Free Judgment - District Court of Colorado - Colorado

Case 1:03-cv-01364-JLK

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Civil Action No. 03-cv-1364-JLK-PAC SCOT HOLLONBECK, JOSE ANTONIO INIGUEZ, JACOB WALTER JUNG HO HEILVEIL, and VIE SPORTS MARKETING, INC., a Georgia corporation, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, a federally-chartered corporation, and U.S. PARALYMPICS, INC., f/k/a UNITED STATES PARALYMPIC CORPORATION, a Colorado non-profit corporation, Defendant.

DIRECTION OF FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. RULE 54(b)

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff' unopposed request that the Court enter s final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Formalizing rulings and orders made on the record at the January 4, 2006 status conference, I GRANT the request based on the following findings: 1. Plaintiffs Hollonbeck, Iniguez and Heilveil (the " Athlete Plaintiffs" are Paralympic )

athletes. These three plaintiffs brought claims against Defendants United States Olympic Committee and U.S. Paralympics, Inc. (collectively " USOC" under title III of the Americans ), with Disabilities Act (" ADA" 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation ), Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the " Athlete Claims" The Athlete Claims allege that the USOC' ). s

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disparate funding and support for Paralympic athletes in contrast to Olympic athletes constitutes discrimination against the Athlete Plaintiffs in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 2. Plaintiff Vie Sports Marketing, Inc. (" ) also brought claims under the ADA Vie"

and the Rehabilitation Act alleging that it was injured by the discrimination alleged by the Athlete Plaintiffs. 3. Finally, Vie brought claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel based

on a course of business dealings between Vie and the USOC. 4. Vie alleges that the USOC entered into a contract with Vie pursuant to which Vie

was to be the exclusive marketing agency for the U.S. Paralympic brand and was to be able to sell rights to that trademark in the open market in return for an agreed-upon compensation. Vie further alleges that it performed substantial work pursuant to the contract, that the USOC prevented Vie from selling the rights to the Paralympic mark in the open market and otherwise fully performing under the contract, and that the USOC failed to compensate Plaintiff Vie Sports as required under the contract. 5. In the alternative, Vie alleges that the USOC made promises to Vie, including but

not limited to promises that the latter would be the exclusive marketing agency for the U.S. Paralympics, that it would have access to the open market, and that it would be compensated for its work, that Vie performed substantial work in reliance on those promises, and that the USOC broke those promises to Vie. 6. As such, this case involves multiple claims and multiple parties.

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7.

On November 16, 2006, this Court dismissed the Athlete Plaintiffs'Athlete

Claims. (See Mem. Op. and Order Granting Defs.'Dispositive Mots. re Athlete Claims (" November 16 Order" The parties have stipulated that this decision and the grounds set forth ).) in the Court' opinion apply with equal force to Vie' claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation s s Act. 8. 9. Vie' claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel are still pending. s The Tenth Circuit requires this Court to make two express determinations under

Rule 54(b): that the November 16 Order is a final order; and that there is no just reason to delay review of the final order until it has conclusively ruled on all claims in the case. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth. v. Bruner, 259 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2001). 10. With respect to the Title III and Rehabilitation Act claims, the November 16 Order

was "an ultimate disposition of [these] individual claim[s] entered in the course of a multiple ` claims action.' See id. (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 " (1980)). 11. Rule 54(b). 12. The question whether there is no just reason for delay is within this Court' s The Court therefore determines that the judgment was final as that term is used in

discretion; the Supreme Court has stated that it is reluctant to fix or sanction narrow guidelines for district courts to follow. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 8, 10-11. 13. Vie' breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims are separable from the s

Athlete Claims. The legal issues are completely distinct -- turning on state contract and -3-

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promissory estoppel law rather than federal statutory anti-discrimination law -- and the factual issues have almost no overlap. 14. Thus, resolution of the breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims will not

raise, on appeal, any of the issues presented by the Athlete Claims. Thus, the "nature of the ` claims already determined [are] such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals.' Stockman' Water Co., LLC v. Vaca " s Partners, LP, 425 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 8). 15. This Court thus determines that there is no just cause for delay of the appeal of the

Athlete Claims. 16. Based on the above, this Court directs that judgment be entered on Claim I and

Claim II of the Amended Complaint against all Plaintiffs.

DATED:

January 10, 2007.

s/John L. Kane SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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