Free Response to Motion - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

Case 1:08-cr-00075-SLR

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
UNITED STATES OF AMEzuCA. Plaintiff,
V.

Criminal Action No. 08-CR-00075-SLR

TEDDY COPPEDGE,
Defendant.

THE GOVER}IMENT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS

NO\il COMES the United

States

of America, by and through its attorneys, Colm

F.

Connolly, United States Attorney for the District of Delaware, and Joseph Grubb, Special Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Delaware, and hereby respectfully responds to Defendant's

Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence and Statements (D.I. 14), as follows:

INTRODUCTION
The defendant, Teddy Coppedge, has been indicted on one count of being a felon in
possession

of a firearm, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(I)

and

92a@)Q). This charge arises from evidence obtained pursuant to a stop of the defendant by
members of the Wilmington Police Department ("WPD") regarding atrafftc violation on 2008.

April

8,

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the Government presented the testimony of V/PD
Detective Todd Riley to establish the following facts: On April 8, 2008, Wilmington Police Officer, Detective Todd Riley, observed a 1995

white Buick Elantra with tinted windows on the corner of Sixth and West Street, in Wilmington,

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Delaware. Detective Cunningham was with Detective Riley. The driver was later identified Coppedge (hereinafter "defendant"). T-4, 8.

as

Teddy

Detective Riley has been a Wilmington Police Offrcer since November, 2002 and is
currently a member of the Drug Organized Crime and VICE Unit. T-3. The detectives were in an unmarked police vehicle and in plain clothes.

T-4. After various stops

and interactions, the

defendant eventually was seen driving westbound on at the intersection of Eighth and Washington Streets, where he disregarded a red light. Detective Riley watched the

light cycle properly twice

before stopping the defendant. T-6. The only person in the vehicle was the driver, the defendant.

T-7. The detectives attempted to contact a marked unit to come and conduct
defendant, however a unit did not respond in

a

traffic stop on the

time. T-7.

The defendant parked his car on the south side of the block and exited his vehicle.
Detectives Cunningham and Riley put on their marked police vests, approached the defendant to stop

him for the traffrc violation and identified themselves
appeared visibly shaken and upset. T-8.

as police

officers. T-8. The

defendant

The defendant was not initially stopped for the trafhc violation because the detectives
were in an unmarked police car without the assistance of any lights or other insignia denoting that they were in fact police officers. T-7. The areainwhich the traffrc stop was conducted is a known high crime and drug area, from the detective's experiences. T- 12- 1 3 . Detective Riley had previously conducted over thirty (30) stops for traffrc violations and has personally issued citations for traffrc

violations as well. T-22-23.
Detective Riley testified that the defendant was handcuffed in order to prevent him from

fleeing and for police safety. T-8. Riley then began routine questioning, asking the defendant how

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he got to the location, to which the defendant answered that he had walked there and did not have

a car inthe

area.

T-9. Riley knew this to be a false statement due to his prior observations and

continued to ask questions. After the defendant lied to Detective Riley, he asked the defendant

if

he had anything illegal on his person, to which the defendant answered that he did not and the defendant consented to a search ofhis person. T-9.
The defendant was not read his Miranda warnings
asked typical questions of an

initially, but rather the defendant was
a car

individual stopped for atraffic violation. T-9-1 1. Riley located

key in the defendant's pocket and asked to what vehicle it belonged. The defendant stated that the key belonged to his cousin's car which was in the Browntown section of the city. T-9. Detective

Riley then asked about the Buick parked across the street that he had been observed driving. The
defendant confessed that the keys belong to the

Buick.

T-

1

0. The defendant further explained that

he had driven the vehicle and lied because he was scared. The defendant was asked whether there

was anything illegal in the vehicle to which he affirmatively answered he had a small amount

of

"bud" in the center console. Through his training and experience, Detective Riley understood "bud" to mean marijuana. The defendant then consented to a search of the vehicle. T-10. The officer's

initial intention was to stop the defendant and issue him a traffic citation. T-26
Detective Riley entered the vehicle and lifted the center console, at which time he located
the marij uana (approxim ately 2 grams) that the defendant said was in the vehicle. T10

. Underneath

the marijuana was the door key to the Buick, which also unlocked the glove compartment box. Inside

the glove box, Detective Riley observed two plastic bags. Inside the white plastic bag was a clear
freezerbagcontaining approximately 40 grams ofmarijuana. T- 1 1. Inside the black plastic bag was

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one black and blue wool glove and a black handgun (later identified as 9mm Sig Sauer Serial

#8124507), loaded with

1

1

rounds of ammunition. T-

11

.'

The defendant and the vehicle were then transported to Wilmington Police Central where
the ofhcers administeredthe defendanthis Mirandarights. The defendantthencompleted aMiranda

waiver form and gave ataped statement.

T-II-I2.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
In his motion, the defendant makes three arguments as to why certain evidence in this
case should be suppressed. The Government respectfully asserts that each of the defendant's

arguments lack merit and that his motion should be denied, and specifically responds as follows:

A.

The Defendant's Statements Were Not the Product of Custodial Interrogation.

The defendant first contends that the statements he made after being placed in handcuffs,

specifically consenting to a search of his vehicle, should be suppressed as being elicited in violation
of his Miranda rights. The defendant's Miranda rights did not apply because he was not'oin custody"
as defined by Miranda, and therefore the statements should not be suppressed.

Police are vested with the constitutional authority
investigatory stop

to conduct a limited,
activity.
Terr.v

warrantless,

if

an officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal

v. Ohio, 392

u.s. 1,88 (1968).

r Det. Riley was asked about and shown notes during the hearing. Det. Riley testified that those notes were not his and that he "believed" he may have written some notes during the post-Miranda interview, but did not recall taking any notes "right after" the detention, The government discussed with defense counsel the issue of notes immediately after the hearing, clari$ring that the notes discussed and turned over in discovery were the TFO Fed Up liaison Steve Parrott's notes. Det. Riley did not, in fact, take any notes.

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Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,477-78 (1966). A person temporarily detained for an ordinary

traffic stop is not "in custody" for the purpose of Miranda. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420

(1934). A defendant's Miranda rights only attach if the statement at issue occurred when the
defendant was "in custody," and was the product of "interrogation." See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U. S.

292, 291 (1990). V/hether a person is in custody is determined through an examination of the
objective circumstances. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
aL

422.In making this decision, the court

mustconsiderthetotalityofthecircumstances. Californiav. Beheler,463 U.S. ll2l,1125 (1983).
Miranda warnings are not required ion the routine, initial, on-scene investigative steps by the police
at a crime scene. Mathis v. U.S., 391 U.S. 1 (1968). Furthermore, a tequest for consent to search

from an individual who is in custody and who has invoked his Miranda rights is not interrogation.
U.S. v. Bustamante, 493
F

.3d

87

9, 892 (7ù Cir. 2007).

The defendant's statements to the V/PD Detectives were made during the course of an investigative traff,rc

stop. The fact that a suspect may not be free to leave the scene of

an

investigative stop "does not mark the point where the stop escalates into an arrest, since in neither
a stop nor an arrest is a suspect free to leave." U.S. v. Edwards, 53 F.3d 676,6L9 (3d.

Cir. 1995).

Also, statements elicited prior to the giving of Miranda warnings may be used during a motion to
suppress

to show the defendant's consent to a search. U.S. v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467,473
F

(9'n Cir.

1977), citing U.S. v. Garcia, 496

.2d 670, 674-675 (5'h Cir. 1974).

The fact that the defendant was placed in handcuffs during part of the traffrc stop does not
convert the stop into adefacto arrest, and thus a custodial situation for Miranda analytical pu{poses.
See

Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1 186, 1 193 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that no per se rule that

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use of handcuffs constitutes an arrest). Police are permitted to use handcuffs on a suspect when the

police objectively believe that the suspect is a flight risk under the totality of circumstances. See U.S.

v. Prince, 157 F.Supp.2d316,325 (D.Del 2001). In U.S. v. Prince, this Court ruled that a suspect who was handcuffed and placed in the
back ofthe squad car was not "in custody" for purposes of Miranda because the measures were taken

in order to advance offrcer safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop. Id. at 324-25.In Prince, the defendant was the passenger in a vehicle that had been pulled over for traffic violations. During routine questioning, the offrcer on the scene became suspicious of the identities provided by the defendant and the driver. At some point, the defendant was handcuffed and placed

in a police car where she was subject to several questions.
The defendant sought to suppress statements she made while handcuffed and in the police
car, arguingthey were made while "in custody" and prior to being administered her Miranda rights.

This Court ruled that the defendant was not "in custody," explaining, "there is no per se rule that the
use of handcuffs or placement in a police car during atrafftc stop constitutes an arrest." Id. at 325.

This Court went on to state that the measures taken were reasonable because "under
circumstances,

the

it [was]

reasonable to be concerned that Prince might attempt to escape. . . . [and]

most important, Prince had already acted suspiciously. She was emotional and upset, and had given

conflicting stories." Id. Therefore, the defendant was not in custody within the meaning of
Miranda[.]" (emphasis added) Id.
As in Prince, defendant Coppedge was handcuffed. The defendant Coppedge gave police a false story as to how he arrived at the location. The defendant argues that he was "in custody"
because that phrase is used in the police report. However, in the police report, Detective Riley uses

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the phrase in layman's terms, not as the legal term of art utilized by Miranda. The Terry stop of the defendant Coppedge does not constitute "custody" forpurposes ofMirandaregardless ofhandcuffs. Here, Coppedge was observed for several blocks acting suspiciously in
area by an experienced
a

high drug and crime

VICE detective. Coppedge was then

seen

running a red light. At that point,

Detective Riley had reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of the defendant

Coppedge. See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (holding that the decision to stop an
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe thata1'rafftc violation has

occurred). When the defendant gets out of his vehicle, the VICE detectives acted and conducted the
Terq, stop, not an affest, because the marked units that were requested had not yet arrived. The stop of the defendant was not a custodial arrest. A review of the totality of the circumstances reveal that the officer conducted a legal Terr.v stop using handcuffs. Detective Riley initially only asked the defendant questions surrounding the traffic violation, specifically questions about the defendant's

vehicle and how he got there. The defendant then lied to the detective. Riley then asks more
questions surrounding the

lie. The defendant eventually admits his lie and also admits

to possessing

illegal drugs in his vehicle. The defendant then gives unsolicited consent to search his vehicle. It
is reasonable under the circumstances for a VICE detective who observed suspicious behavior in a

known drug area to handcuff the suspect during a Terr.v stop. Therefore, the defendant was not "in
custody."

B.

The Defendant Consented to a Search of His Person and Vehicle, Constituting a Waiver of any Fourth Amendment Claim.

The defendant argues that if his consent to search the vehicle is inadmissible under Miranda,

it is necessary also to suppress the physical evidence seized during the search, because consent made

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in violation of Miranda is inherently involuntary for purposes of search and seizure under the Fourth

Amendment. This arsument lacks merit because it is incorrect as a matter of law.

It is well

established that derivative evidence obtained as a result

of non-Mirandized

statements is admissible and not precluded under the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine. U.S. v.

Crooks,2008 WL 1908852, at *6 (D. Del. 2008).
In U. S. v. DeSumma,
a case

involving non-Miran dizedconsent to search

a

vehicle, the Third

Circuit stated, "[A] Miranda breach does not necessarily preclude the use of all evidence flowing

fromtheinfraction."272F.3d176,Il8-79(3dCir.2001). InordertoshowaviolationoftheFourth
Amendment, it is not enough to prove a Miranda violation.
The defendant argues that
a

Miranda violation has necessary implications for non-testimonial

evidence because the Miranda exclusionary rule and Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule are

effectively one and the same. This argument is incorrect as a matter of law. See U.S. v. Smith,

3

F.3d at 1098 (holding that consent to search is not a selÊincriminating statement and, therefore, a
request to search does not amount to interrogation).

In order for the defendant to successfully argue for the suppression of the seized weapon, he

will

have to show that his consent to search the vehicle was involuntary according to law, not just

inadmissible according to Miranda. See U.S. v. Dra)'ton, 536 U.S. 194,206 (2002) (holding that

involuntary consent is determined through analysis of facts and circumstances); Colorado v.
Connolly, 479 U.S. 157,224 (1986) (holding that coercive police activity is necessary predicate to finding that confession is not voluntary within meaning of due process clause). The defendant offers no evidence that his consent was involuntary. He simply argues that

if

the court finds a Miranda

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violation, itmustpresumehisstatementswereinvoluntary.AMirandaviolationdoesnot implythat
a statement was involuntary. DeSumma , 272 F .3d at 118-79
.

Here, the questioning at issue surrounded the traffic violation until the defendant lied and
gave rise to more suspiciousness. The defendant then admitted to the officer that there were illegal

drugs in the vehicle. The officer did not demand consent, or threaten consequences

if

consent was

not given. The officers did not even ask for consent, but merely asked if the defendant had anything

illegal in the vehicle. T-10. The defendant offered his consent without being asked for it. T-10. The
consent was clearly voluntary.2

The defendant further argues that, as a matter of law, the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine, announced in Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 47I (1963), applies here, and that because a

Miranda violation occurred, the weapon constitutes "fruit of the poisonous tree" which must be
suppressed.

In DeSumma, the Third Circuit stated, "[T]his Court fhas previously] observed that Elstad rejected the proposition that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine [...] applied to Miranda

violations." DeSumma, 272 F .3 d at Il

9.

Violations of Miranda, which safeguard Fifth Amendment rights, do not implicate the

"fruits" doctrine, which apply to Fourth Amendment violations. 470 U.S. 298,306 (1985).
Therefore. even if the Court finds that the defendant's consent is inadmissible under Miranda, the

2Furthermore, the defendant's admission that illegal drugs were in the vehicle makes the search of the vehicle valid pursuant to the automobile exception detailed in Carroll v. U.S. ,267 U.5. 132,153-54 (1925) (holding that so long as police have probable cause to believe that an automobile is carrying contraband or evidence, they may lawfully search the vehicle without a warrant).

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weapons seized in the subsequent search should not be considered

"fruit of the poisonous tlee" and

should thus be properly admitted as a matter of law.

C.

Violation.
The defendant argues that the confession he provided at the police station after receiving his

Miranda warning should also be suppressed as "fruit" of the Miranda violation.

The subsequent Miranda warning is sufficient to remove any conditions that may have
precluded admission of the earlier, pre-Miranda statements. See U.S. v. Crooks , at*6 (quoting that

where a statement is voluntary but made without the benefit of proper Miranda warnings, a
subsequent administering

of Miranda warnings should suffice to remove the conditions

that

precluded admission of the earlier statement where the suspect makes a rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights.

Id. As noted, the defendant in this case gave both

verbal and written waivers of his rights, the voluntariness of which is not being challenged by the
defendant.

10

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CONCLUSION
UPON THE FOREGOING, the United States respectfully requests that the Court deny
defendant's Motion to Suppress Pþsieal Evidence and Statements.

Respectfully submitted,

COLM F. CONNOLLY UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

BY:

/s/Joseoh S. Grubb Joseph S. Grubb Special Assistant United States Attorney

Delaware Bar I.D. No. 4712 The Nemours Building 1007 Orange Street, Suite 700 P. O. Box 2046 Wilmington, DE 19899 Joseph.Grubb@usdoj . gov (302) 473-6271 x 157

Dated: August 29,2008

1L