Free Reply to Response to Motion - District Court of Federal Claims - federal

Case 1:07-cv-00707-CFL

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

DAVID WHALEN, GREGORY TURNER, GREG MORGAN and ATC 1 through ATC 50,

) ) ) Plaintiff, ) vs. ) ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________________)

07-707C (Judge Lettow)

PLAINT F ' R P YT D F N A TSMO I NT D S S T EC MP A N IFS E L O E E D N ' T O O IMIS H O L I T IN PART AND MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT Plaintiffs are and were Air Traffic Control Specialist ("ATCS") employed at High Desert TRACON, Edwards Air Force Base, California. Plaintiffs claim that they were entitled to receive overtime compensation as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq., ("FLSA"), for overtime work they performed. They further claim that defendant improperly treated them as being exempt from the FLSA. T e o p i aee t th df dn hseu e t s A C 'tw r i ecso h cm ln lgsh t e nat a r i d h e T Sso ok n xes f atl a e e qr e 40 hours per week and has failed to compensate them for this work as required by the FLSA. (Complaint ¶¶ 7-9, 19-21) Plaintiffs further allege that they were employed by the Federal Aviation Administration at all times relevant and during the three years prior to the filing of the complaint in September, 2007 (the FLSA limitations period). (Complaint ¶ 6). D f dn T e n e Sa s"oe m n )b m t n " t a ush C ut e nat h U id te ( vr et ,y o o ( " r e t or e , t t g n " i Mo ) g e sol "i i t cm ln a tpr p i i D v Whl o t t oy f ulao o hu d m s h o p i " so a y ln f ai a n n h h r o dp ct n f d s s e at t a tf d e e e i i ao e"ed g u i t s or ci a t l abs fra d m s l pr ato u nt rpni si n h C ut in sh e l ai o si i i a "us nt R l h n t i " tg e g s d s s, u e

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1() ( t 1). Defendn fr e a u t t ln f hv "i a d C C1( b nt 2b. Mo ¶ " at ut r r eh p i is ae v le R F 0a y o s h g a a tf ot ) lt gh nm s f ln f A C1 hog A C5.( t 1). Lastly, defendants argue that ii t a e o p i is T t uh T 0 Mo¶ sn e a tf r " t p i i sol"rv e m rdf i s t etcm ln gh "o p i is vge h ln f hu poi a oe e n e te n o p i n t cm ln so au" e a tf d d it a m " ai e at citing as the legal basis, RCFC 12(e). (Mot ¶ 1). ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE 1. T e oen n'Moi Ma e P ru n t R l1() A T Pa tf h G vrmet s t n d " usa to ue 2b" s o l ni o i f

David Whalen Should Be Denied
T e oe m n m vso d m st cm ln a t pr p i i D v Whlen on h gvr et oe t "i i h o p i " so a y ln f ai a n s s e at t a tf d t oyhth peeto p i idp ct en nt ro p i i t s or " h r t t r ncm ln s ulav iao ecm ln n h C ut Abbey v. e a e s at i i h at i , United States, Fed. Cl. No. 07-22 .Mo ¶ 2. The government cites as the legal basis for its 7C" t d m s l pr ato u 1()ad os o i otdntifying the subsection(s) which it i i a "us ntR l 2b" n de s wt ui s s, u e h e moves. Mot ¶ 1T spottcn n osht . a n s n A b p i i,t . o upri ot t n t MrWhl ia " by ln f"h s ei a e a tf e government predominately relies upon documents provided outside of the pleadings. See Mot Appendix. If the government is making a RCFC 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the allegations stated in the Complaint are assumed to be true and jurisdiction is decided on the pleadings submitted. Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see generally 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (3d ed. 2004). It gvrm n s o o i ed t qet nh C ut sb cm trui ii ,v ec fh oe et m t n n nso uso t or uj t aej s co ei ne e n ' i t i e ' e s t rd t n d outside the pleadings may then be considered. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Y tok go h " u nt e fh at nn e r i n t eiec o ntf el i tt t e a ro t co idt m n gh x t e r oo on e r u e i e i e sn j i ii "Tex. Peanut Farmers v. United States, 409 F.3d 1370, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005)), the u s co ( rd t n government concedes that the Court has jurisdiction over these FLSA claims because it does not 2

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m k ay uhui ii ac i s so h o e p i i'w o rs ir sut .n at ae n sc j s co llm a t t t r ln fs h a i l l i a dI f , rd t n a e h a tf e m ay t e c t gvrm n s o o m ks o e r c t t w r " rd t n ad pert cnee h oe et m t n ae n r e neoh od j i ii " n apa o ocd e n ' i fe e u s co s that this Court does have jurisdiction over all claims as well as personal jurisdiction over all pr 'i l i MrWhl . e g n r y nl r htui ii ac i sh gvrm n a ysn u n . a nB i ete uc aw aj s co llm t oe et t cdg e n il e rd t n a e n is attempting to prove, such claims if any, must fail under RCFC 12(b)(1). Because the government makes no reference to a jurisdictional claim, and present matters outside of the pleading, the possibility remains the government may be mistakenly asking the Court to grant a partial summary judgment upon Mr. Whalen. Yet there exists no statement that sc it gvrm n sn n os n t gvrm n m ks o e r c t"2b() uhsh oe et i et n ad h oe et ae n r e neo 1() " e n ' t i e n fe 6. Rule 12(b) provides in relevant part: " , m tn I a o o asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the f i pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be t a d s n fru m r j g etn d psd fs rv e i R F 5. r t a oeo sm a u m n ad i oe o a poi d n C C 6 ee y d s d " See Rule 12(b), emphasis added. Thus, the natural reading of the rule is, the government must first plead a defense under Rule 12(b)(6) which it does not. There is no indication of it, nor does it state that Rule 56 is the alternative requested. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under RCFC 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Dismissal is only appropriate when the accepted pleading standard set forth in RCFC 8(a)(2) is not met: "ne c i freehs en te aeutyim y e upr d y oc a lm o r i a be s t dqa l t a b spot b a lf ad e, e showing any set of facts consistent with the allegation in the complaint." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. , 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

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Moevr"ne c i freehs en te, p i i r e e t bnf o i ai t n r e oc a lm o r i a be s t a ln f e i sh ee t fm g ao, o , a lf a d a tf c v e i ni so long sh hpt ss rcniet i t cm ln " at 1969 (citation and internal a t yo ee a os t wt h o p i .Id. e h e sn h e at quotation marks omitted). For the same logical reasons here why the RFCF 12(b)(1) request fails, that is, all other p i i'c i s rntot t , u t amission of viable claims to them, applies equally ln fs lm a o cn s dt sh d a tf a e ee h e tMrWhl a a p i isa s ir sut . o p i ¶ 16. What the government o . a n s l ln f 'r i l l i a dC m ln e l a tf e m a y t e at appears to be doing, is short circuit Rule 12(b) and leap to the result of a conversion to Rule 56 without first meeting the threshold requirement of making claim under Rule 12(b)(6). This is entirely inappropriate. For a conversion to properly commence, another threshold requirement is, the Court must fsacp t " ae otd t p ai .A t t t eause defendants have failed to do itceth m tr u i h l d g f rh , c r e ts s e e e n " e a b so, the Court is then to provide notice that the issue will be treated as one for summary judgment and then provide a reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by RCFC 56. RCFC 12(b) provides that when an RCFC 12(b)(6) motion is converted into an RCFC 56 m t nt pre "hlb g e a esnb opr n yo r etlm t i m d o o, e a i sa e i n r oal pot i t pe n a a r l ae i h ts l v a e ut s l ea prnnt sc a o o b R F 5.R F 1()se e i to uh m t n y C C 6 C C 2b;e Thoen v. United States, 765 F.2d te i " 1110, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Cases from this and other courts underscore the importance of the opportunity for the opposing party to counter a summary judgment motion."). Again, as the rules require, as due process demands, the government must give notice of its intent. Even then, were t gvrm n s o o cni r il h m sf oalt i t am s o t thra " h oe et m t n os e dn i t ota r eot h d i i h t e r a e n ' i de g v b ,e sn a e e nm eo i ushtr ntr etn h cs" os oj tyh dat r i t y eus u br fs e t a ope ni t s ae de ntu i t r i ee h r et s a e s i sf e sc lf e q . See Mot ¶ 2.

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Under Rule 56, the government as the moving party on its motion if that was its intent, it has the burden of establishing the absence of disputed genuine issues of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact is one that would change the outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). Again, the government cites nothing that would change the outcome of t li t nF rhs r sn,oe m n s tcm n solnt e os e d s e a h ig i . o t ee osgvr et aah et hu o b cni r a w l s e t ao e a n ' t s d de l t gvrm n seus"usato u 1()m sf l h oe et r etpr n tR l 2b" uta. e n ' q u e i 2. T e oen n'Moi Ma e P ru n t R l1() A To Plaintiffs h G vrmet s t n d " usa to ue 0a" s o

ATC 1 through ATC 50 Should Be Denied
U dr C C1( t tacuthu w i " e a ys ed o aoy i aa s neR F 0a h r lorsol e h t pr 'ne frnnm t gi t )ei d g h t y n t gnr peu p o t ta i 'dn ts e vib t t pb c n t l eho o h ee lr m t nh pre i ti b aaal o h ul ad h i l od f e a s i a ts e ie l e e i eki prejudice to the oppoi pre.Wolfchild, 62 Fed. Cl. at 552-53 (citing Advanced Textile, s g ai " n ts 214 F.3d at 1068). T e oe m n a usht p i isf r fe lt ns o r snb " eas, h G vr etr e t , ln f 'e o r aao inte oal bcue n g a " a tf a tii a e " h F S seicl fri e p yrf m r aan aa sp i i for filing lawsuits T e L A pc i l ob s m l e r e lt g gi t ln ffs f ay d o s o tii n at sei F S bnfs Mo¶ 4. However, this argument in opposite to the decisions held in ek g L A ee t" t n i. Mitchell v. Roma, 265 F.2d 633, 637 (3rd Cir. 1959) and Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, 60 F.R.D. 106 (N.D. Ohio 1973) where those courts upheld anonymity based upon the same assertions. In Mitchell v. Roma a67 h cute t t[ep et s t oy rh io aa sr aao t 3 t orhl h " si]h tu r poi t n gi te lt n e d a d t e at bi n tii [it] provides little comfort to an employee faced with the possibility of subtle pressures by an employer, which pressures may be so difficult to prove when seeking to enforce the prohibition").

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While the court in Gomez,dr s gh F S hl t tT e L A" qi sh ade i t L A e h " h F S r u e t sn e d a e r e initiation of a collateral proceeding by the aggrieved party or by the [Secretary of Labor], it is oe h h ol ov ulb et m ld f u frh C uto rpr ple T e fr n w i w u bi s e x e e ii l o t ort poe y o c. hr oe c d o y r y fc t e l i " e , t cut r t t F S p i is nnm t bcue t m t d rpsd y ln f h orga e h L A ln f aoy i eas " e e o pooe b p i is e nd e a tf y h h a tf affords them a higher degree of security than does the statutory provision without being subject tt vgr sht rm ss)Id at 107. o h aa e t po i " e i a e . I t s co, e ln fs ae n r us d ht ui t er s gs fh nh at nt p i i'hv ol e et t dr gh a y t e o t i i h a tf y q e a n e l a e poed g t e p ye r a aoy os n leu e b t cut n ll stus has rcei sh m l e' e i nnm u ut r i d yh or ut c ss t n e o s m n i qr e , i a a been granted or until the employees have completed their consent forms and facts pertaining to the reasonableness of any potential fear can be obtained. If then at time later, of course, such relief the government seeks might be appropriate. The retaliation remedies the government claims exists, does not cure the concern that a potential party may possess which effect would cause them not to exercise their rights to their FLSA claims in the first place. Stated plainly, the gvrm n s ru ets r oe et a m nipemature. n ' g Moreover, Does I thru XIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000) upon which the Government relies does not support their argument. In Advanced Textile at 1069, the court found that the district court had abused its authority where it did not allow the plaintiffs to proceed anonymously. The court stated, " h d tccutr d y ai tcni rv ec o t et e r aao T e ir tore e b f l go os eei ne fh a nd e lt n si r in d d r e tii by parties not before the court; concluding that risks of extraordinary economic injury are insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy plaintiffs' burden; failing to consider as a factor plaintiffs' vulnerability to retaliation; failing to identify specific prejudice to defendants; and failing to decide whether the public's interest was best served y eu i p i iso eelhii n ts Id at 1067-69. b r in ln f t r at rd ti . q r g a tf v e e ie " In this action, this Court should allow the plaintiffs to remain anonymous. This Court should do so because, 1) plaintiffs are and will continue to be vulnerable to retaliation based 6

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upon their employment with the government, 2) the government has failed to identify any specific prejudice it would suffer if those plaintiffs are allowed to remain anonymous and 3) the government has failed to demonstrate what public interest would be served if the plaintiffs are allowed to be anonymous.1 3. T e oen n'Moi P ru n t R l1( S o l B D ne h G vrmet s t n usa to ue 2e h ud e ei o ) d L syt gvrm n m vs pr ato C C1( "o a oe e n i s t et at , e oe et oe "us n tR F 2e fr m r df iv te n l h n u ) ite a m aei " e [ln f ] ae o i n f d h seific pay periods [that] he or she has not lg g t y p i ishv ntd ti t pc l n h a tf e ie e be fl cm est " h h eu dpi sh gvrm n o ko l g " ht r e ae en u y o pna d w i r l er e t oe et f nwe e w e ew hv l e c st v e n d h a tu o l it n df s t ay f ln f 'lm .Mo ¶ - 7. Yet by its own s t e fi ti s e neo n o p i isc i s at m ao e a tf a " t 6 statements, the government is fully aware that the complaint is narrow and only to Air Traffic Controllers, employed and formally employed at Edwards AFB. It is well settled public knowledge that such records the government complains of are in its exclusive custody and control. Complaint ¶ 6; Mot ¶ 6. As previously discussed, a complaint is to be evaluated upon pleading standard set forth in RCFC 8(a)(2). Here, the government makes precisely the same argument which was denied in this Court by Judge Flutey. See Fed. Air Marshals FAM 1 through FAM 1096 v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 484, 488 (2006). In that case, Judge Flutey said: "ln f hv aeuty l ddhic i fr vrm cm est n o t Pa tf ae dqa lp ae t rlm o oe i e o pnao frh i is e e e a t i e years during which defendant failed to comply with FLSA. Considering defendant

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T e oe m n a o rushttneso nww i plaintiffs are alleging that they were h gvr etl a e t i"ed t ko h h n s g a c nta poeoe i e o hthy a i et a p i isaeaosMo ¶ 6. This opi rpr vrm s t t cn n sgt ln f 'lgt n. t d t a e v i e a tf l i . argument is misplaced and unsupported. Plaintiffs have properly alleged that it is those Air Traffic Controllers who worked at High Desert TRACON from January 1996 until the filing of the complaint and who were not being properly paid. Because the government has the ability to investigate which Air Traffic Controllers are and were assigned to High Desert TRACON during those periods it has the ability to identify each and every possible plaintiff. See Advanced Textile at n11. 7

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has control over these records itself, it can easily access those documents during d cvr ad eeet lh h t e e osn uso. i oe n btrs b s t i pr d i qet n s y t ai em i i " T ei i t tt a nt udno enhtaewt oeahuad ln f 'ii h f d gh iw s o bresm i t cs, i vr t sn p i is ts nn a a h o a tf s certainly not grea r e wt a egr 3 o n ap i i' A cri l t gvrm n s t hr i m ae5 pt tl ln fs cod g , e oe et e e h e i a tf . nyh n ' motion for a more definitive statement must be denied. CONCLUSION F rh aoe n fr o g esn, e oe m ns o os pr ato u 1() o t bv ad oe i r ost gvr et m t n "us n t R l 2b, e gn a h n ' i u e " " C C1( " n " C C1( " hu b dn d R F 0a ad R F 2e sol e ei . ) ) d e Respectfully submitted,

________________________________ /s Jeffrey D. Moffit, Attorney for Plaintiffs Dated, February 15, 2008 Jeffrey D. Moffatt, Esq. 43625 N Sierra Hwy, Suite A Lancaster, CA 93534 661 9456121 Fax 661 9453019 [email protected]

I e b crf t tn era 1,08 cp o t fr o g ln fsepneo h hr y e i h o Fbur 520 a oy fh oe i Pa tf r os tt e ty a y e gn i i' s e D f dn s MO I NT D S S T EC MP A N I P R A DMO I NF RA e nat " TO O IMIS H O L I T N A T N e ' TO O MO ED FN T S A E N " a fe e c oi l . uderstand that notice of this filing R E I IE T T ME T w sid l t n ayI n l er cl wlb sn ta pre b oe t n fh C ut e c oifi ss m Pre m y ces i e eto l a i y pr i o t ors l t n in yt . a i a acs l l ts ao e ' e r c lg e ts t sin t og t C ut ss m s e r D Mof t h fi h uh h ors yt ./ fe . f t i lg r e ' e J fy a

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