Free Letter - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

Case 1 :04-cv-01505-GMS Document 83 Filed O3/27/2006 Page 1 of 2
Youno CONAWAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP
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DIRECT FAX: (302) :76-3>16 EDWARD B. M.L\wEL1. 2No
[email protected]
March 27, 2006
BY ELECTRONIC FILING
The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
United States District Court __
District of Delaware . .1..
844 North King Street “ it
Lockbox 19
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Re: T herma Finnegan LLC v. Applera Cmp.,
Civil Action No. 04-1505-GMS
Dear Judge Sleet:
Applera submits this letter in response to Thermo’s letter of March 24, 2006 (D.I. 82), in
which Thermo draws the Court’s attention to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Atajina v. Great
Lakes Chemical Corp., C.A. No. 05-1359 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 2006).
Atofina reaffirms the principle underscored in Phillqys that the intrinsic evidence is the
rimar source for determinin the meaning of a claim limitation to one of ordinar skill in the
D y
art:
Our primary focus in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim
limitation is to consider the intrinsic evidence of record, viz., the patent itself,
including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history,
from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art.
Slip op. at 7. The Federal Circuit adhered to this principle in affirming the district court’s
construction of the limitation "chromium catalyst" based on statements in the specification and
prosecution history. [ci at 8-11. As Thermo notes, the Federal Circuit did conclude that it was
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Case 1:04-cv-O1505—G|\/IS Document 83 Filed O3/27/2006 Page 2 of 2
Youno CoNAwAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP
March 27, 2006
Page 2
proper to rely on technical dictionaries to construe the term "catalyst," but it did so "[b]ecause
there is no suggestion that the intrinsic evidence defines the term "catalyst .... " Id at 8. Here, in
contrast, the intrinsic evidence does define the term "capillary electrophoresis" (the Court quoted
a definition from the specification of the ’654 patent in paragraph 2 of its March 9, 2006 Order),
as well as the terms "anions," "target temperature,” and others.
Atojina also reaffirms the principle that statements by an applicant during prosecution to
distinguish claims from prior art may disclaim claim scope, even in instances where the
distinction was not “absolutely necessary to avoid particular prior art.” [al at ll. This is
particularly pertinent in this case to the construction of the phrase "detecting said anions by
simultaneously monitoring said sample at two different wavelengths? See, ag., D.l. 60 at 28.
We are available at the Court’s convenience should the Court have any questions on this
or any other aspect of the claim construction issues before the Court.
Respectfully submitted,
. p i
I f
Karen L. Pascale (No. 2903)
cc: Clerk, U.S. District Court (by e-filing and hand delivery)
Frederick L. Cottrell, lll (by e—filing and e-mail) [[email protected]]
Wayne L. Stoner, Esquire (by e-mail) [[email protected]]
Richard Goldenberg, Esquire (by e-mail) [richard. [email protected]]
Stephen M. Muller, Esquire (by e-mail) [[email protected]]
DB0l:2049124,l oasssriooz