Free Memorandum and Order - District Court of Delaware - Delaware

Case 1:08-cv-00161-SLR

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JAMES A. PERSON, Plaintiff,
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) Civ. No. 08-161-SLR )
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v.
CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES and DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER At Wilmington

thi~?l.day of June,

2008, having screened the case pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A; IT IS ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1), for the reasons that follow: 1. Background. Plaintiff James A. Person ("plaintiff'), an inmate at the Howard

R. Young Correctional Institution, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. He appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 2. Standard of Review. When a litigant proceeds in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 provides for dismissal under certain circumstances. When a prisoner seeks
redress from a government defendant in a civil action, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides for screening of the complaint by the court. Both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1) provide that the court may dismiss a complaint, at any time, if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks

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monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 3. In performing its screening function under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court applies the standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Fullman v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. 4:07CV-000079, 2007 WL 257617 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2007) (citing Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, -U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002). A complaint must contain '"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.''' Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, -U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 4. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, however, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."

kl. at 1965 (citations omitted).

The "[t]actual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)."

kl.

(citations omitted). Plaintiff is

required to make a "showing" rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). "[W]ithout some

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factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only "fair notice," but also the "grounds" on which the claim rests.

ld..:.

(citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n.3). Therefore, '''stating ... a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' the required element."

ld..:. at 235 (quoting Twombly,

127 S.Ct. at 1965 11.3). "This 'does not impose a

probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." lQ. at 234. Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, -U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). 5. Discussion. Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to sick call, asked some questions that led him to believe he may have Hepatitis C, and was given an injection for protection from Hepatitis A and B. Plaintiff later felt fatigued and was given another blood test. Plaintiff was told that he was "fine", but believes it is a lie and that he needs appropriate and necessary health care. Plaintiff was seen a second time and was told that his blood count was low. He asks for one million dollars in damages. 6. Medical Needs. The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment requires that prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-105 (1976). In order to set forth a cognizable claim, an inmate must allege (I) a serious medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429

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U.S. at 104; Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A prison official may manifest deliberate indifference by "intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. 7. "[A] prisoner has no right to choose a specific form of medical treatment," so long as the treatment provided is reasonable. Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138 140 (2d Cir. 2000). An inmate's claims against members of a prison medical department are not viable under § 1983 where the inmate receives continuing care, but believes that more should be done by way of diagnosis and treatment and maintains that options available to medical personnel were not pursued on the inmate's behalf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Moreover, allegations of medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108 09 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Daniels
V.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34

(1986) (negligence is not compensable as a Constitutional deprivation). Finally, "mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment" is insufficient to state a constitutional violation. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 8. Even when reading the complaint in the most favorable light to plaintiff, he fails to state an actionable constitutional claim against defendants for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Rather, the complaint alleges that plaintiff is receiving medical care and attention. Nonetheless, he believes he should receive additional care. At the most, the allegations might fall under the aegis of a medical malpractice!

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negligence claim, rather than deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim. 9. Conclusion. Based upon the foregoing analysis, the complaint is dismissed
for failure to state a claim and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and §
1915A(b)(1). Amendment of the complaint would be futile. See Alston v. Parker, 363
F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir.
2002); Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976).


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UNITED STAT

DISTRICT JUDGE

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