Free Motion in Limine - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

Case 1 :04-cv-01565-SLR Document 184 Filed 08/20/2007 Page 1 of 4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ARLJN M. ADAMS, Chapter 11 Trustee of
the Post-Confirmation Bankruptcy Estates of
CORAM HEALTHCARE CORPORATION,
a Delaware Corporation, and of CORAM
INC., a Delaware Corporation, Case No. 04-1565 (SLR)
Plaintiffs,
v.
DANIEL D. CROWLEY, DONALD J.
AMARAL, WTLLIAM J. CASEY, L. PETER
SMITH, and SANDRA L. SMOLEY,
Defendants.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 TO EXCLUDE
EVIDENCE OF CROWLEY'S VVEALTH OR NET WORTH
August 20, 2007 J ef&ey C. Wisler - #2795
Christina M. Thompson - #3976
Marc J. Phillips - #4445
CONNOLLY BOVE LODGE & HUTZ LLP
The Nemours Building
1007 N. Orange Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
(302) 658-9141
i -and—
John W. Keker
Elliot R. Peters
R. James Slaughter
KEKER & VAN NEST, LLP
710 Sansome Street ` »
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 391-5400
Attorneys for Dekndant DANIEL D. CROWZE Y

Case 1 :04-cv-01565-SLR Document 184 Filed 08/20/2007 Page 2 of 4
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Daniel D. Crowley moves in limine to exclude the Trustee Arlin M. Adams
from introducing or mentioning any evidence of Crow1ey’s wealth or net worth, other than his
compensation from Coram or Cerberus. Crowley is accused of breaching fiduciary duties to
Coram, and his prior and subsequent earnings and overall wealth are wholly irrelevant to that
issue and likely to cause Crowley unfair prejudice.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
"Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible? Fed. R. Evid. 402. "The purposes of
the Federal Rules of Evidence include assuring that irrelevant evidence does not unfairly
prejudice the trial." Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988)). Under Federal Rule of Evidence
401, proffered evidence is only relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401. "The particular facts of the case determine
the relevancy of a piece of evidence." United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir.
2001). Moreover, the Court may exclude any evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
III. ARGUMENT
The Court should exclude any evidence or argument pertaining to Crow1ey’s wealth or
net worth. The Trustee’s accusations against Crowley, which consist solely of a breach of
fiduciary duty claim, bears a relationship neither to Crowley’s earnings prior or subsequent to his
tenure at Coram and consultancy for Cerberus, nor to his overall net worth. Such evidence
would in no way support the Trustee’s claims, nor make any of the Trustee’s factual allegations
more probable than they would be without the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 401. For this reason,
courts have routinely excluded evidence of a party’s independent wealth as immaterial and
irrelevant. T esser v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New York, 370 F.3d 314, 318
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Case 1 :04-cv-01565-SLR Document 184 Filed 08/20/2007 Page 3 of 4
(2d. Cir. 2004) ("Evidence of the wealth of a party is never admissible, directly or otherwise,
unless in those exceptional cases, where position or wealth is necessarily involved in determining
the damages sustained.") (citations omitted); Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 639 (Del. Supr.
2001) ("[C]ou1ts generally forbid the admission of the defendant's net worth for consideration by
the jury. . ."); VWlm0t/z v. Limestone Products Co., 255 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)
("As a general rule, the financial status of the parties to a tort action for damages is immaterial
and irrelevant to the question of liability or to the amount of damages that may be recoverable
and consequently any reference to the poverty or wealth of either party to such a suit, if made in
the presence of the jury trying the case, is usually regarded as an improper appeal to the
sympathy or prejudice of the jury.").
Even if evidence of Crowley’s overall wealth or net worth was somehow relevant-
which it is not-the slight probative value of such evidence would be outweighed by the high
risk of prejudice to Crowley. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Given the high proiile cases in recent years
against CEOs, evidence of Crowley’s wealth could bias jurors against him and lead them to take
out their anger over perceived corporate greed against Crowley. Submitting evidence of
Cr0wley’s worth could only serve to inflame the tires of class prejudice, something the Supreme
Court has instructed courts to avoid. United States v. Socony— Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
239 (1940) ("[A]ppeals to class prejudice are highly improper and cannot be condoned and trial
courts should ever be alert to prevent them.").
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for all the reasons discussed above, Crowley respectfully requests that
the Court exclude all evidence regarding his wealth or net worth and prevent any mention
thereof other than as related to his compensation from Coram or Cerberus.
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Case 1:04-cv-01565-SLR Document 184 Filed 08/20/2007 Page 4 of 4
Dated: August 20, 2007 CONNOLLY BOVE LODGE & HUTZ LLP
0___€ g .
Jeffrey C. Wisler — #2795
Christina M. Thompson — #3976
Marc J. Phillips - #4445
The Nemours Building
1007 N. Orange Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
(302) 658-9141
J -and—
John W. Keker J
Elliot R. Peters
R. James Slaughter
KEKER & VAN NEST, LLP
710 Sansome Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 391-5400
Attorneys for Defendant
DANIEL D. CROWLEY
#559460vl
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