. The U.S. naval

fleet was provided with production SSQ-53 sonobuoys and, upon using them at their deployed depth of 90 feet, recommended that they include a dual depth capability, i.e. the deployed hydrophone(s) functioning at a shallow 90 foot or deep 500 or 1,000 foot depth (below the 300 foot thermocline). P120.1-.15. The Naval Air Development Center

("NADC"), the Navy's sonobuoy research and development arm, had conducted theoretical studies and sea tests which confirmed that a deeper hydrophone would result in an improved submarine detection capability. P120.4. 28. According to the Navy, as told to its defense contractors at National Security Industrial Association ("NSIA") meetings, the Soviet Union had developed technology for rapidly sending submarines deep below the oceanic thermocline located hundreds of feet below the oceanic

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surface.

P168.9-.16.

Sonobuoys deployed at a depth of 90

feet either could not detect or obtained reduced detection of these Soviet submarines because the thermocline, located between the targeted submarine below the thermocline and the deployed sonobuoy above the thermocline, prevented or impaired the transmission of submarine acoustic signals through the thermocline to the sonobuoy.1 Id. A failure to

rapidly and accurately detect these new, fast, deep diving Soviet submarines posed a national security threat the U.S. Navy needed to counter. Id.; P210.6.

29. The problem of obtaining a rapidly deploying deep depth sonobuoy persisted for years. P120.4, 168.9-.16, 210.6. U.S. sonobuoy contractors were aware of it. Id. The U.S. The

Navy finally funded the three contractors manufacturing the SSQ-53 sonobuoy to solve the deep depth rapid deployment problem. P120.4, 120.12. The Sanders Associates and

Magnavox Company were the original manufacturers of the SSQ53 sonobuoy. Id. They attempted to solve the problem They

through conventional techniques. P120.1-.15.

lengthened the existing cable connecting the electronics to the upper part of the sonobuoy so that the electronics would deploy to a 1,000 foot depth. Id. Deployment of the

electronics within the sonobuoy was effectuated through the lower end of the sonobuoy. Id.
1

Underscoring is for emphasis supplied unless otherwise indicated.

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30. On the other hand, Sparton, the third SSQ-53 manufacturer, recognized that this purported solution was ill advised. P120.4 this approach. Rapid deployment was unobtainable with

By the time the electronics deployed to

depth under this purported solution, the submarine to be detected would have sped away, thus evading detection. P168.9-.16, 210.6-.8. Accordingly, the primary factor to

the solution of developing a deep depth sonobuoy was the speed at which the sonobuoy could deploy its electronics. Id. Sparton departed from conventional wisdom and was the

company which developed a rapidly deploying deep depth sonobuoy. Sparton solved one of our country's most pressing That solution formed the basis

Cold War ASW problems. Id.

of the two patented inventions in suit. Id. 31. As a result of U.S. fleet recommendations, NADC theoretical studies and sea tests, the Naval Air Systems Command ("NAVAIR"), the Navy's sonobuoy contracting arm, granted an Engineering Change Proposal ("ECP") at about the same time (FY70-72) to each of its three SSQ-53 producers, to supply the Navy with 500 buoys deployable at 90 or 500 feet (Magnavox), 300 buoys at 90 or 1000 feet (Sanders) and 300 buoys at 90 or 1000 feet (Sparton). 177.11-.12. P120.4, 120.12,

The ECP effort with Sparton occurred under the The U.S. Navy

0465 contract as ECP 0465-2. P120.12.

determined that 1,000 feet was an optimum deep depth for the

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operation of its SSQ-53 sonobuoy.

The Navy decided to

remove Sanders from its mobilization base of qualified SSQ53 suppliers when Sanders was unsuccessful in developing the deep depth deployment function in its SSQ-53 sonobuoy (which already contained a 90 foot shallow depth deployment function) under its ECP. P152.22.

32. Notwithstanding Sanders' failure, Sparton's ECP program was a huge success. Sparton's developmental ECP program led

to deliveries in April and June 1972 (at about the same time the other contractors delivered their sonobuoys) of a developmental quantity of 300 dual depth sonobuoys with which the Navy was "extremely pleased," a specification and nomenclature change (from SSQ-53 to SSQ-53A) and the commencement of pilot production in FY74 under a follow-on contract N00019-72-C-0585 ("the 0585 contract"). 136.1-.54, 155.22-.23, 177.11-.12. P53.1-.2,

The Navy concluded that

"[t]he AN/SSQ-53A was developed as a part of a Product Improvement Program by Sparton in FY72 [ECP 0465-2]and limited production quantities were awarded solely to Sparton in FY74 and FY 75 [0585 contract]." P152.22-.23. The SSQ-

53A was Sparton's dual depth sonobuoy and became the Navy's first dual depth DIFAR sonobuoy purchased to combat the Soviet nuclear submarine threat during the height of the Cold War and end of the Viet Nam War. P210.6.

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33. Although the ECPs were issued and performed by the SSQ53 producers, FY 1972 funding limitations prevented the Navy from entirely funding the "previously authorized SSQ-53 product improvement program," which involved "non-recurring" (engineering) costs with the three SSQ-53 producers. B776, 506, 778. In this regard, Sparton expended a substantial

amount of its own funds to develop this new dual depth sonobuoy in the interests of national security to counter a threat perceived by our Navy. P170.1-.4, 110.1-.3, 210.6.

II. SPARTON EVENTS LEADING TO AND THROUGH THE ECP A. Sparton's Deep Depth Sonobuoy Program 34. Sparton established a DIFAR research and development company sponsored program in the mid 1960s. 210.6. P175.1-.3,

This program was soley funded by Sparton to assist

in its efforts to obtain a Navy contract for the production of the SSQ-53 sonobuoy. Sparton obtained this contract in P2.1-.4,

March 1969 in the form of the 0465 contract. 210.7.

35. Sparton was informed by the Navy in the mid-late 1960's or early in 1970 of its dual depth need and the reason which created it. A109-112. The 0465 contract executed March 5,

1969 was a fixed price supply contract which required Sparton to provide the Navy in the first program year with 50 SSQ-53 sonobuoys for first article testing, 1,600 SSQ-53 sonobuoys subjected to production sampling aircraft drop SPPREFA2.DOC 24

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tests prior to delivery for typical fleet use (with a Federal Stock Number to be assigned to them), and 200 technical manuals. In the second program year, Sparton was

required to supply the Navy with 9,600 production SSQ-53 sonobuoys provided that the first article testing of Sparton's SSQ-53 sonobuoy was successful. P2.1-.4.

Successful first article testing was required for and triggered the commencement of production. P3.7-.16.

36. The 0465 contract contained a security classification specification, DD Form 254, which indicated that any information relative to the following subjects was classified, such that its disclosure to the public was prohibited by law, 18 U.S.C. §793-94: detection range and reliability, bearing range, military application of sonobuoy and technical advances in the state of the art. 155.3, 157.4-158.4. P2.1-3.16,

The 0465 contract did not contain a

Patent Rights Clause. Id. 37. Between the late 1960s and early 1970, Sparton mechanical design engineer Widenhofer conceived of an idea for rapidly deploying the SSQ-53 DIFAR sonobuoy to a deep depth by using (a) the top end of the sonobuoy as an exit for deployable sonobuoy internal components, (b) a release plate mechanism actuated by a force imparted by a float assembly to either retain or deploy the sonobuoy internal components within or from the sonobuoy housing, and (c) the

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sonobuoy housing as a descent vehicle to assist the rapid deployment of sonobuoy internal components to a deep depth. The idea was called an "inverse" or "upside-down" deployment design because all production sonobuoys up to that time routinely contained release plate assemblies located at the bottom of the sonobuoy to deploy sonobuoy components from the bottom end of a sonobuoy. The "upside-

down" design completely departed from convention wisdom in the manner by which sonobuoy components should be deployed. A205-08, P6.3-.13, 210.6-.8. 38. On September 16, 1970, Sparton project engineer Devereaux issued a memorandum to his superior, lab manager Hungerford, which outlined a program schedule under company sponsored Job number 7400 for developing a 1,000 foot DIFAR sonobuoy. The proposed schedule concerned design modifications required for providing a deep 1,000 foot capability for the SSQ-53 sonobuoy. The major redesign

areas were the hydrophone, electrical and mechanical sections. The mechanical design changes were considered the most extensive and required the greatest effort. P7.1-.2.

This program was called a "Deep DIFAR" sonobuoy program because Sparton had already developed and produced the SSQ53 sonobuoy for shallow depth operation. With a solution

to rapid deployment for deep operation, Sparton would then

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have a DIFAR sonobuoy capable of shallow or deep depth operation, i.e. a dual depth DIFAR sonobuoy. P210.7-.8. 39. The program schedule required the fabrication of six (6) dummy hydrophone engineering models and twenty (20) final hydrophone engineering models to be designed and constructed between December 13, 1970 and January 31, 1971. The preliminary mechanical design was to commence on November 1, 1970 and be completed by January 17, 1971. A drop test of

six (6) mechanical dummy sonobuoy models was to occur on November 22, 1970, redesign was to follow and another drop test of fully operational models was to occur on January 10, 1971. Although the mechanical design was to be completed by

January 17, 1971, the 20 engineering models constructed to that design were to be assembled and tested by February 21 and March 7, 1971, respectively. P7.1-.2. 40. On October 21, 1970, Devereaux informed Hungerford that it was not feasible to incorporate a battery package in Sparton's deep DIFAR sonobuoy to perform at a 1,000 foot depth and yet operate over an eight (8) hour period. Thus,

battery life for this sonbouoy had to be shortened in any proposal to the Navy. P8.1. 41. On November 11, 1970, Sparton chief engineer Passman issued a memorandum to Hungerford addressing a proposal to be made to the Navy for a dual depth SSQ-53 DIFAR sonobuoy. Sparton's technical proposal for this dual depth SSQ-53

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sonobuoy was to (a) contain manually selectable hydrophone depths of 90 and 1,000 feet, (b) tabulate equipment specification changes and additions, (c) be hardware oriented, (d) contain a layout and a diagrammatic assembly drawing identifying the location and function of all significant subassemblies, (e) avoid detailing parts and subassemblies in order to maintain flexibility of design, (f) emphasize common use of many critical items of the existing SSQ-53 sonobuoy, including the directional and omni-directional hydrophones, subsurface suspension system, and VHF transmitter, (g) state that the directional hydrophone had already been tested at pressures in excess of that required for 1,000 foot operation, and (h) indicate that only minor changes in the construction of the subsurface electronics housing was required to withstand the additional pressure involved in a 1,000 as distinguished from a 90 foot deployment. In describing the mechanical

design approach, Passman wanted Sparton's proposal to emphasize the necessity for improvement in space utilization to accommodate additional cable and "the need for insuring rapid deployment [of components] to depth," with "no sacrifice in mechanical function and deployment reliability." items: The proposal was to include the following

"(a) Introduction[,] (b) Scope of work[,] (c)

Technical approach, electrical[,] (d) Technical approach,

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mechanical[,] (e) Specification changes[,] (f) Proposed schedule (bar chart)[,] and (g) Related experience[.]" Sparton mechanical design engineer Depew was assigned the responsibility to prepare the technical mechanical description section of Sparton's proposed dual depth sonobuoy. P162.1-.2. 42. The scope of work to be contained in the Sparton proposal was to be divided into three major phases, each separately priced: "(a) Design, including six engineering models and sea test[,] (b) Qualification, including CD [contractor demonstration] tests, preproduction approval, manufacturing drawings, hand-book and design data items (MIL-D-18300)[,] and (c) Rebuild and deliver one production lot (500) of AN/SSQ-53 sonobuoys." In all three phases of

the program it was assumed that GFE buoys were to be utilized from current production contracts. Sparton's

schedule for completion of the proposal and estimate was as follows: (a) bill of material and sketches by November 16, 1970, (b) written material for proposal by November 16, 1970, (c) engineering estimate sheets by November 18, 1970 and (d) proposal and prices for delivery to the Naval Air Sea Center ("NASC") by November 30, 1970. P162.2.

43. A dual depth sonobuoy proposal was prepared by Sparton and was reviewed by NADC employee Graff. B963-65, 1012-51. That proposal contained a confidentiality legend which

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prevented a disclosure of its contents by the Navy to any member of the public. P179.1-.16, 210.8. 44. On December 2, 1970, Widenhofer issued a memorandum to his superior Devereaux relating to a proposed test program for the Sparton 1,000 foot DIFAR preliminary mechanical design. The purpose of the test program was "[t]o evaluate

the performance of the proposed inverse sonobuoy package with particular reference to the float pressure activated release plate design." Other areas of interest were "...the

air deployment and subsequent descent with parachute and the deployment of various subsurface components of the sonobuoy." Six air deployable sonobuoys, which were The

mechanically operational only, were to be tested.

quantity of signal cable and the length of the suspension system were selected to permit deployment of components only to a depth of 75 feet. The sonobuoy was configured so that

the total depth of the deployed unit would not exceed 65 feet. Widenhofer noted that testing in shallow water (65-75

feet) would "...maximize the evaluation of the float pressure activated release plate[,] [but would] limit the objectives for testing the 1,000-foot design." P10.1-.2. 45. The following personnel and equipment were required by Sparton from the Navy to conduct this proposed test because Sparton did not possess them: (a) one aircraft equipped with sonobuoy launchers; (b) an aircraft mounted high speed movie

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camera; (c) one boat and crew; (d) divers with underwater still cameras; (e) a boat deck located high speed movie camera; (f) one Q-57 (or other passive) sonobuoy, and (g) receiving equipment for the Q-57 sonobuoy (to monitor squib fire). P10.1. 46. On December 20, 1970, Widenhofer issued a memorandum indicating that on December 19, 1970, Sparton had tested six experimental sonobuoys, mechanically operational only (no electronics or a hydrophone were included), in shallow water at the Navy's facility in Key West, Florida. These

sonobuoys contained a Sparton deep DIFAR preliminary mechanical design. NADC personnel John Tenuto, Al Waynich and Bill Myers witnessed the test. Although no underwater

photographs were taken during the test (because the water was murky) and no squib times were available, Widenhofer indicated that sonobuoy units 1 through 4 performed as intended (although unit 2 had a soft float), unit 5 lost its subsurface electronic unit and suspension system (as a result of a badly tied strain relief) and had a soft float, and the parachute on unit 6 did not deploy (although the release plate actuated to support the surface unit). .4. 47. A multipiece spider release plate mechanism was incorporated by Widenhofer within the sonobuoys tested on December 19, 1970 and an illustration thereof is shown P11.1-

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below.

A description of the construction and operation of

the sonobuoys tested on December 19, 1970 is also contained below, except that the hydrophone and electronics referred to therein were not contained in the sonobuoys tested on December 19, 1971. P160.1-.7.

48. On February 26, 1971 Widenhofer issued a memorandum addressing a February 18, 1971 airdrop test of Sparton's preliminary deep DIFAR sonobuoy design at Key West, Florida. The purpose of this test was "[t]o evaluate the present mechanical and electrical designs prior to constructing a final engineering lot of twenty sonobuoys intended to demonstrate an acceptable design for a deep DIFAR." Naval

personnel present during the test were John Tenuto and Al Waynich. Six fully operational sonobuoys were airdropped All six sonobuoys contained the Four out of

during this test.

Widenhofer multipiece spider plate mechanism.

six of these sonobuoys tested on February 18, 1971 failed when cables therein snapped causing the lower electronics units attached thereto to fail and sink to the ocean floor. Although Widenhofer considered this a "serious problem," he also considered it to be "...a correctable malfunction of the cable spool...[and noted that] the problem is still being investigated." Widenhofer concluded in this

memorandum that "[t]he objective [completion of a preliminary design, not the testing of the 20 sonobuoys to

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determine the workability of the design] of the two 6 sonobuoy engineering tests has been achieved." P13.1-.8.

49. A description of the construction and operation of the sonobuoy tested on February 18, 1971 is as follows and refers to the three figures which follow: The sonobuoy

consists of numerous parts and assemblies all stowed within a cylindrical casing (1). The casing is closed on the lower The lower end is

end and serves as a descent vehicle. provided with a weight (2).

A directional hydrophone and an

omnidirectional hydrophone (22) are located adjacent to the bottom end weight. The subsurface electronics assembly (23)

is positioned above and adjacent to the hydrophone elements. A damper element and associated compliant cable subassembly (24) is located between the subsurface electronics assembly and a cable spool wound with flexible cable (25). A sea

water activated battery (26) that provides power to the electronics assemblies and a sea water activated squib battery (18) that activates the float inflation system is intermediate the surface electronics assembly (3) and the cable spool. Underwater acoustic signals transduced to an

electrical analog by a hydrophone are imparted to the subsurface electronics assembly and then are transmitted, by a line driver, to the surface electronics assembly, which contains a VHF transmitter, by means of a signal path existing through the compliant cable, the flexible cable

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wound on the cable spool and its extension (27) through the bulkhead (28) at the bottom of the surface electronics assembly. There is a flexible wire interconnection between

the bottom of the surface electronics assembly and the VHF transmitter. Radio frequency ("RF") energy is coupled from

the VHF transmitter to the base of the antenna (29), which is located within the float assembly, by a flexible coaxial cable (30) located above the VHF transmitter and below the float assembly. An RCA phone plug and socket (31)

facilitate connection of the flexible coaxial cable to the transmitter output. A surface electronics/float assembly (3) resides near the upper end adjacent to the release mechanism (21. A

parachute (4) and parachute release device (5) reside above the release mechanism. The float (6) is stowed within and

is attached to the surface unit by means of a collar (7) which is a necked down portion of the surface electronics housing. The float cup (8) is positioned over and around The closed end of the float cup is attached to a The piston is guided and held in place by a The two plates

the float. piston (9).

support plate (10) and a milled plate (11).

are separated by a load spring (12) which allows for variations in the length of the subassemblies that are contained within the sonobuoy casing. A spider plate with a

central ring (13) resides on the shoulder of a piston (15).

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The spider plate is made from cold rolled steel.

It has

three long narrow legs attached to and extending radially from the central ring. The legs have large tensile strength

along their length axis but are drawn easily in a direction perpendicular to the plane that contains the three legs. enlarged end on each of the three legs engages with a key hole feature in each of three latches (16). The latches are An

located in positions such that they each retain a fiber housing (22) and extend through and engage the sonobuoy casing. The arms of the spider plate (17) are located above The radius plate in conjunction with the

the milled plate.

milled plate capture the spider plate and associated latches in a sandwich like fashion. The radius plate has a center

hole with a large radius on the side adjacent to the spider plate. When the Deep DIFAR sonobuoy is deployed into the ocean, sea water causes the sea water squib battery (18) to be activated which in turn fires a squib actuated bottle piercing mechanism (19) that results in the opening of two CO2 bottles (20) causing C02 to inflate the float. As the

float inflates, pressure is applied to the float cup (8) resulting in upward movement of the float cup and the attached piston (15). As the piston passes through the hole

in the radius plate, (17) the thin arms of the spider plate are drawn around the radius. Continued upward movement of

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the piston results in the spider arms and attached latches moving inward until the latches (16) disengage from the sonobuoy casing, whereupon the release mechanism along with the parachute housing and attached parachute are forcefully ejected. This action permits the surface electronics

assembly to exit through the top end of the casing, and the casing with the balance of its contents descend to operating depth whereupon the casing is shed and the subsurface components assume their operating configuration. P160.1-.7.

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50. In four of the six sonobuoys tested on February 18, 1971, the following sonobuoy components did not function properly: "signal receiving and transmitting apparatus" and "flexible cable means". P13.1-.8, 210.9-.10. The February

18, 1971 sonobuoys did contain a "signal receiving and transmitting apparatus" (in the form of a hydrophone and its electronics for converting acoustic signals to electrical ones and transmitting them to a vhf transmitter for conversion to radio frequency signals and then transmitting them to an antenna for radiation to an aircraft/boat) and "flexible cable means" (in the form of cables, coils and wires connecting the "signal...apparatus" with an inflatable float). Id.

51. On March 8, 1971 Widenhofer issued a memorandum indicating that a proposed test program was developed by Sparton for evaluating descent vehicle characteristics of its deep DIFAR sonobuoy at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory

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("NOL") 100 foot tank facility.

The purpose of the test

program was to evaluate the "serious" "cable break problem" experienced during the February 18, 1971 test by identifying "the cause of the cable breaks" and "...evaluat[ing]...modifications intended to correct the problem." This evaluation was justified on the basis that

"...the cable breaks are not due simply to a `cable pack problem.'" Widenhofer also acknowledged that Sparton did

not possess the facilities required to evaluate "...these type of problems as they require "[a] deep tank of large diameter with view ports and movie camera coverage for the full depth." He also acknowledged that sea tests were of

limited value because movie coverage of deployment during sea tests was "impossible." P13.2, 14.1-.3.

52. In another March 8, 1971 Sparton memorandum concerning the evaluation of the "cable break problem," Widenhofer noted that "[t]he unique nature of the deep DIFAR design invites a close scrutiny of all conceivable cable break possibilities in an attempt to better understand the peculiarities inherent in the inverse approach to sonobuoy design." P15.1-.10. 53. As a result of the "serious" cable pack problem, an updated schedule for the completion of the Sparton deep depth DIFAR program, Job 7400, was prepared by Devereaux for his superior Hungerford on March 16, 1971. This updated

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schedule was necessary for two reasons:

first, the test

data for the final 20 sonobuoy units had not been taken and was contingent on Sparton's making of necessary arrangements with VAST, the Navy's facility contractor, at St. Croix; and second, the NOL test was required to be added to the schedule "...due to the design uncertainties related to the cause of cable failures during the Key West drop tests." Devereaux believed that the completion of the preliminary mechanical design would occur on April 4, 1971, with the building and testing of the 20 engineering models occurring between April 11-25, 1971. P16.1-.2

B. Sparton's March 17, 1971 ECP And Mod. 4 To The 0465 Contract 54. On or about March 17, 1971 Sparton submitted to the Navy a letter and enclosed engineering change proposal for an experimental test program which would result in Sparton's supply of 300 sonobuoys to the Navy "for test and evaluation[.]" fleet use. These sonobuoys were not intended for normal Sparton proposed to perform a 7-1/2

P210.10.

month program which would accomplish the following: The redesign, modification and test of engineering models to verify feasibility of design approach. Sparton's method of adding the dual depth capability is outlined in the enclosed ECP. Modify and deliver 300 units in accordance with conditions described in the enclosed ECP.

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In order to construct and test the engineering models and deliver the 300 modified units per the ECP, Sparton requested 335 completed (GFE) SSQ-53 units to be made available from the 0465 contract. P5.1-.2, 155.2-.3.

55. The formal ECP 0465-2 attached to Sparton's March 17, 1971 letter justified the requested change by indicating that "[t]his proposed change will add the capability to the AN/SSQ-53 to operate at 1,000 ft. depth as well as 90 ft." Sparton completed the "Developmental Requirements" section of the ECP by recommending "...that 300 completed AN/SSQ-53 units be modified as described in the proposal and submitted for test and evaluation." Sparton noted that it knew of no "Alternative Solutions." Importantly, production

effectivity of the change was to occur in "Future Procurement," but only "...if evaluation tests prove the proposed merits [of the change]." This proposed engineering

change was not to affect other SSQ-53 sonobuoy units required to be delivered by Sparton under the 0465 contract. On page 10 section 1.0 of the ECP, a "Statement of Work" was proposed. Sparton segregated the work into two phases: Phase 1: Phase 2: Design and construct engineering models and perform sea tests. (1) Modify and deliver one production lot of 300 GFE AN/SSQ-53 sonobuoys for dual depth operation. (2) Deliver operating manual.

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Sparton proposed to use "Thirty-Five (35) GFE Sparton AN/SSQ-53 Sonobuoys" for Phase 1 and "Three Hundred (300) GFE Sparton AN/SSQ-53 Sonobuoys" for Phase 2. The 335

completed SSQ-53 sonobuoys were to be shipped "in place," and no "drop tests" were to be required for the 335 sonobuoys. P6.1-.13, 155.2-.3. "Design and construct

56. The language in Phase 1, to wit:

engineering models and perform sea tests" represents experimental work. So does Sparton requesting "...aircraft Even the

and support facilities for engineering sea tests."

300 deliverable units, which were modified "for dual depth operation," represent experimental work because (a) government furnished equipment had to be modified and reconstructed before it could be supplied to the Navy and (b) the 300 units, according to the ECP, were being "...submitted for test and evaluation." P6.1-.13, 155.2-.3.

Sparton submitted the ECP to the Navy because it desired the Navy to defray in part Sparton's development program costs, inasmuch as it was the Navy that requested a solution to the dual depth problem. P210.10. 57. Pursuant to his assignment to prepare a technical mechanical description of Sparton's proposed dual depth sonobuoy in ECP 0465-2, Sparton employee Depew conceived of using a multipiece release plate mechanism (he had earlier thought of using as a water impact plate) shown below with

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the "inverse sonobuoy design" described in the ECP. DePew plate is the one described in ECP 0465-2 and

The

corresponds to the ECP 0465-2 description: "As the float inflates, it pushes a trigger plate located below the release plate assembly. plate from the buoy." This action disengages the release P155.6-.7, 161.1-.16, 6.8. The DePew

release plate, i.e. a water impact plate, needed to be redesigned in order to function as a float activated release plate. Boyle.

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58. Widenhofer was aware of the preparation of ECP 0465-2, but did not actively enage in its preparation. Id. His

multipiece Spider plate mechanism was not described or proposed in ECP 0465-2. P155.6-.7, 161.1-.16, 6.8

59. On July 13, 1971, ECP 0465-2 and Sparton's March 17, 1971 letter proposal were incorporated into the 0465 contract as Mod. 4. The Navy was knowledgeable that

experimental, i.e. redesign and testing, work was to be performed under Mod. 4, that 300 Sparton SSQ-53 sonobuoys, modified for dual depth operation, were to be submitted by Sparton to the Navy for test and evaluation purposes and that production of a Sparton dual depth SSQ-53 sonobuoy was contingent upon the Navy's evaluation tests proving the proposed merits of the engineering change. 155.2-.3. P4.1-6.13,

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60. The Depew multipiece release plate mechanism proposed for incorporation into the 300 sonobuoys to be provided to the Navy under Mod. 4 of the 0465 contract was projected as having a dry weight of 1.2 lbs. P6.11B67.

C. Events Subsequent To The Sparton March 17, 1971 ECP But Prior To Conception of the 120 and 233 Patented Inventions 61. On March 23, 1971, Widenhofer issued a memorandum containing a proposed Sparton test program at NOL designed "...to identify the cause of the cable breaks on the February Deep DIFAR sea test, ..." by studying: (1) "[t]he effects of `Initial Plunge' conditions[,]" including "(a) Initial high cable drag[,] (b) Initially high relative descent rate[,] (c) Hydrodynamic lift force on cable pack assembly[,] [and] (d) Initial descent vehicle stability[,]" (2) "[s]tability or instability [of sonobuoy descent] and its effect on cable payoff[,]" (3) "[s]hock absorber deployment, the mass damper deployment, and the release of the subsurface unit from the sonobuoy housing[,]" and (4) "[c]haracteristic descent times for a DIFAR subsurface unit and for the last 90 feet of a deep DIFAR subsurface unit." P17.1-.7. 62. By March 30, 1971, Sparton was informed by its Engineering department that 20 final hydrophone engineering models were ready to be delivered to Sparton's sonobuoy group. P18.1-.2.

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63. On April 6, 1971, Widenhofer issued a memorandum indicating that on April 3, 1971, he conducted deep DIFAR tests at NOL on four Sparton deep DIFAR sonobuoys to evaluate descent vehicle characteristics "...to identify the cause of the cable breaks on the February Deep DIFAR sea test, to evaluate modifications intended to correct the cable break problem, and to examine other areas of concern in the deployment sequence...." One Navy tank operator and Four

two photographers were involved in the test.

sonobuoys, mechanically operational only, were tested in accordance with Widenhofer's proposed test plan. Although

Widenhofer concluded that no sound conclusions could be drawn until the films taken during the test were viewed, he did make a few observations: "1. [t]he new design descent

vehicle is more stable during descent than the `February' design descent vehicle[;] 2. [t]he shock absorber design has a good safety margin[;] 3. [t]he key arrangement between the cable pack assembly and the subsurface electronics housing must be modified to prevent jamming[;] 4. [h]ydraulic forces acting on the cable pack assembly during `Initial Plunge' may be the cause of the cable breaks[;] [and] 5. [t]he stretched length of compliant rubber on a DIFAR suspension system may not meet the required specified depth." P19.1.14.

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64. On May 3, 1971, Sparton knew that official Navy approval for the design and development of a Sparton dual depth DIFAR was imminent. Sparton employees were informed to "...

develop a test program and schedule including any necessary sea tests at Key West or elsewhere, which would ascertain all the deep DIFAR cable parameters and their limits by May 17, 1971." P20.1. Sparton did not want the cable break P210.10.

problem to derail its development efforts.

65. On May 21, 1971, Passman informed Sparton program manager Rice that the twenty 1,000 foot sonobuoy models had been completed, tested, packed and were ready for airdrop testing. The Sparton project group was instructed to retain

these sonobuoys and make no firm arrangements for drop testing them pending negotiations with the Navy, i.e. the Naval Air Sea Center ("NASC"), and receipt of the SSQ-53 dual depth ECP. Passman indicated that, in the event

Sparton was unsuccessful in its attempt to sell these buoys to the Navy for special test purposes, Sparton should proceed with its plan to run an engineering drop test of them as part of its dual depth development program. At this

point in time the Sparton deep DIFAR program was merging with and into its dual depth DIFAR program, also identified as Job No. 7400. P21.1, 155.15.

66. On June 15, 1971, Widenhofer issued a memorandum indicating the mechanical design considerations necessary

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for the development of a Sparton dual depth DIFAR.

The

purpose of the memo was (a) to indicate the mechanical design effort required in a dual depth DIFAR program and (b) to review design problems to be encountered in that program. The mechanical design considerations for the dual depth DIFAR were based on an examination of the existing deep DIFAR design. Widenhofer suggested eleven design "3.

considerations, of which the third stated as follows: Release Plate Design -

Highly simplified designs [of the

release plate] are feasible and should be investigated at this time (a major cost feature). The existing design used It could be P22.1-.3.

on deep DIFAR appears to be dependable.

somewhat simplified and made less expensive."

67. On June 21, 1971, Widenhofer issued a final report under Job #7400 for the Sparton deep DIFAR sonobuoy. The purpose

of this final report was to describe the final mechanical design of the deep DIFAR sonobuoy. The final engineering

lot of 20 sonobuoys had been assembled, were awaiting final evaluation and were awaiting final determination as to how they could best be utilized. They were never tested under

Sparton's deep DIFAR program to demonstrate an acceptable design for Sparton's deep DIFAR sonobuoy. P155.15.

Modifications had been made to Sparton's deep DIFAR design as a result of the testing it had conducted at NOL to correct the cable break problem encountered during the

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February 18, 1971 airdrop test.

Widenhofer noted that,

"[t]hese modifications and others made since the February air drop have not been evaluated by air deployment and sea testing." As a result, he concluded that "...the reliability of said changes [the major modifications to the deep DIFAR design] has not been established." P23.1-.8. 68. The layout for the deep DIFAR design with multipiece spider plate mechanism had been finished; a bill of material for that design had also been completed; there was a full set of engineering part drawings for this sonobuoy; no assembly drawings, however, had been prepared for this deep DIFAR sonobuoy design by June 21, 1971. Assembly drawings were necessary to manufacture this deep DIFAR sonobuoy. P23.1-.8, 155.19. 69. In his June 21, 1971 final report, Widenhofer also commented upon the cable break design problem encountered during the February 18, 1971 test of Sparton's deep DIFAR sonobuoy. He stated that "[t]he cable break problem,

thought initially to be an easily correctable, `cable pack' defect, turned out to be quite elusive. Much effort was

invested in a study of the many possible causes of cable breakage. Many in-house tests were performed in an attempt The result of this study was a

to pin down the cause.

definite recommendation for a descent vehicle dynamic study at the NOL 100 foot tank facility." As a result of this NOL

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study, Widenhofer determined "...that the cable pack was withdrawing from the descent vehicle prematurely [due to] `initial plunge' conditions... [and] would spin on its side until the signal cable would catch [and sever] in a [sharp edged] slot milled into the ballast weight attached to the cable spool." Based on this determination, Widenhofer

suggested that the cable pack problem could be solved by the incorporation of two thin narrow mylar strips attached to the lower end of the sonobuoy housing. The upper ends of

the two strips could be sandwiched between layers of cable on the cable spool. This solution would prevent the cable

spool from separating from the descent vehicle until it reached approximately 850 feet. The proposed solution to

the cable break problem, however, had not been sea tested. The workability of this change had not been established as of June 21, 1971. P23.1-.8.

70. Shock and vibration had not been considered as parameters during the design of the deep DIFAR sonobuoy. These aspects of the sonobuoy had not been investigated. There was some concern that the surface electronics section design was marginal in this respect. Eleven major

mechanical design considerations were suggested to convert the Sparton deep depth DIFAR sonobuoy design to one with a dual depth capability. The "Release Plate Design" was one P23.1-.8.

of the eleven considerations.

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71. Per a Sparton July 10, 1971 memorandum, the twenty 1,000 foot SSQ 53 sonobuoys completed under Job 7400 were to be used by Sparton's Engineering department as it saw fit. It

was planned that some of the 20 sonobuoy units would "...be drop tested to gain further confidence in the design and some of them..[would] be modified and drop tested to check out design revisions." P24.1.

D. Sparton's Dual Depth DIFAR Program Subsequent To The March 17, 1971 ECP Offer And Mod. 4 Sale 72. A meeting was held at Sparton on July 20, 1971 to discuss the work plan for supplying 300 dual depth DIFAR sonobuoys under ECP 0465-2. This meeting was memorialized in a memorandum written by Sparton assis