Free Memorandum in Opposition to Motion - District Court of Connecticut - Connecticut

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I Case 3:03-cv-00630-DJS Document Filed 10/j4/2003 Page 1 of 4
I O Q
I ERIC DEAN, Plaintiff, v. PRICELlNE.COM, INC., Defendant.
No. 3:00CVl273 (DJS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
I 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24982
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I June 5, 2001, Decided
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DISPOSITION: [*1] Plaintiffs motion to join LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES — Core Concepts:
additional parties denied.
I Labor & Employment Law: Wage & Hour Laws:
I CASE SUMMARY: Overtime & Work Period
[HN1] See 29 USGS. § 207(a)(1).
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff former employee
brought a l2—count action against defendant former Labor & Employment Law: Wage & Hour Laws:
employer, alleging two federal claims under 29 US.C.S. Exemptions
§§ 207(a)(1), and 2l5(a)(3) ofthe Fair Labor Standards [HN2] The general mandate for overtime pay in 29
Act (FLSA), and 10 state law claims under various state US.C.S. § 207(a)(l) does not apply to persons employed
I statutes and the common law. The employee moved for in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional
I certification of a "collective action" under 29 US.C.S. § capacity. 29 USGS. § 213(a)(1).
216(b) ofthe FLSA.
· Labor & Employment Law: Wage & Hour Laws: Civil
I OVERVIEW: The gravamen of the employee's Procedure & Remedies
I complaint was that the employer violated the FLSA [HN3] The Fair Labor Standards Act allows one or more
I because it did not pay him overtime wages. The employees to pursue an action in a representative
I employer took the position that the employee was capacity for other similarly situated employees. 29
I exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. The UTS.C.S. § 216(b). This type of action allows potential
I issue before the court was whether the “appropriate class members who are similarly situated to the named
circumstances" existed for the court to exercise its plaintiff to "opt in" to the case.
discretion in allowing the action to proceed as a
I collective action. The employee argued that the employer Labor & Employment Law: Wage & Hour Laws: Civil
violated the FLSA by failing to implement a company- Procedure & Remedies
I wide policy by which it could accurately categorize [HN4] See 29 U.S. C.S. § 216(b).
` exempt and non—exempt employees. It was clear that
I what the employee was really challenging was the Labor & Employment Law: Wage & Hour Laws: Civil
I employer's determination that the employee was exempt Procedure & Remedies
I under the FLSA. Collective treatment of the action was [HN5] It is well settled that district courts have the
I inappropriate. From a practical standpoint, litigating this discretionary power to authorize the sending of notice to
case as a collective action would have been extremely potential class members in a collective action brought
difficult. The exempt or non—exempt status of any pursuant to 29 U.S.C.S. § 216(b) of the Fair Labor
I particular employee had to be determined on the basis of Standards Act.
I whether his duties, responsibilities, and salary met all of
* the requirements of the appropriate section of the Labor & Employment Law: Wage & Hour Laws: Civil
regulations. Procedure & Remedies
[HN6] The threshold issue in deciding whether to
OUTCOME: The motion was denied. authorize class notice in an Fair Labor Standards Act
action is whether plaintiffs have demonstrated that
CORE TERMS: exempt, overtime, similarly situated, potential class members are "similarly situated."
collective action, wages, notice, join, duties, Fair Labor
I Standards Act, properly classified, job duties, non- Labor & Employment Law: Wage & I-Iour Laws: Civil
exempt, authorize Procedure & Remedies
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Case 3:03-cv-0063%%).13 Document 40-9 Filed 10%2003 Page 2 of 4 I
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Labor & Employment Law: Wage & Hour Laws: Now pending is the plaintiffs motion to join additional
Exemptions parties pursuant to § 2l6(b) of the FLSA. For the reasons “
[HN?] To detemiine which employees are entitled to that follow, the motion is DENIED. I
overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards l
Act depends on an individual, fact-speeitic analysis of FACTS I
each employee's job responsibilities under the relevant I
statutory exemption criteria. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a I
Senior Database Administrator from April I5, 1999, until I
Labor & Employment Law: Wage & Hour Laws: he resigned on June 14, 2000. The plaintiff claims that he |
Exemptions often was called upon to perform tasks in the evening,
[HN8] See 29 C.F.R. § 542.20l(b)(2). the early morning hours, and on weekends from April y
through December of 1999, and, thereafter, every third
Labor & Employment Law: Wage & Hour Laws: week from January 2000 until his resignation in June of
Exemptions 2000. The gravamen of his complaint is that the I
[HN9] Determining whether an employee is exempt is defendant violated the FLSA because it did not pay him
extremely individual and fact-intensive, requiring a overtime wages during his tenure as a Priceline
detailed analysis of the time spent performing employee. nl
administrative duties and a careful factual analysis of the l
full range of the employee‘s job duties and ---------—»——----- Footnotes -----------——--
responsibilities. - - -
1
COUNSEL: For Eric Dean, PLAINTIFF: Mark Paul
Carey, Carey & Associates, Southport, CT USA.
nl The Fair Labor Standards Act states that no
For Eric Dean, PLAINTIFF: Robert L Cavanaugh, Jr, employer within the meaning of the Act [HNI] l
Rodie & Connolly, Stratford, CT USA. "shall employ any of his employees for a I
worlcweek longer than forty hours unless such
For Pricelinecom Inc, DEFENDANT: Kevin D O‘Leary, employee receives compensation for his employment I
Joel B Casey, Cummings & Lockwood, Hartford, CT in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not
USA. less than one and one-half times the regular rate at
which he is employed." 29 US. C. § 207(a)(1).
For Price1ine.com Inc, DEFENDANT: Richard Michael [HN2} This general mandate, however, does not
Solazzo, Cummings & Lockwood, Stamford, CT USA. apply to persons employed in a bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional capacity. See 29
JUDGES: DOMINIC J. SQUATRITO, UNITED U.S.C. § 2I3(a)(l). I
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
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OPINIONBY: DOMINIC J. SQUATRITO
----——--—----——-- End Footnotes -----——------ 2
OPINION: RULING ---- ]
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The plaintiff has brought this twelve-count action [*3] I
against the defendant, Priceline.com, Inc. ("Priceline"),
alleging two federal claims under the Fair Labor The defendant has taken the position that the plaintiff J
Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 US C. §§ 207(a)(l) & is exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. It I
2l5(a)(3), and ten state law claims under various state claims that from the outset of his negotiations with
statutes and the common law. Count One alleges a Priceline, the plaintiff understood that he would not
failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the FLSA. receive overtime, but would be a salaried professional-
Count Two alleges that Priceline retaliatecl against level employee instead. Further, Priceline claims that the I
plaintiff in violation of 29 U.S. C. § 215(a)(3) for tiling a position for which plaintiff was hired, and at which he I
complaint with the Department of Labor. Counts Three worked, was one that required him regularly and
and Four allege overtime and retaliation claims[*2] in consistently to exercise discretion and independent
violation of state statutes. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 3l~ judgment in, inter alia, identifying and solving problems; i
60(a) & 69(b). Counts Five through Twelve allege state planning, scheduling, and coordinating activities; and Q
common law, contractual, and extra-contractual, claims. developing problem-solving systems. I
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Case 3:O3—cv-OO63@JS Document 40-9 Filed 10@2003 Page 3 of 4
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In light of these duties, Priceline maintains that the 600 1·*Z2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978)). Thus, the issue
plaintiff is exempt from the overtime mandate of the presently before this court is whether the "appropriate
FLSA on two independent grounds. First, the defendant circumstances" exist for the court to exercise its
argues that the plaintiff is an exempt computer-related discretion in allowing this action to proceed as a i
professional employee within the meaning ofthe FLSA. collective action. Id. [HN6] The threshold issue in l
Second, the defendant asserts that the plaintiffs job deciding whether to authorize class notice in an FLSA l
description also meets the definition of an administrative action is whether plaintiffs have demonstrated that l
employee, another exempt category. The plaintiff, of potential class members are "similarly situated." Id. g
course, disagrees with both arguments and has moved (citing 29 U.S. C. § 2I6(b)). I
this court for permission to give notice of this suit to ·
other Priceline[*4] employees who also were not payed According to the plaintiff the putative class members i
overtime wages and to allow them to join the litigation. are similarly situated because all were denied overtime ]
pay as a result of being rnisclassificd as exempt. The
DISCUSSION plaintiff argues that the defendant violated the FLSA by '
failing to implement a company-wide policy by which it l
The plaintiff moves for certification of a "collective could accurately categorize[*6] exempt and non-exempt I
action" under § 2l6(b) of the FLSA. 112 [HN3] The employees. It is clear that "what plaintiff [is] really
FLSA allows one or more employees to pursue an action challenging here is defendant's determination that "
in a representative capacity for other similarly situated [plaintiff is] exempt under the FLSA." Morisigz v. Public
employees. See 29 USC § 2I6(b). This type of action Service Electric and Gas Co., III R Supp. 2d 493, 498
allows potential class members who are similarly (DNJ. 2000) (denying plaintiffs motion for collective
situated to the named plaintiff to "opt in" to the case. Id. action under § 216(b)). This court finds the following ]
language, employed by Judge Pisano in Morisky,
—---------—---—--- Footnotes -—-—--------—-- particularly persuasive given the factual similarities
— - - between these two cases:
[HN7] To determine which employees are entitled to {
overtime compensation under the FSLA depends on an
n2 Section 2l6(b) of the FLSA provides in pertinent individual, fact-specific analysis of each employee‘s job l
part: responsibilities under the relevant statutory exemption
criteria. Therefore, "similarly situated" in this case must
[HN4] An action may be maintained against any be analyzed in terms of the nature of the job duties
employer by any one or more employees for and in performed by each class member, as the ultimate issue to ]
behalf of himself or themselves and other employees be determined is whether each employee was properly l
similarly situated. No employee shall be a party classified as exempt The scope of the class is I
plaintiff to any action unless he gives his consent in dependent upon the answer to the question that is at the l
writing to become such a party and such consent is heart of this case -- which employees are properly n
tiled in the court in which such action is brought. classified as exempt? The proposed class consists of a
group of individuals with different jobs [*7]and different
29 U.S. C. § 216(b). job responsibilities who believe they have been
improperly classified as exempt and denied overtime
wages Thus, plaintiffs are seeking to have this Court I
certify a class based upon their own belief as to which
-...........----- End Footnotes ------------- employees do not satisfy any of the exemption criteria -- l
---- the very issue to be litigated in this action.
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Id at 498-99. Given the pending legal issues and the f
current posture of this matter, the court concludes that
[HN5] "It is well settled that district courts[*5] have collective treatment of this action would be
the discretionary power to authorize the sending of inappropriate. j
notice to potential class members in a collective action ]
brought pursuant to § 216(b) of the FLSA." Hofmann v. Further, from a practical standpoint, litigating this case I
Sbarro, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 249, 261 (S.D.Nl’C 1997) as a collective action would be extremely difficult, at
(citing Hofmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 US. best. [HN8] "The exempt or non-exempt status of any
165, 107 L. Ed 2d 480, 110 S. Ci. 482 (1989); particular employee must be determined on the basis of
Braunsiein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., whether his duties, responsibilities and salary meet all E
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Case 3:03-cv-0063@=`IS?JS Document 40-9 Filed 10€1¤¤52003 Page 4 of 4
the requirements of the appropriate section of the I
regulations." 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b)(2). [HN9] CONCLUSION I
Determining whether an employee is exempt is I
extremely individual and fct-intensive, requiring "a The plaintiffs motion to join additional parties [doc. #
detailed analysis of the time spent performing 69 (3:00CV1273 (DJS))] is DENIED.
administrative duties" and "a careful factual analysis of
the full range of the emp1oyee's job duties and S0 ordered this 5th day of June, 2001. ·
responsibilities." Cooke v. GeneralDym1mics Corp., 993 I
F. Supp. 56, 59-6] (D. Com:. 1997).[*S] For these DOMINIC ISQUATRITO
reasons, the court declines to exercise its discretion to
allow a collective action in this case. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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