Free Motion for Protective Order - District Court of Colorado - Colorado

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-cv-01295-LTB-CBS BETTY GALLEGOS, BERTHA PACHECO, LAURA REYES, MANUELA ARRAS, DAVID ZUBIA, ANTONIO MEZA, JESUS ARENIVAR, ALBA BARRIOS, GLORIA CAMPOS, SAN JUANITA CELEDON, REYNEL CARMONA, SYLVIA CRUZ, JESUS ESTRADA, MARIA ISABEL FLORES, JORGE MARTINEZ, MARIA MCREYNOLDS, IGNACIO RANGEL, JUANA ROSALES, MARIA TOVAR, ANTELMO ZUNUN, MARIA ALVA, PETRONA COREAS, MARIA ESTEVEZ, ALFREDO PINEDA, CARMEN LUNA, PATTY LEHMKUHL & LUIS OCHOA, Plaintiffs, v. SWIFT & COMPANY, Defendant. _____________________________________________________________________________ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER TO DENY OR LIMIT THE SCOPE OF PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 30(b)(6) ______________________________________________________________________________ COMES NOW Defendant Swift & Co. ("Defendant" or "Swift"), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(4), and respectfully submits the following Motion for Protective Order To Deny or Limit The Scope Of Plaintiffs' Notice of Deposition Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). In support of this Motion, Defendant states as follows:

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INTRODUCTION Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) provides that upon a showing of good cause, a court "may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Specifically, a court may order that "the disclosure or discovery not be had" or that "certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1),(4). Defendant objects to Plaintiffs' Notice of Deposition Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) because it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, vague, duplicative, and seeks to impose burdens of diligence and preparation beyond that required by the rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 30(b)(6). Therefore, Defendant requests that the Court enter a Protective Order stating that the 30(b)(6) deposition not be permitted or, in the alternative, that the scope of the 30(b)(6) deposition be substantially limited to certain discrete matters. ARGUMENT A. General Objections To Plaintiffs' Notice of Deposition Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). Defendant objects to Plaintiffs' Rule 30(b)(6) notice because it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, vague, and seeks to impose burdens of diligence and preparation beyond that required by the rule. (See Notice To Swift & Company, Inc. of Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition, attached hereto as Exhibit A). Moreover, many of the areas of testimony are designated in a manner that fails to meet the specificity requirements of Rule 30(b)(6). First, the notice fails to describe with "reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested." Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). For example, several of the requested areas of examination contain no relevant time frame. (See Exhibit A at ¶¶ 8, 10, 12). It will therefore

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be impossible for Defendant to designate a proper deponent. Additionally, many of the proposed areas of examination fail to specify the particular Swift facility at issue. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2, 9, 10). Swift operates eight (8) facilities in the United States. With no parameters as to location, Defendant would be required to perform a file by file search of all Defendant's business records in order to adequately prepare a deponent under Plaintiffs' current notice. Such an overly broad and unduly burdensome request cannot be justified where the case involves one Colorado facility. "An overbroad rule 30(b)(6) notice subjects the noticed party to an impossible task." Reed v. Bennett, 193 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D. Kan. 2000). Because Defendant "cannot identify the outer limits of the areas of inquiry noticed, compliant designation is not feasible." Id. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) notice is void on its face and should not be permitted. Id. Second, the notice exceeds the scope of Rule 30(b)(6) by seeking information that is not known or "reasonably available" to Swift. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). The "obligation imposed by Rule 30(b)(6) is not infinite." Calzaaturficio v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 201 F.R.D. 33, 38 (D. Mass. 2001). The rule "requires testimony only as to `matters known or reasonably available to the organization.'" Id. (citation omitted, emphasis in original). The Rules of Civil Procedure "preclude proponents of discovery from wielding the discovery process as a club by propounding requests compelling the recipient to assume an excessive burden." SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex, Inc., 2000 WL 116082, *9 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Counsel for a recipient of a Rule 30(b)(6) request is not required to muster all of its own factual evidence to prepare a witness to testify regarding a defense or claim. Id. "This rule holds especially true where," as here, "the information sought is likely discoverable from other sources." Id. 3

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A federal judge recently faced with a 30(b)(6) notice similar to that of Plaintiffs' reasoned as follows: I appreciate that there remains open the necessity of taking one or more 30(b)(6) depositions as to the remaining 27 topics. I feel an urgent necessity to supervise that process for several reasons. I have reviewed carefully the list of topics in Plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) Notice of Video Deposition . . . In most respects, it certainly does not describe with "reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested." Instead, each of the topics reads like an interrogatory or a section of a request for production of documents. For example, Topic 20 defines a "topic" as: "The sum and substance of all conversations between Ann Harkin and any employee of the SAO concerning Mr. Banks from January 1, 2002 and March 20, 2002, the date of those conversations, where those conversations took place, the reason for those conversations, the person who requested that a conversation (which includes a meeting) take place." It almost goes without saying that this "topic" is absurdly overbroad; conversations about Mr. Banks' hair style or his new suit cannot possibly be relevant in this lawsuit. I am afraid that many of the other "topics" suffer from the same or similar problems. Banks v. Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms and Doorkeeper, 222 F.R.D. 7, 18-19 (D.D.C. 2004) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) topic list is likewise filled with "absurdly overbroad" areas of examination which read like interrogatories or requests for production of documents. Indeed, as detailed below, several of the "topics" listed are identical to previous discovery requests and are therefore not only overly broad, but also unreasonable cumulative and duplicative. (See Defendant's Response to Plaintiff Maria Alva's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, attached hereto as Exhibit B). For instance, Plaintiffs ask Defendant to answer, for a second time, each of Plaintiffs' interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents.

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For these reasons, and as set forth in more detail below, Defendant objects to Plaintiffs' Notice of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition to Swift and requests that the Court issue a protective order that such deposition not be permitted or, in the alternative, that such deposition be limited to certain matters as described below. B. Specific Objections To Plaintiffs' Notice of Deposition Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6). 1. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain the adoption and implementation of the Swift & Company "Restricted Duty Return to Work" policy.

Provided that the inquiry is limited to Defendant's Greeley, Colorado facility, Defendant does not specifically object to Topic # 1. 2. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain the identification and designation of positions to be considered "Restricted Duty" positions according to the policy.

Provided that the inquiry is limited to Defendant's Greeley, Colorado facility, Defendant does not specifically object to Topic # 2. 3. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain Swift's understanding of each Plaintiff's medical limitations or restrictions.

OBJECTION: Defendant objects to Topic # 3 as unreasonably duplicative of discovery already propounded by Plaintiff. Discovery rules empower this Court to restrict discovery of information that is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); see also Zoltek Corp. v. U.S., 61 Fed. Cl. 12, *19-20 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (corporation need not comply with 30(b)(6) subpoena to the extent noticed topics are duplicative of previous discovery requests). Plaintiffs propounded this same question to Defendant in their First Set of 5

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Interrogatories. (See Exhibit B at Interrogatory No. 5) ("Please disclose what restrictions you contend affect Plaintiff's ability to be placed in any position at the plant."). Topic # 3 is therefore unreasonably cumulative and duplicative, and Defendant has no obligation of compliant designation under 30(b)(6). 4. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain Swift's understanding of the essential functions and physical demands of all positions performed by: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m. n. o. p. q. Maria Alva after April 1B.50, [sic[ 2003 Jesus Arenivar after November 3, 2000. Manuela Arras after April 26, 2002. Alba Barrios after October 2, 2003. Gloria Campos after September 10, 2001. Reynel Carmona after March 11, 2002. Silvia Cruz after November 11, 2002. Maria Estevez after June 11, 2001. Jesus Estrada after May 10, 2002. Maria Isabel Flores after May 6, 2002. Betty Gallegos after October 28, 2002. Patty Lehmkuhl after September 25, 2002. Carmen Luna after May 21, 2001. Jorge Martinez after January 8, 2002. Maria McReynolds after January 7, 2002. Antonio Meza after March 15, 2002. Luis Ochoa after February 16, 2004.

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r. s. t. u. v. w. x.

Bertha Pacheco after July 27, 1993. Alfredo Pineda after September 16, 2002. Ignacio Rangel after September 30, 2002. Laura Reyes after January 26, 2001 Maria Tovar after March 3, 2000. David Zubia after August 9, 2002. Antelmo Zunun after November 26, 2003.

OBJECTION: Defendant objects to Topic # 4 as unreasonably duplicative of discovery already propounded by Plaintiffs. Discovery rules empower this Court to restrict discovery of information that is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); see also Zoltek Corp. v. U.S., 61 Fed. Cl. 12, *19-20 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (corporation need not comply with 30(b)(6) subpoena to the extent noticed topics are duplicative of previous discovery requests). Plaintiffs propounded this same question to Defendant in their First Set of Interrogatories. (See Exhibit B at Interrogatory No. 1) ("Please identify and describe all positions performed by [Plaintiff] as follows: (a) name of the position; (b) department; (c) level of position as it relates to the Collective Bargaining Agreement; (d) Shift and (3) the essential functions of the position). Topic # 4 is therefore unreasonably cumulative and duplicative, and Defendant has no obligation of compliant designation under 30(b)(6).

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5.

A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain Swift's understanding of each plaintiff's job performance in the positions covered in item 4.

OBJECTION: Defendant objects to Topic # 5 as overbroad and unduly burdensome. This topic covers literally hundreds of positions and improperly resembles a document request or an interrogatory rather than an area of inquiry for a 30(b)(6) deposition. See Banks, 222 F.R.D. at 18-19. Any significant performance problems would likely be the subject of some type of memo in the Plaintiff's personnel file, which have already been produced. The "obligation imposed by Rule 30(b)(6) is not infinite." Calzaaturficio, 201 F.R.D. at 38. The rule "requires testimony only as to matters `know or reasonably available to the organization.'" Id. (citation omitted, emphasis in original). Even with diligent preparation, no individual could possibly memorize and regurgitate all the information requested. Subject to these objections, and in response to this designation, Swift will be prepared to read and explain any performance issues contained in a Plaintiff's personnel file, provided they are brought to the deponent's attention by Plaintiffs (to the extent the performance issues relate to a Plaintiff's physical ability to do the job). 6. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain Swift's actions with respect to the review of any available positions to place each Plaintiff in the month prior to placing the affected Plaintiff on involuntary medical leave following implementation of the policy.

OBJECTION: Defendant objects to Topic # 6 as overly broad, unduly vague and unreasonably duplicative of discovery already propounded by Plaintiffs. Discovery rules empower this Court to restrict discovery of information that is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or 8

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less expensive." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); see also Zoltek Corp., 61 Fed. Cl. at *19-20 (corporation need not comply with 30(b)(6) subpoena to the extent noticed topics are duplicative of previous discovery requests). Plaintiffs propounded this same request to Defendant in their First Set of Requests for Production. (See Exhibit B at Interrogatory No. 3) ("Please identify all positions for which you considered placing [Plaintiff] after September 2, 2002 and identify the particular reasons you claim that the position could not be offered to her."). Topic # 6 is therefore unreasonably cumulative and duplicative, and Defendant has no obligation of compliant designation under 30(b)(6). This topic is also absurdly overbroad. The "obligation imposed by Rule 30(b)(6) is not infinite." Calzaaturficio, 201 F.R.D. at 38. The rule "requires testimony only as to matters `know or reasonably available to the organization.'" Id. (citation omitted, emphasis in original). Even with diligent preparation, no individual could possibly memorize and regurgitate all the information requested. The request is therefore also overly broad and unduly burdensome, and Defendant has no obligation of compliant designation under 30(b)(6). Subject to these objections, and in response to this designation, Swift will be prepared to testify generally as to the review of available positions for employees under the Restricted Duty, Return to Work Policy. 7. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain Swift's decision to subject each Plaintiff to the Policy, and all actions taken in connection with applying the policy to each Plaintiff.

OBJECTION: Defendant objects to Topic # 7, as it is absurdly overbroad and therefore does not describe with "reasonably particularity" the matters on which examination is requested. See Banks, 222 F.R.D. at 18-19 (30(b)(6) (topic requesting details concerning all 9

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communications between various employees "absurdly overbroad."). The "obligation imposed by Rule 30(b)(6) is not infinite." Calzaaturficio, 201 F.R.D. at 38. The rule "requires testimony only as to matters `know or reasonably available to the organization.'" Id. (citation omitted, emphasis in original). Even with diligent preparation, no individual could possibly memorize and regurgitate all the information concerning "all actions taken" with regard to each Plaintiff. Defendant therefore has no obligation of compliant designation under 30(b)(6) for Topic # 7. Subject to these objections, and in response to this designation, Swift will be prepared to testify generally as to the application of the "Return to Work Policy" to Plaintiffs. 8. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain each and every "LMS" Report which Swift has prepared and/or produced pursuant to discovery in the above-referenced lawsuit.

OBJECTION: Defendant objects to Topic # 8 as unreasonably duplicative of discovery already propounded by Plaintiffs. Discovery rules empower this Court to restrict discovery of information that is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); see also Zoltek Corp.,61 Fed. Cl. at *19-20 (corporation need not comply with 30(b)(6) subpoena to the extent noticed topics are duplicative of previous discovery requests). Defendant has already produced every LMS Report to Plaintiffs. The reports speak for themselves, as they are merely daily print outs of the individuals performing a given position. Each daily report is four hundred and two pages long. Defendant produced each daily LMS report for the years 2002, 2003, and 2004. Topic # 8 is therefore unreasonably cumulative and duplicative, and Defendant has no obligation of compliant designation under 30(b)(6).

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Subject to this objection, and in response to this designation, Swift will be prepared to testify generally as to what an LMS report is and how to interpret such reports. 9. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain any positions that became available from March 1, 2003 ongoing.

Defendant objects to Topic # 9, as it is absurdly overbroad and therefore does not describe with "reasonably particularity" the matters on which examination is requested. See Banks, 222 F.R.D. at 18-19 (30(b)(6). This topic involves hundreds of positions, many of which none of the Plaintiffs were eligible to bid for. The "obligation imposed by Rule 30(b)(6) is not infinite." Calzaaturficio, 201 F.R.D. at 38. The rule "requires testimony only as to matters `know or reasonably available to the organization.'" Id. (citation omitted, emphasis in original). Even with diligent preparation, no individual could possibly memorize and regurgitate all the information requested. Defendant therefore has no obligation of compliant designation under 30(b)(6) for Topic # 9. Topic # 9 is also cumulative and duplicative of discovery already propounded, as Defendant has produced to Plaintiffs all "bid sheets" indicating open positions at the plant from September 1, 2002 to September 1, 2004. Defendant therefore has no obligation of complaint designation under 30(b)(6) for Topic #9. 10. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain the essential functions and physical demands of all positions at the plant.

OBJECTION: Defendant objects to Topic # 10 as absurdly overbroad, as it involves all positions ever performed at the Greeley plant. Banks, 222 F.R.D. at 18-19 (30(b)(6) topic requesting details concerning all communications between various employees "absurdly

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overbroad."). The "obligation imposed by Rule 30(b)(6) is not infinite." Calzaaturficio, 201 F.R.D. at 38. The rule "requires testimony only as to matters `know or reasonably available to the organization." Id. (citation omitted, emphasis in original). This "topic" improperly resembles an interrogatory rather than an area of examination for a 30(b)(6) deposition. See Banks, 222 F.R.D. at 18-19. Even with diligent preparation, no individual could possibly memorize and regurgitate the essential functions of "all positions at the plant." Moreover, Defendant has already provided to Plaintiffs the essential functions of all positions performed by Plaintiffs. Defendant therefore has no obligation of compliant designation for Topic # 10. 11. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain Swift's consideration or lack thereof in placing Plaintiff in any available position following his or her layoff.

OBJECTION: Defendant objects to Topic # 11 as overly broad and unreasonably duplicative of discovery already propounded by Plaintiffs. Discovery rules empower this Court to restrict discovery of information that is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); see also Zoltek Corp., 61 Fed. Cl. at *19-20 (corporation need not comply with 30(b)(6) subpoena to the extent noticed topics are duplicative of previous discovery requests). Plaintiffs propounded this same request to Defendant in their First Set of Requests for Production. (See Exhibit B at Request No. 3) ("Please identify all positions for which you considered placing [Plaintiff] after September 2, 2002 and identify the particular reasons you claim that the position could not be offered to her."). Moreover, even with diligent preparation, no individual could possibly memorize and regurgitate all the information requested. The "obligation imposed by Rule 30(b)(6) is not infinite." Calzaaturficio, 201 F.R.D. at 38. The rule 12

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"requires testimony only as to matters `know or reasonably available to the organization.'" Id. (citation omitted, emphasis in original). Topic # 11 is therefore unreasonably broad, cumulative, and duplicative, and Defendant has no obligation of compliant designation under 30(b)(6). Subject to these objections, and in response to this designation, Swift will be prepared to testify generally as to the process of review of available positions for employees under the Restricted Duty, Return to Work Policy after they were placed on medical leave. 12. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain all efforts made to communicate with Plaintiff, Plaintiff's representatives, or Plaintiff's medical providers regarding accommodation of his or her medical limitations.

OBJECTION: Defendant objects to Topic # 12 as overly broad and unreasonably duplicative of discovery already propounded by Plaintiff. Discovery rules empower this Court to restrict discovery of information that is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); see also Zoltek Corp., 61 Fed. Cl. at *19-20 (corporation need not comply with 30(b)(6) subpoena to the extent noticed topics are duplicative of previous discovery requests). Plaintiffs propounded this same request to Defendant in their First Set of Requests for Production. (See Exhibit B at Interrogatory No. 4) ("Please describe all conversations and communications you had with [Plaintiff] with respect to accommodating her medical restrictions). Moreover, even with diligent preparation, no individual could possibly memorize and regurgitate "all efforts to communicate" with Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' representatives, or Plaintiffs' medical providers. See Banks, 222 F.R.D. at 18-19 (30(b)(6) (topic requesting details concerning all communications between various employees "absurdly overbroad"). Topic # 12

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is therefore unreasonably broad, cumulative, and duplicative, and Defendant has no obligation of compliant designation under 30(b)(6). Subject to and without waiving these objections, Swift will be prepared to testify generally as to the process of communication between employees, medical providers, and the Union with regard to the Restricted Duty, Return to Work policy. 13. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain the allegations, affirmative defenses or denials contained in Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint.

OBJECTION: Defendant objects to Topic # 13 as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and as implicating privilege concerns and potential problems with confidential information. This topic is not limited to the underlying facts, but rather seeks all knowledge and information about Defendant's affirmative defenses and denials. Such topics are improper and implicate the attorney/client and work product privilege. In Re Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litigation, 168 F.R.D. 651, 654 (D. Kan. 1996) (asking a party to testify in a 30(b)(6) deposition about claims and defenses implicates "serious privilege concerns, and potential problems with confidential information . . ."). However, even had Plaintiffs limited this inquiry to the underlying facts of Defendant's defenses and denials, Defendant is not required to have counsel "marshal all of its factual proof" and prepare witnesses to testify regarding a defense or claim. Courts have found that "attempts to discover facts upon which a defendant will rely for its defenses through a rule 30(b)(6) deposition is overly broad, inefficient, and unreasonable." In Re Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litigation, 168 F.R.D. at 654. Defendant therefore has no obligation of compliant designation for Topic # 13. 14

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14.

A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain allegations, affirmative defenses or denials contained in Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatories.

OBJECTION: Defendant objects to Topic # 14 as overbroad, unduly burdensome, duplicative, and as implicating privilege concerns and potential problems with confidential information. This topic is also nonsensical, as allegations, affirmative defenses, and denials are not contained in Defendant's answers to Plaintiffs' interrogatories. Topic No. 14 is also duplicative and cumulative of other discovery, as Plaintiffs are basically asking Defendant to answer their interrogatories for a second time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); see also Zoltek Corp., 61 Fed. Cl. at *19-20 (corporation need not comply with 30(b)(6) subpoena to the extent noticed topics are duplicative of previous discovery requests). It also implicates the attorney work product privilege. Defendant therefore has no obligation of compliant designation for Topic # 14. 15. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain allegations, affirmative defenses or denials contained in Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's Requests for Admission.

OBJECTION: Defendant objects to Topic # 15 as overbroad, unduly burdensome, duplicative, and as implicating privilege concerns and potential problems with confidential information. This topic is also nonsensical, as allegations and affirmative defenses are not contained in Defendant's answers to Plaintiffs' requests for admissions. Topic No. 14 is also duplicative and cumulative of other discovery, as Plaintiffs are basically asking Defendant to answer their requests for admissions for a second time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); see also Zoltek Corp., 61 Fed. Cl. at *19-20 (corporation need not comply with 30(b)(6) subpoena to the extent noticed topics are duplicative of previous discovery requests). It also implicates the attorney 15

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work product privilege. Defendant therefore has no obligation of compliant designation for Topic # 15. 16. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain any document produced in response to Plaintiff's Request for Production.

Defendant objects to Topic # 16, as it is absurdly overbroad and therefore does not describe with "reasonably particularity" the matters on which examination is requested. See Banks, 222 F.R.D. at 18-19 (30(b)(6). At least three hundred thousand documents have been produced in this case. Even with diligent preparation, no individual could possibly memorize and regurgitate all the information concerning "any document" produced by Defendant. Defendant therefore has no obligation of compliant designation under 30(b)(6) for Topic # 16. 17. A Swift Representative who has knowledge and information about, and is authorized to discuss and explain any document produced in response to a Request for Production from the EEOC or CCRD.

Defendant objects to Topic # 17, as it is absurdly overbroad and therefore does not describe with "reasonably particularity" the matters on which examination is requested. See Banks, 222 F.R.D. at 18-19 (30(b)(6). At least three hundred thousand documents have been produced in this case. Even with diligent preparation, no individual could possibly memorize and regurgitate all the information concerning "any document" produced by Defendant to the EEOC and CCRD. Defendant therefore has no obligation of compliant designation under 30(b)(6) for Topic # 17.

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CONCLUSION Defendant objects to Plaintiffs' Notice of Deposition Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) because it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, vague, duplicative, and seeks to impose burdens of diligence and preparation beyond that required by the rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 30(b)(6). Therefore, Defendant requests that the Court enter a Protective Order that the 30(b)(6) deposition not be permitted or, in the alternative, that the scope of the 30(b)(6) deposition be limited to certain matters as set forth above, or as determined by the Court. WHEREFORE Defendant requests that the Court issue a Protective Order that Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) deposition not be permitted or, in the alternative, that the scope of the 30(b)(6) deposition be limited to certain matters as set forth above or as determined by the Court. Respectfully submitted this 30th day of January, 2006.

s/ W. V. Bernie Siebert W. V. Bernie Siebert Leslie Abernathy Johnson SHERMAN & HOWARD L.L.C. 633 Seventeenth Street, Suite 3000 Denver, CO 80202 Tel: (303) 297-2900 Fax: (303) 298-0940 [email protected] [email protected] Stuart B. Johnston, Jr. VINSON & ELKINS, L.L.P. 3700 Trammell Crow Center 2001 Ross Avenue Dallas, TX 75201-2975 Tel: (214) 220-7842 Fax: (214) 999-7842 [email protected] Attorneys for Defendant Swift & Company

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 30th day of January, 2006, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER TO DENY OR LIMIT THE SCOPE OF PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO RULE 30(b)(6) was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following e-mail address: Britton Morrell at [email protected]

s/ Clarine R. Kuntz

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