Free Order on Motion for Judgment - District Court of Connecticut - Connecticut

{ Case 3:00-cv-00722;.5CH Document 49-2 Filed O9/$32004 _Pag%
{ o r M7
{ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT my jijjv ; > rj, jc
I DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
{ WILLIAM CONNELLY : Ii I I
Plaintiff : l {
{ : CIVIL ACTION NO. - ‘· _, ,
{ v. 3-00-cv-720 Q { {I Ll; —. _ ;
\ DA.VID COSGROVE, ET AL : SEPTEMBER 1, 2004 . I I
{ Defendants : l
I RULING AND ORDER I
Pending before the court is defendant SeIig’s Motion for Entry of Separate Final
Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
On March 13, 2003, this court granted a Motion to Withdraw Claims [Dkt. No. 27]
as Ilo defendant Talton, dismissed all claims in the amended complaint with prejudice as
to defendants Cosgrove, Wolff, Selig, Zacyzynski, Scott, Norko, Young, Lorenzen,
Del./eau and John Does Nos. 1-6; dismissed without prejudice to reopen and replead I
for failure to state a claim all claims against defendants Wollenhaupt, Silvis, Clerk of
Court and John Does Nos. 7-11 and as to the conspiracy claims against defendants
Golemba, Strange, O’NeilI, Whidden, Serrano and Cupka; and dismissed without
prejudice to reopen and replead all other claims as to defendants Golemba, Strange,
O’Neill, Whidden, Serrano and Cupka pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a) for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See Ruling and Order [Dkt. No. 28].
The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs state
law claims. The court informed the plaintiff that he could move the- reopen judgment
accompanied by an amended complaint provided he could allege facts to state a claim
against defendants Wollenhaupt, Silvis, Clerk of Court and John Does Nos. 7-11 and/or {
l
I






[ Case 3:00-cv-00720ii5DH Document 49-2 Filed 09/8262004 Page 2 of 4
l
l
provide evidence of exhaustion of administrative remedies as to his claims against
defendants Golemba, Strange, O’NeilI, Whidden, Serrano and Cupka. @2; Q; On
f March 18, 2003, the court entered judgment for the defendants. tig Judgment [Dkt.
l No. 29].
l The plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal [Dkt. No. 31] on April 7, 2003. The appeal i
was dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction because the March 13, 2003 Ruling was not a final
order} See Order [Dkt. No. 36]. On October 16, 2003, the court granted the plaintiff
thirty days to file an amended complaint. On November 21, 2003, the plaintiff filed a
seccond amended complaint naming Wollenhaupt, Silvis, Clerk of Court, John/Jane Doe
No. 7, John Does Nos. 8-11, Golemba, Strange, O’NeiII, Whidden, Serrano and Cupka
as defendants. Pursuant to the Courl’s October 16, 2003 Ruling, the case has been
reopened upon the filing ofthe second amended complaint.
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant Selig
moves for a separate and final judgment pursuant to the court’s I\/larch 12, 2003 Ruling
dismissing all claims against him. Defendant Selig argues that there is no just reason
for a delay in the entry of a separate judgment and that it would be prejudicial to him to
be subject to an appeal ofthe dismissal of all claims against him after the resolution of
all other claims against the remaining defendants.
Rule 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
1 The file was not returned to this court from the Second Circuit until April 4, 2004.
2 l
l
l
I
l
A l

Case 3:00-cv-00720-JCH Document 49-2 Filed 09/02/2004 Page 3 of 4
E
J action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-clairn, or
third—party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason fo·r delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In
( the absence of such determination and direction, any order
l or other form of decision, however designated, which
- adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and .
l liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the
( action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and
the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
i
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Second Circuit has held that Rule 54(b) provides a I
procedure for a district court to enter a final partial judgment and to permit an
immediate appeal from that judgment, "when the district court determines that such an
appeal is needed to avoid harshness or injustice." Obert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29, 40 (2d
Cir. 2003). A district court’s power to enter a partial final judgment, however, should be
used sparingly. gee L.B. Foster Co. v. Am. Piles, Inc., 138 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1998) )
("The power ‘should be used only in the infrequent harsh case’ where there exists l
‘sorne danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by [
immediate appealf") (citations omitted). This policy exists to protect the historic: rule 5
against piecemeal appeals in federal court. §__ee Curtiss—Wright Corp. v. General I
jgsjztric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980).
Here, defendant Selig does not contend that he seeks a partial judgment
because he seeks to immediately appeal the court’s ruling. lnstea-d, he argues that this
case involves multiple claims against multiple parties; the claims against him have been 4
3 l
0 l
l

Case 3:00-cv-OO7%;JCH Document 49-2 Filed 09702/2004 Page 4 of 4
_ _ —>_,, J 7 4, a. 5 l
finally decided by the court within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291; there is no risk of
duplicative appeals because the claims against him are based on factual allegations
and legal issues that are different from the factual allegations and legal issues
underlying the claims against the remaining defendants; and there is no just reason to
delay the entry of final judgment in his favor. Defendant Selig does not explain how he [
will be prejudiced if a final partial judgment does not enter at this point in the case
rather than when all claims against all defendants have been adjudicated. The court I
concludes that no danger of injustice or undue hardship exists due to the delay in the I
entry of final judgment as to defendant Selig. gg Brunswick Corp. v. Sheridan, 582
F.2d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that partial judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)
"should not be entered routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel")
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the entry of a partial final judgment as to
the claims against defendant Selig is not warranted. Defendant Selig’s Motion for Entry {
of Separate, Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure [Dkt. No. 43] is DENIED. N
SO ORDERED. l
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 1st day of September, 2004. {
(‘\ rw , / I
V ._,- f l
net C. Hall
nited States District Judge
i
l
- 4 - N